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Please Note 
 
1. I have had to insert the grave accents for some of the Greek font manually on my 
dissertation, which are therefore missing on the electronic PDF version. 
 
So on page 73, in the Greek quotation (Ps.-Plut. Vit. X. Orat. 4), there should be a grave 
accent over the epsilon in ‘men’ and ‘de’. 
 
Likewise on page 110, in the Greek quotation from Aristotle (Arist. Rh. 2.21.1395a), 
there should be a grave accent over the epsilon of ‘de’ (x2). 
 
And on Page 118, in the Greek quotation from Aristotle (Arist. Rh. 2.21.1395a), there 
should be a grave accent over the epsilon of ‘men’ (x2), ‘de’ (x3), and the final syllable of 
‘¢prepej’. 
 
2. I have also included a copy of my dissertation in Microsoft Word, lest any of the 
Greek font was distorted in changing the format. 
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Abstract 
MA in Classical Studies at UCT 2011  
Hamish Williams 
 
In the ensuing dissertation I explore the extent to which a coherent praeceptor persona 
may be found in Horace’s Ars Poetica. 
 In the first chapter, ‘Interpreting the Ars Poetica’, I commence by reviewing and 
commenting upon previous critical attempts to explain Horace’s poem. This I have 
divided into three main sections: ‘Interpretations of Incoherence’, ‘Interpretations of 
Coherence’, and ‘Authorial Personae’. In the first of these I explore how some critics 
have denied the possibility of arriving at a coherent interpretation of the poem, which 
they regard as an unfinished hotchpotch effort. Most notably in this section I illustrate 
how the Ars Poetica fails to conform to the expected form of any one particular literary 
genre. In the second section, ‘Interpretations of Coherence’, I examine attempts, 
particularly Brink’s in his Prolegomena, to structure the poem into certain fixed aesthetic 
units, and I then explore some of the difficulties of utilizing such rigorous and 
tendentious rubrics i  a flexible and free-flowing poem. Lastly, in the third section, 
‘Authorial Personae’, I review more modern attempts to explain Horace’s poem through 
the identification of an authorial persona within the text. I proceed to justify my 
preference for this interpretative method by explaining it both with reference to modern 
literary theory and ancient poetic and dramatic practice. Lastly, in this chapter I briefly 
introduce the character of the authorial persona whom I shall endeavour to locate in the 
Ars Poetica – the teacher or praeceptor persona. 
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 In the second chapter, ‘The Praeceptor Persona in Play’, I commence by trying to 
build a characteristically Horatian concept of the teacher figure in the Ars Poetica, in my 
section, ‘The Horatian Concept of the Praeceptor’. To this end I turn to the Satires of 
Horace, particularly, 1.1, 1.4, and 1.10, where I show that the Horatian model of a 
praeceptor can be explained through three conceptual criteria – ‘instruction’, 
‘demonstration’, and ‘play’. Applying in turn each of these three conceptual criteria to 
the text of the Ars Poetica I illustrate how the very language of the authorial persona of 
the poem fulfils these criteria. 
 In the third chapter, ‘The Teacher of Satire 1.4’, having established the presence 
of a Praeceptor persona in the Ars Poetica, I turn my attention to the Satires of Horace 
where the most extensive critical work has been undertaken with respect to the character 
of the authorial persona; particularly, since it has informed my concept of the Horatian 
praeceptor, I examine the teacher figure of Satire 1.4. In the first section, ‘Interpretations 
of the Teacher Persona’, I examine and criticise four scholarly attempts to explain the 
character of the teacher figure in the sermo. I identify the mixture of instruction and 
humour in the language as the key critical concern of these critics. In the final section, 
‘The Playful Satirist’ I then apply my conceptual criterion of ‘play’ to the discourse of 
the teacher of 1.4, suggesting that his humour is not incompatible with instruction, but is 
actually a vital constituent of his role as a praeceptor. 
 Finally, I give a brief ‘Epilogue’, summarising my analysis and, more 
importantly, emphasising the importance of identifying a characteristically Horatian 
model of a praeceptor. A detailed bibliography is then given of the source material 
consulted and references used through the dissertation. 
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Preface 
 
I have used the Harvard method (author date) of citation and referencing throughout this 
dissertation. The full details of all works cited and consulted for this dissertation may be 
found in the bibliography at the end of this work. On occasion I have used footnotes 
within the text to further reinforce a particular point with additional scholarship or 
otherwise to explain certain conventions, abbreviations etc. which I employ in my 
narrative. All sources cited in the footnotes may also be found in the bibliography.   
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Chapter 1 – Interpreting the Ars Poetica 
 
 
Introduction to Interpretations 
 
The Ars Poetica1, known variously as Liber de Arte Poetica or as the Epistula ad 
Pisones, is a 476 line hexameter epistolary poem written by the Augustan poet Horace.  
Ostensibly addressed to the Pisones – pater et iuvenes patre digni (Hor. Ars P. 
24)2, the Ars3 appears, on the one hand, to be designed to give advice to its readers on 
how to manufacture a quality work of poetic art. We are supplied with suggestions of 
appropriate subject matter for a literary work: 
 
rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae, 
verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur. 
(Hor. Ars P. 310-311) 
 
We are instructed in detail as to the suitable form of artistic discourse: 
 
et nova  fictaque nuper habebunt verba fidem si 
Graeco fonte cadent, parce detorta. 
(Hor. Ars P. 52-53) 
                                               
1 All abbreviations of Classical literature and modern Classical journals taken from: Hornblower, S & 
Spawforth, A. Eds. 1996. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Journal 
Abbreviations not found in OCD have been taken from L’Année Philologique. 
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all Latin text of the Ars Poetica and Epistles II has been taken from: Rudd, N. 
1989. Horace: Epistles Book II and Epistle to the Pisones. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
3 Henceforth I shall often refer to the Ars Poetica as simply the ‘Ars’. 
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We are told how to provide our creations with a fit order and arrangement: 
 
ordinis haec virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor, 
ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici, 
pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat; 
(Hor. Ars P. 42-44) 
 
We are instructed in what the purpose of our work should be:  
 
omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci, 
lectorem delectando pariterque monendo.  
(Hor. Ars P. 343-344) 
 
And, moreover, we are even lectured in terms of how we should behave in our everyday 
life: 
 
qui didicit patriae quid debeat et quid amicis, 
quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes, 
quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium, quae 
partes in bellum missi ducis, ille profecto 
reddere personae scit convenientia cuique. 
(Hor. Ars P. 312-316) 
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On the other hand, the Ars seems to be crafted by Horace to be enjoyed as a work of art 
in itself. The poem is rich in visual imagery, such as the recurrent humorous picture of 
the mad ‘inspired’ poet: 
 
ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte 
credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas 
Democritus, bona pars non ungues ponere curat, 
non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat. 
(Hor. Ars P. 295-298) 
 
There are several wonderfully constructed pithy epigrammatic verses – purple patches, if 
you like – within the poem – parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus (Hor. Ars P. 139); 
and this is not to mention the ways in which the language itself often seems to reflect 
ironically the subject matter of a particular passage. 
It is essentially the dual nature of the Ars to be at once appreciated as a didactic or 
prescriptive guide to producing poetic art but also to be appreciated itself as a poetic 
work. In short, it is a poem about poetry. Many interpretations of the Ars have ignored its 
poetic function and examined it purely in terms of its didactic nature4, while, conversely, 
in recent times, the trend has often been to ignore the manifestly prescriptive nature of the 
work and to read far too much into what the poet is really ‘trying to say’ in the Ars5. This 
simple paradox in misinterpreting the Ars has encouraged me to try to locate some means 
                                               
4 For example: Tracy (1948), Brink (1963), Russell (1973a). For further discussion see below. 
5 For example: Oliensis (1998), Harrison (2007), Laird (2007). For further discussion see below. 
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by which one might find coherence in a reading of Horace’s poem. How might I arrive at 
an understanding of the Ars by which I could both appreciate its aesthetic function, but at 
the same time not ignore its obvious didactic purpose? Indeed, the Ars itself recommends 
an admixture of ‘utility and sweetness’6 in the formation of any poem. 
As the title of this dissertation indicates, I have attempted to locate this coherence 
by identifying a specific kind of authorial persona in the text. But before I reveal the 
identity of this persona7 and before I illustrate how this persona can be found within the 
very language of the poem8, it is necessary first to provide some criticism of previous 
scholarly interpretations of the Ars (to date) and to reveal how they have led me to my 
particular approach. 
 
As literary critics we should consider ‘interpretation’ to be the fundamental practice of 
our field. But what does it mean to ‘interpret’ poetry or, ultimately, any mode of 
discourse? What is the root purpose of interpretation? Tracing the original Latin term 
from which the English word, via French, was derived, we find ‘interpres’, which is a 
noun of agency: quite literally it is a person who is concerned with locating a ‘pretium’ – 
a ‘value’ or ‘worth’ – between, ‘inter’, things. In essence, it is a process of ‘translation’: 
just as an actual translator might hope to render a ‘value between’ two respective 
languages by means of a verbal or written translation, the literary critic hopes to render a 
value between the literary or poetic text as it lies before him and his own understanding. I 
do not wish to become too embroiled in the theory behind this process, but, simply put, 
                                               
6 Lines 333-334, 343-344. 
7 Unless otherwise indicated, I shall use the term ‘persona’ as shorthand for ‘authorial persona’, and not a 
secondary literary persona within the text. 
8 This will constitute the second chapter of this dissertation. 
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the desire to interpret a text lies in the assumption that a text is somehow insufficient to 
be appreciated by itself, that it requires some kind of external semantic property, 
‘meaning’, to be translated, to be interpreted from its raw textual state; to phrase it 
another way, interpretation denotes an essential dissatisfaction with the existing state of a 
work of literary art (Sontag 1972: 657). But here is not the place to discuss the efficacy of 
literary criticism in general – this is the occupation of literary theorists. 
 Now the interpretation which is bestowed upon the literature under inspection 
can, in my understanding and experience of criticism, generally adopt one of two forms. 
An interpretation might endeavour to locate coherence in the given text: it is the job of 
this critic to piece together the apparent web of intermingling ideas within a text into a 
‘coherent’ framework, an argument which ‘sticks together’, whose meaning can 
theoretically be comprehended completely; or, otherwise, the interpretation acts as a 
deliberate rejection of the possibility of arriving at meaning in the text: it is the job of this 
critic to illustrate how the text is essentially ‘incoherent’, that it cannot be pieced together 
into an organized framework of meaning. The former might loosely be termed the 
objective approach, since it views the text as an object which is able to be analysed, often 
through highly structured, almost geometric, methodology; the latter might be termed the 
subjective approach, which, rather than regarding the text as an object of analysis, tends 
to illustrate how numerous incompatibilities within the text deny the possibility of fixed 
meaning, as, for example, in post-structuralist criticisms (Genette 1988b: 69-71). 
 Naturally there are obvious pitfalls in either approach. Without becoming too 
embroiled in complex theory, let us briefly consider some common objections to these 
opposed methods of analysis. The objective, for example structuralist, method tends to 
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form what Gerald Genette, in ‘Structuralism and Literary Criticism’, calls “systems of 
latent relations” (Genette 1988b: 68): the analyses tend to construct relationships between 
parts of the original text which are not always explicitly identified in such a manner and 
can accordingly be prone to rather tendentious criticisms and indeed, in the worst cases, 
to invention (Genette 1988b: 68)9. Secondly, objective analyses appear to be intrinsically 
opposed to the notion of textual fragmentation – the possibility of a given work actually 
being irresolvable – with the result that further subordinate layers of structure are often 
added to conceal this essential anxiety (Genette 1988b: 68-9).  
The subjective approach, on the other hand, in its allegiance to hermeneutics, or 
the theory of interpretation, often appears to be ‘anti-critical’ in its desire to remain 
irresolvable; and yet, ironically enough, as J. H. Miller describes in his essay ‘The Critic 
as Host’10, such subjective readings are ineradicably linked to ‘logocentric readings’ – 
indeed, to employ Miller’s own appropriate analogy, these subjective readings really act 
as ‘parasites’ on the ‘body’ of objective criticisms, without which they could not possibly 
exist (Miller 1988: 282-283). A econd major criticism of the subjective approach, what 
E.D. Hirsch refers to as ‘critical relativity’ in ‘Faulty Perspectives’, is the manner in 
which this method paradoxically sets itself up as a universal: “That this doctrine of 
critical relativity should itself be the single doctrine exempt from an otherwise universal 
skepticism rarely strikes its adherents as a damaging inconsistency” (Hirsch 1988: 259). 
 Now scholarship in Classical Philology has often appeared reluctant to 
accommodate radical contemporary theories in literary studies, preferring rather to adopt 
an eclectic approach to the subject, utilising a fair range of philosophies and approaches 
                                               
9 This is a problem particularly relevant to studies of the Ars Poetica; see my section on ‘Interpretations of 
Coherence’ with regard to Brink’s divisions of the poem. 
10 With particular regard to deconstructionist analyses in the case of his study. 
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of analysis. I myself do not wish to head at this point any further into the nexus of literary 
theory, which itself can occupy an entire work; rather, utilising what I consider to be the 
more amenable labels of ‘interpretations of incoherence’ and ‘interpretations of 
coherence’, I shall endeavour to underline and comment on what has been said of the Ars 
Poetica over the past century and a half of critical scholarship. 
 
 
Interpretations of Incoherence 
 
Early commentators of the Ars from the late 19th century seem to base their 
interpretations of the poem on the notion that it was an incomplete work, that unlike 
Epistles I and the first two letters of the second book, to Augustus and Florus, Horace did 
not manage to finish the Ars Poetica to his accustomed degree of refinement. So what 
reasons do these commentators give for their judgement? Wilkins, in his detailed 
commentary of the Ars, provides the following popular verdict: “It has been commonly 
supposed to be the latest of the works of Horace; and the want of structural completeness, 
which it undoubtedly displays, if regarded as a poetical treatise ‘on the Art of Poetry’, has 
been considered as a proof that it was never finished, and probably was not published by 
the poet himself” (Wilkins 1886: 330). This early judgement of the Ars is thus concerned 
with an apparent lack of structure in the poem: the paradox between the subject matter, or 
content, of the poem and its form, or language, is here the chief object of criticism. There 
is an expectation that, if the poem were in fact complete, the language and verbal 
arrangement of Horace would reflect far more logically his choice of subject on poetics 
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or ars poetica: “It is sometimes difficult to trace the sequence of the remarks; and 
digressions and repetitions appear to abound” (Wilkins 1886: 334). 
 Wilkins in this way raises two important and related critical questions regarding 
the Ars Poetica for us to consider: firstly, is the Ars an unfinished work? Secondly, does 
the Ars possess any discernible structure? It seems to me that the first question cannot be 
handled purely, as Wilkins seems to suggest, in terms of the apparent structural 
deficiencies of the poem, which at the very most can create the impression of an 
unfinished work. Surely declaring that the Ars is an incomplete work would require both 
historical evidence and obvious physical evidence from the poem itself?  
Regarding the latter, does the poem conclude abruptly or awkwardly, in medias 
res (Hor. Ars P. 148)? Is there evidence that Horace would have elaborated further? Now 
unlike the twelfth book of Virgil’s Aeneid, in which the story ends abruptly immediately 
after the death of Turnus, the conclusion to the Ars seems quite fitting; indeed, several 
commentators11 have pointed out the symmetry in imagery between the opening and 
concluding lines of the Ars: at the start of the poem, the ‘literary work without art’ is 
given the shape of a monstrous creature, reminiscent of Scylla: 
 
humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam 
iungere si velit et varias inducere plumas 
                                               
11 Most notably Brink: “It might be argued too that the Ars has an open ending, the satiric story of the mad-
poet. But I think it more likely that the marked similarity with the initial caricature – poem and poet going 
wrong from an excess of ingenium uncontrolled – suggests a looking back to the beginning, humano capiti. 
Imperceptibly, towards the end, this kind of poem wheels back to something like the initial situation so that 
a circular movement seems to arise. This is familiar from archaic Greek writing; it has been called ‘ring-
composition’” (Brink 1971: 453). And Laird: “Yet that rapid conjunction of ideas and images involving 
sickness and hybridisation of the human with the bestial does recall the humoruous supposition at the  
beginning of the Ars Poetica… This subtly themed ring-composition makes it clear enough that the 
products of an undisciplined mind are as sick and grotesque as the poet who produces them” (Laird 2007: 
137). 
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undique collatis membris ut turpiter atrum 
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne, 
spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici? 
(Hor. Ars P. 1-5) 
 
While at the end ‘the poet without art’ is transformed first into a bear and then, finally 
into a leech12: 
 
certe furit, ac velut ursus, 
obiectos caveae valuit si frangere clatros, 
indoctum doctumque fugat recitator acerbus; 
quem vero arripuit, tenet occiditque legendo, 
non missura cutem nisi plena cruoris hirudo.  
(Hor. Ars P. 472-476) 
 
In other words, the monstrous imagery of the poet metamorphosed at the conclusion of 
the Ars recalls the poem metamorphosed at the start. Now given this ‘ring composition’13 
which encapsulates the entire poem, surely there is no need to assume that Horace had 
anything more to say? Indeed, even if this ring composition is to be interrogated, there is 
                                               
12 Clearly these verses, particularly noticeable in the phrase occiditque legendo, have a comic function, 
which I shall discuss further in my section on ‘Sportive Language’ in the second chapter of this 
dissertation. 
13 For further discussion on such elaborate poetic structures in the Ars, see my section on ‘Transitional 
Language’, in the second chapter of this dissertation. Alternately for a more detailed discussion Brink’s 
analysis in the chapter ‘Poetic Patterns in the Ars Poetica  and the Odes’ in Horace on Poetry: the Ars 
Poetica is required reading. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 13 
no obvious evidence of a lacuna or corrupted text at these concluding lines of the poem to 
suggest an incomplete work14. 
 And on account of what historical evidence can we firmly establish that the Ars 
was unfinished? Nowhere is such a fact recounted in the ancient sources. The poem itself 
is only twice cited before the second century A.D., on both occasions by Quintilian 
(Wickham 1891: 383)15. We then have to conjecture as to the possible dates of the Ars 
Poetica. Was it written right at the end of Horace’s life, such that he would have had very 
little time to ‘polish’ the verses and prepare it for publication? Such an interpretation 
would certainly suit Wilkins’ diagnosis of the Ars. There has been much scholarship 
pertaining to the date of the Ars. Let us briefly examine some popular hypotheses. W.K. 
Smith proposes a late date for the poem on account of the prestige in which Virgil is held 
alongside Varius, within the discussion of appropriate choice of diction (Smith 1936: 
164)16. Syme, in common with many other historians, tries to establish the date of the 
poem through the identification of the Pisones to whom the Ars is addressed, but he is left 
to conclude that no definite relationship can be ascertained between the true historical 
figures and the addressees (Syme 1980: 341). Some critics have naturally leapt upon the 
profession of the authorial persona17 ‘of playing the grindstone’18 as indicative of a late 
Horace, concerned with literary criticism after he had completed his more creative or 
                                               
14 For example, although he makes several alterations in the opening 200 lines of the poem, from line 407-
476 Rudd’s text is entirely in concordance with Brink’s, which should suggest to us at any rate, that this 
section of the manuscript is among the least troublesome. Moreover, Brink, apart from a debate about the 
sense of moverit and a preference for obiectos over obiectas, does not indicate any significant textual 
alterations needing to be addressed in the final seven verses of the poem (Brink 1971: 429-431). There is, 
in short, no indication by either critic that the Horatian text is broken or incomplete at the conclusion. 
15 See note 21. 
16 quid autem / Caecilio Plautoque dabit Romanus ademptum / Vergilio Varioque? (Hor. Ars P. 53-55). 
17 Out of necessity when discussing the criticisms of other scholars here and elsewhere I have been forced 
to utilize the term ‘authorial persona’ before adequately introducing it as an interpretative concept. For 
further discussion please see my section on ‘Authorial Personae’. 
18 Line 304. 
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lyric works (Rudd 1989: 21); while others have even tried to suggest that the style of the 
Ars is reminiscent of later Silver Age poetry, thus also conjecturing a late date (Dilke 
1958: 51-54). There has yet to be a definitive solution to this problem of the date of the 
Ars. Moreover, the matter is further and indeed quite unnecessarily complicated by the 
modern preoccupation of placing the Ars Poetica within Epistles II, immediately 
following the letters to Augustus and Florus: the combined length of the three poems, 
around 900 lines, might suggest that they form a single book; however, in the collected 
manuscripts of the Horatian works, the Ars only either comes in second position after the 
Odes or fourth after the Carmen Saeculare, far removed from the other epistles, which 
come last or in the penultimate place (Rudd 1989: 19)19. 
 Suggestions that the Ars is incomplete, to return to Wilkins’ original statement, 
are therefore exposed to be mere conjecture, seeing that there is neither obvious textual 
evidence of a broken unfinished narrative nor enough accurate historical information to 
be able to locate the poem late in the poet’s career. Those commentators who profess that 
the Ars is unfinished have done so purely to account for their inability to identify an 
adequate structure in Horace’s poem20. 
 
It seems to me that Wilkins’ difficulty with the structure of the poem perhaps lies 
ultimately in a conflict of generic expectations. In his declaration of the lack of structure 
within the Ars, he supplies the following protasis as the cause of his interpretation of 
incoherence: “if regarded as a poetical treatise ‘on the Art of Poetry” (Wilkins 1886: 
330). It is instructive for us to notice that Wilkins should employ a conditional clause 
                                               
19 For further discussion on the placement of the Ars, see Brink 1971: 12-21. 
20 I shall discuss in more detail later, in the section, ‘Interpretations of Coherence’, the various objective 
attempts by critics to locate specific structures in the work, and to what extent they are successful. 
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here. It in fact illustrates quite well the uncertainty of many critics regarding the genre of 
the Ars Poetica. Let us now examine some of the critical difficulties in designating a 
specific genre for Horace’s poem. 
As a starting point, without even sparing a glance at the text, the very name of the 
work, the ‘Ars Poetica’, should suggest to us a type of philosophical or didactic prose 
treatise. The problem, of course, is that we do not know whether this was the title which 
Horace himself gave to his poem; indeed, we do not even know whether Horace had in 
fact created a definitive title for publication (Rudd 1989: 19). Quintilian, as I have 
already mentioned, bestowed the titles of ‘Ars Poetica’ and ‘Liber de Arte Poetica’ upon 
the poem21. Wilkins acknowledges the artificiality of these titles and rightly supposes that 
they might consequently mislead us into a certain predefined approach towards the poem 
(Wilkins 1886: 333). To put it simply, if we read a poem entitled ‘On the Art of Poetry’, 
we will both consciously and unconsciously read it as a didactic treatise. Consider how 
different the historical reception of Horace’s poem would have been, had it been 
unanimously titled ‘Epistula ad Pisones’, as it is in some modern editions, such as 
Rudd’s22. 
I should add here that there is always a danger for the literary critic of 
amalgamating the reception of a literary work into our analysis of the work itself23. 
                                               
21 “Originally the work may have been called Epistula ad Pisones; certainly its status as an epistle is 
implied by the grammarian Charisius (fourth century A.D.) who cites the work by the phrase Horatius in 
Epistularum. But Quintilian (first century A.D.) referred to it as the ars poetica (Pref. to Trypho, 2) and as 
the liber de arte poetica (8.3.60), and the first of these titles has stuck” (Rudd 1989: 19). Indeed, the fact 
that Quintilian refers to it as a liber does imply that the Ars was regarded as a free-standing entity by that 
time, removed from all the other epistles.  
22 I should probably state at this point that I refer to the poem as the ‘Ars Poetica’ throughout this 
dissertation simply out of convenience and habit rather than any preference for its status as a purely 
didactic treatise. 
23 In other words, what has been generally termed in literary theory ‘The Affective Fallacy’, after the essay 
of the same name by Wimsatt and Beardsley; so, for example, the modern English student often tends to 
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Certainly, Horace’s works in general served an important didactic function both in the 
school curriculum – “Horace retained his standing as a school author throughout late 
antiquity, and it is not surprising to find him frequently evoked by the major Latin poets 
of the period, such as Claudian and Ausonius” (Tarrant 2007b: 281-282) – and in more 
theoretical or technical treatments of topics such as aesthetics, as illustrated by 
Quintilian’s reference. But such a didactic reception, as perhaps reflected in the 
posthumously-fabricated title ‘Ars Poetica’, need not denote that the work itself was 
crafted by Horace as a didactic treatise; we might, by the same anachronistic approach to 
literature, entitle Virgil’s Aeneid a ‘didactic’ treatise, simply on account of the fact that it 
played so important a role in the educational syllabus in Antiquity. In this dissertation I 
shall be far more concerned with confronting the world which takes place within the 
poetry of Horace, the intra-textual world, than such extra-textual questions as, for 
example, whether the ensuing generations of Romans did in actual fact regard and utilize 
the Ars Poetica as an instructional text (Volk 2002: 4). 
To return to the subject of genre, it is quite useful, as most critics have tended to 
do when considering how to classify the Ars Poetica, to commence our analysis by 
reflecting on what kind of epistle the work is – that is to say, how it stands in the Greco-
Roman tradition of letter writing24. To this end, commentators have by and large been 
concerned with two defining questions: firstly, how does the epistle appear to interact 
with its addressees? And, secondly, how do we resolve the epistolary form with the 
hexameter verse?  
                                                                                                                                            
‘read himself’ according to Shakespeare, Milton, et cetera, far removed from the original context (Wimsatt 
& Beardsley 1972: 351). 
24 For perhaps the most succinct coherent study of genre in the poem, see Frischer’s chapter ‘Genre of the 
Ars Poetica’ in Shifting Paradigms: New Approaches to Horace’s Ars Poetica (1991: 87-100). 
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Regarding the former, it has long been realised that Horace’s three longer epistles 
(to Augustus, Florus, and the Pisones) – often amalgamated, probably anachronistically25, 
into a single book called ‘Epistles II’ in many modern editions – present a wholly 
different tone to those of his first: the initial twenty shorter letters often maintain a 
familiar quite intimate tone with their addressees, while the attachment of the ‘Horace’26 
of ‘Epistles II’ to his recipients is far less noticeable (Ferri 2007: 130-1). Moreover, even 
when focusing solely on the three longer epistles, the importance in the relation of the Ars 
to its addressees seems remarkably tenuous or weak with regard to the overall 
composition of the work: to illustrate this point, we might, without any obvious alteration 
to the affect or function of the poem, remove the names of the ‘Pisones’ from the Ars and 
replace it with any other familiar Roman cognomen, while on the other hand clearly 
substituting the title of Augustus – Caesar (Hor. Epist. 2.1.4) from the first epistle of the 
second book would radically alter our appreciation of that work, seeing that he has been 
fully integrated into the text as an addressee with his own set of preoccupations, 
expectations, etc: “Thus we find that the addressees in these poems27 are so precise and, it 
appears, so controlling of the sort of material to be discussed that the ever-present 
generalized addressee of didactic poetry28 vanishes. Epistles 2.1 and 2.2, furthermore, 
rather than aiming to teach Augustus or Florus anything of significance, function 
primarily as apologies” (Toohey 1996: 149). Indeed, even if we were to have more 
                                               
25 See Note 19. 
26 In inverted commas so as to distinguish this figure from the historical personage known as Horace; again 
I have avoided using the term ‘authorial persona’ until I arrive at that section. 
27 To Augustus and Florus. 
28 Which I discuss as a potential genre for the Ars below, after I have introduced the problem of integrating 
the hexameter verse with the epistolary form. 
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information on just who the Pisones were, I think it is doubtful whether this would 
greatly enhance our critical readings of the Ars. 
Having said that, it must be admitted that there is little concord among critics 
about the relative importance of the Pisones to the poem, whether they are really just 
‘dummy figures’, to use Katharina Volk’s terminology, through which an imagined 
audience is communicated to, or whether their preoccupations do shape the poem (Volk 
2002: 38): some critics, such as Joan Plotnick, point to the obscure reference to Roman 
satyr plays (or the dramatic focus in general) at the centre of the Ars as being directed 
towards the interests of the addressees (Plotnick 1979: 329-335)29; while others, such as 
David Armstrong, have conjectured that the Pisones invoked in the poem were supporters 
and patrons of Philodemus and that the Ars constantly maintains a style and content 
reflective of the mores of this Epicurean philosopher (Armstrong 1993: 185-230)30. 
Nevertheless, I should think that the distance which the Ars maintains from its 
generalized addressees – as contrasted with the more ‘integrated’ addressees in Horace’s 
other epistles – might encourage us to locate the work within the tradition of Greek 
didactic epistles, such as those of the philosopher Epicurus, where the names of 
Herodotus or Menoeceus play a minimal, if any, role in the philosophical exposition of 
the Epicurean system. I am certainly in agreement with Russell as to the relative 
importance of the historical Pisones to the poem, when he declares succinctly: “It is very 
much a treatise with dear so-and-so at the beginning” (Russell 1973a: 113). 
                                               
29 For a different interpretation of the emphasis on drama in the Ars, see my section on ‘Illustrative 
Language’ in the second chapter. 
30 In a similar vein of thinking, W.S Anderson attempts to locate a Socratic ‘Horace’ – ‘Socratic style’ and 
‘Socratic content’ – in the first four sermones of Satires 1. 
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This characterization of the Ars Poetica as a technical didactic treatise where the 
epistolary form is a mere convention which only pays lip service to the true historical 
addressees, who are in effect dummy figures, conduits through whom an imagined 
audience is lectured, has indeed been a popular interpretative stance: “Much labour was 
spent in this century and the last tracing the alleged derivation of the Ars Poetica from the 
genre of the technical handbook” (Frischer 1991: 87). However, such a critical response 
does ignore our second fundamental difficulty in designating a genre: that is to say, how 
do we account for the hexameter verse? The type of technical treatise in epistolary form –
we might say in more modern terms, the genre of the ‘letter thesis’ or ‘letter essay’ – 
within which Epicurus, for example, wrote, was of course presented in standard prose 
form, not poetic metre31. 
Bernard Frischer, in his work Shifting Paradigms: New Approaches to Horace’s 
Ars Poetica, has argued quite persuasively that there are three ways in which we can 
resolve the epistolary form with the poetic: “Once we see that the Ars is most likely an 
independent work in the corpus, three possible ways of classifying it as something other 
than a handbook come to mind, of which the second two have rarely, if ever, been raised 
in this century: a verse letter, a didactic poem, or some tertium quid32” (Frischer 1991: 
89). Let us now briefly discuss the potential placement of the Ars Poetica within each of 
these genres, as Frischer outlines. 
                                               
31 For further refutation of the notion of the Ars as a technical treatise, see Frischer 1991: 88, note 3, in 
which he argues that the classification of the Ars under such a heading is largely an anachronistic result of 
the epistle theses of the sixteenth century. 
32 That is to say, the genre of the sermo, discussed further below. 
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The verse letter, of which Horace’s first book of epistles is a prime example33, is, 
according to Frischer, defined by a tone which is “informal in spirit and supplies or 
requests information of some sort from or to a friend” (Frischer 1991: 89); regarding the 
second criterion, he provides the following definitions by Ps.-Acro and Porphyrio: 
epistulis enim ad absentes loquimur, sermones cum praesentibus (Ps-Acro Commen. In 
Horatium Sat. 1.1.1), and in sermonum autem libris vult intellegi, quasi apud praesentem 
se loqui, epistolas vero quasi ad absentes missas (Porphyrio Commen. In Horatium: 
Sermonum Liber Primus 1.1). It is quite clear in reading the Ars Poetica, I believe, that 
there is no exchange of information, none of the reciprocal discourse which one finds in a 
verse letter, addressed to an absent friend; rather, the Pisones appear to be addressed in 
the poem as though they were present, ‘quasi apud praesentem’34. As I discussed above, 
they seem to be the typical generalized addressees of didactic discourse.  
There are, moreover, some other formal conventions of the typical verse letter 
which are conspicuously absent in the Ars: firstly, the addressees, the Pisones, are not 
referred to until the sixth line of the poem: “In all but one of Horace’s poems that are 
indisputably epistles, the addressee is named, or referred to by some form of tu or a verb 
in the second person singular, in the first sentence and usually the very first line. The Ars 
Poetica does not begin in this typically epistolary way” (Frischer 1991: 92); the Ars, 
however, commences in an uncommonly generalized fashion for a verse epistle, a most 
impersonal discussion on the nature of artistic representation (Frischer 1991: 92). 
                                               
33 Frischer tracks the development of the genre of the verse letter in Roman literature to Spurius Mummius 
in 146 BC (Frischer 1991: 90, note 8). 
34 My sections, in the second chapter of this dissertation, on ‘Language of Command’, in which the teacher 
of the Ars directly conveys commands to the Pisones, and ‘Empathetic Language’, in which the Pisones are 
integrated into the text, as though they were present at the time of argument, will offer adequate proof of 
the principle, ‘quasi apud praesentem’. 
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Secondly, the Ars must be distinguished from other Horatian verse epistles in having 
multiple addressees, ‘father and sons, worthy of their father’35 (Frischer 1991: 92). A 
third formal element, quite evident but easily overlooked, is the sheer size of the Ars 
Poetica: at 476 lines it is roughly nine and a half times36 longer than the average37 epistle 
from Horace’s first book, and just over 200 lines longer than the largest verse epistle, to 
Augustus (Toohey 1996: 149). Given how radically the Ars Poetica differs from the verse 
epistle in its formal structure and in the manner in which it treats its addressees, serious 
doubts must be cast upon critical interpretations which deem it necessary to place the 
poem within this genre. It must also be said, however, that Frischer’s first criterion, 
namely that verse epistles should be ‘informal in spirit’, is perhaps less useful, less facile 
to distinguish in a writer such as Horace who is almost always conversational in his 
discourse, never wholly formal or serious, even when he does engage in highly technical 
material as in the Ars (Toohey 1996: 149). Just how ‘Horace’ manages this playful 
conversational side of his language will constitute a major part of the argument of the 
second chapter of this dissertation and must now be left until that stage. 
As an addendum to this discussion of the genre of the ‘verse letter’, there has been 
a trend towards referring to the Ars Poetica as a ‘literary epistle’, alongside the letters to 
Augustus and Florus: “the recent tendency to consider Horace’s poem on poetics as a 
‘literary epistle’ points to the way in which it can be imagined in an original context: as a 
poem in the oeuvre of a major Augustan writer, who refined and built on a longstanding 
tradition of Aristotelian and later Hellenistic poetic theory” (Laird 2007: 132-133). This 
would appear to represent an attempt to find a mean, a middle ground between the 
                                               
35 pater et iuvenes patre digni (Hor. Ars P. 24) 
36 9.46 times, rounded off, by my calculations. 
37 Arithmetic mean. 
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conversational verse epistle, as in Epistles I, and the didactic prose epistle, as in the 
letters of Epicurus, for example, as I have already outlined.  
Laird’s reference, however, to this movement towards perceiving the Ars as a 
literary epistle as being somehow ‘recent’ in critical studies of the poem is, if not an 
untruth, then at any rate a slight anachronism, as we find Wickham (1891) introducing 
the three longer Horatian epistles under the collective heading ‘General Introduction to 
the Literary Epistles’ (Wickham 1891: 327). In his discussion of the concrete points of 
contiguity between the three longer epistles Wickham gives the following account: “the 
comparison of the temperament which the Greeks and Romans severally brought to 
literature; the indication of the constitutional Roman vice of avarice as tainting literary 
men and spoiling their work; the complaint of audiences as inevitably lowering the 
standard of those who wrote for them; the vindication… of the dignity and use of poetry; 
the disproportionate share given… to drama; the special attack on Plautus; the use of 
Choerilus as the type of poetaster” (Wickham 1891: 334-335). In short, Wickham’s 
decision here to class these three longer works as ‘literary epistles’ stems essentially from 
their perceived shared subject matter, or ‘res’, of ‘literature’, in a very general sense.  
 Now I do not wish to imply that choice of subject is irrelevant to the designation 
of genre – epic tends to deal with heroic mythological tales, elegy with love affairs, and 
so forth – however, as the sole rubric for the inclusion of the Ars within this genre it 
appears feeble to me. What of the formal differences, as Frischer espouses, in the ways in 
which the addressees are treated in the three epistles? The absent addressee as compared 
to the present addressee? And what of the frequent technical language employed in the 
Ars (Toohey 1996: 149)? And what of its length? Even when compared to the letters to 
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Augustus and Florus, approximately 500 lines is far more characteristic of Greek didactic 
poems: “It is striking that they38 all preserve the single-book format and that their length 
is generally in the 500-1000vv. range” (Toohey 1996: 3-4). Indeed, this approach towards 
classifying the three epistles together generically also seems to ignore the position of the 
Ars within the surviving manuscripts, where, as I have shown previously, it is treated as a 
single entity, a ‘liber in ipso’, rather than being clumped together with the other two 
longer epistles39. There is, lastly, a rather dangerous tendency in genre studies towards 
the creation of sub-genres and sub-sub-genres (etc) in the pursuit of making a work ‘fit’ 
into a category, however much it might resist. So much for the literary epistle.  
Progressing onto Frischer’s second possible generic solution in our quest to 
resolve the epistolary with the hexameter in the Ars Poetica, we have the didactic 
poem40: “It is strange that the case for categorizing the Ars as a didactic poem has not, to 
my knowledge, been made in a serious way during this century: Lucretius’ De Rerum 
Natura and Virgil’s Georgics certainly show how popular and prestigious was the genre 
in the mid- to late first century” (Frischer 1991: 90). Before tackling how the Ars might 
compare to such works, I think it is necessary first to question Frischer’s assumption here 
that the genre of the didactic poem was a well-known and ‘prestigious’ category of 
literature in the first century BC, purely on the basis of the fact that Virgil and Lucretius 
had attained a degree of success for their respective individual works. In fact it cannot be 
said that Romans from the period of the late Republic and early Empire even 
acknowledged the existence of such a distinct genre: “It is suggestive that we can find no 
                                               
38 The Greek didactic poems. 
39 See note 21. 
40 Also referred to by some critics as ‘didactic epic’ on account of the metre primarily. 
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word in any Latin author before Servius41 to refer specifically either to a didactic poem or 
to the didactic genre. In the introduction to his commentary on the Georgics, Servius uses 
the Greek word didascalice, which is also found in the fourth-century grammarian 
Diomedes… Didactic poetry was not generally listed by the critics as a separate genre. 
On stylistic grounds it was joined with epic and treated as a subset of hexameter verse” 
(Dalzell 1996: 19-20). 
Indeed, we can turn to the Ars Poetica itself for evidence of this fact, where, in 
the discussion of the genres, no mention, either explicitly or obliquely, is made of 
‘didactic poetry’ as a distinct category: 
  
res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella 
quo scribi possent numero, monstravit Homerus. 
versibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum, 
post etiam inclusa est voti sententia compos; 
quis tamen exiguos elegos emiserit auctor, 
grammatici certant et adhuc sub iudice lis est… 
(Hor. Ars P. 73-78) 
 
Even if we are to include didactic poetry in the broad genre of the epic in hexameter – as 
Dalzell suggests with reference to a passage in Quintilian, “who in his survey of Greek 
and Latin authors, listed the didactic42 poets alongside writers of epic and pastoral” 
(Dalzell 1996: 20) – it is instructive for our particular purpose in analysing the Ars 
                                               
41 4th century AD. 
42 This is a slightly misleading adjective: rather, writers whom we moderns call ‘didactic’. 
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Poetica to see that the subject matter which the Horatian text recommends for hexameter 
verse – ‘the deeds and gloomy conflicts of both kings and leaders’ – is quite incompatible 
with the often highly technical subject of what we customarily regard as didactic poetry. 
Certainly, to employ a rather rhetorical argument here, I should say that it is most 
peculiar for an author, who is allegedly writing in the genre of didactic poetry, to omit the 
slightest mention of this in an historical overview of the literary genres, which lasts for 
some ten verses in the poem. We therefore need to interrogate whether Horace 
historically regarded the didactic poem as a distinct coherent genre, and why, if he had in 
fact acknowledged it as a genre, he failed to give it the slightest mention in a part of his 
poem where its presence was demanded. 
Dalzell, however, in The Criticism of Didactic Poetry, argues against the need for 
a genre to be explicitly recognized by an author in order for that particular author to 
follow in a certain generic tradition of writers: “It does not follow that because theory 
was so slow to define the status of didactic poetry, poets did not recognize that they were 
working in a genre which had a tradition of its own. There were literary codes which 
marked the distinctness of the genre. The most obvious of these was to appeal to the 
authority of Hesiod, the prôtos heurêtês of the genre. Aratus is praised by Callimachus 
for following the theme and manner of Hesiod… Virgil describes the Georgics as 
‘Ascraean song’ (2.176)… it was a common practice among Latin poets to indicate their 
literary affiliations at the beginning of their work with a graceful nod to their 
predecessors… These references suggest an apostolic succession of didactic poets who 
are aware of their common generic links and who see themselves as carrying on a 
tradition which goes back to Hesiod” (Dalzell 1996: 21-22). 
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Now to allow literary critics the freedom to ignore entirely the validity of theory43 
and to define the genre of didactic poetry loosely in terms of certain ‘literary codes’ 
which may be found in a tradition of Greek and Roman writers stemming all the way 
back from Hesiod, as Dalzell suggests, is and has in fact proven to be a dangerous grant. 
Just what might these literary codes be? How specific or broad should the criteria be 
made into which didactic poetry falls? And, since there is no ancient theory for the 
definite placement of this genre, under whose critical authority do we ultimately rest? 
Thus we can view Katharina Volk, in her approach of compiling criteria through the 
‘empirical evidence’ of certain pre-selected poems (a sort of common-sense method), 
providing us with four restrictions for didactic poetry: namely, that it must have ‘explicit 
didactic intent’, a ‘teacher-student constellation’, ‘poetic self-consciousness’, and ‘poetic 
simultaneity’ (Volk 2002: 36-39). Under this rubric, the Ars Poetica fails to survive 
under the heading of didactic poetry: “Thus, Horace’s Ars Poetica, while clearly 
exhibiting didactic intent as well as the typical teacher-student constellation (the speaker 
v. the Pisones), does not show poetic self-consciousness (and therefore not poetic 
simultaneity either)” (Volk 2002: 42). While, on the other hand, Peter Toohey, who 
provides the somewhat more liberal classificatory criteria of ‘a strong, singular, and 
persuasive voice’, ‘striking, even sensational subject matter’, ‘marked variety in 
narrative, textual, generic, even discursive type’, ‘conceptual simplicity’, and ‘a tension 
between play and instruction’ duly allows for the Ars Poetica under this genre’ (Toohey 
1996:15).  
One gets the impression that these criteria, without any coherent theory backing 
them up, have been tendentiously construed by these critics in order to match their pre-
                                               
43 Or here its somewhat conspicuous absence. 
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determined selections. Ironically enough, both of these commentators, in order to 
incorporate Ovid’s elegiac Ars Amatoria into their classification of ‘didactic poetry’, 
have ignored the basic criterion of hexameter verse, if we are to assume that the ancients 
would have placed didactic poetry within the general class of epic (as Toohey argues). 
Certainly, it is apparent from the passage cited in the Ars Poetica that the ancient 
conception of genre rested more in the simple matter of metre than such abstract 
conceptual criteria as ‘poetic simultaneity’ or ‘a tension between play and instruction’; 
one must question therefore whether a Roman critic of the late Republic, or even a lay 
reader, would have been willing to list poems written in dactylic hexameter and elegiac 
couplets under the same generic class. The necessity, moreover, to incorporate such 
diverse works as those of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura, Virgil’s Georgics, Ovid’s Ars 
Amatoria and even Horace’s Ars Poetica (with respect to subject, tone of voice, scale of 
treatment, etc) into the category of didactic poetry has in turn encouraged literary 
theorists, such as Bernd Effe, to provide a detailed taxonomy of didactic poetry, that is to 
say, further sub-divisions, as cited in Dalzell (1996: 31-34). Sub-divisions of a sub-genre, 
which itself is not explicitly identified in any theoretical text during the historical period 
in question? To the aporetic reader the divisions appear endless, the solutions quite 
subjective. 
Indeed, a theoretical solution to these inherent difficulties in trying to manufacture 
an adequate system of classification for the ancient Graeco-Roman didactic poem far 
exceeds the interpretative scope of this particular dissertation, which itself will not be 
concerned with analysing the text of Ars Poetica by genre44. Now, although it is rather 
                                               
44 But, instead, by the language of the authorial persona, see the respective section below. For further 
studies on the genre of ancient didactic poetry: see Volk, K. 2002. The Poetics of Latin Didactic. Oxford: 
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difficult for us to consider the place of the Ars within such a malleable loose ‘genre’, let 
us briefly consider some manifest ways in which the Horatian poem in a most general 
sense might conform to, or depart from, other works of Latin literature which are 
commonly placed by modern critics in the tradition of ‘didactic poetry’, such as the De 
Rerum Natura of Lucretius, and the Georgics of Virgil. 
There are perhaps two principal attractions in labelling the Ars a didactic poem: 
the generalizing manner in which the addressees of the poem are treated, and the highly 
instructive flavour which the work attains on occasion. Firstly, just like “Lucretius’ 
Memmius, whose relevance to the De Rerum Natura is quite problematic” (Frischer 
1991: 96), the identity of the Pisones does not seem relevant to the composition of the 
Ars; rather, on the contrary, their identity fluctuates according to the didactic purpose of 
the poem: “they seem to be critics of poetry in vv.6 and 292; poets in v.24; one a critic 
(the father) and one a poet (366-369, 385-388); and it is even possible to see their number 
change from plural (16, 235, 291) to singular (102, 119, etc)” (Frischer 1991: 96). So 
whereas in a verse letter, as we have seen, the identity of the addressee will shape the 
content of the epistle, in a didactic poem the addressee takes shape in accordance with the 
nature of the instructions at a particular point in the poem; there is, in short, no ostensible 
desire on the part of the didactic poet to characterize the addressees in a coherent manner 
such that the reader may build up a specific image in his mind of who this addressee45 is 
(Frischer 1991: 96). Regarding my second observation, a detailed analysis of how the 
discourse of the Ars functions to give commands on ars poetica, to instruct – which is of 
                                                                                                                                            
Oxford University Press; Dalzell, A. 1996. The Criticism of Didactic Poetry. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. Toohey, P. 1996. Epic Lessons: An Introduction to Ancient Didactic Poetry. London: 
Routledge. Effe, Bernd. 1977. Dichtung und Lehre: Untersuchungen zur Typologie des antiken 
Lehrgedichts. Munich: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 
45 Plural in the case of the Ars. 
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course at the root of most modern critics’ conception of didactic poetry, inherent, for 
example, in Volk’s criterion of ‘explicit didactic intent’ and Toohey’s ‘a tension between 
play and instruction’ – will ensue in the second chapter of this dissertation (Toohey 1996: 
150). 
Toohey provides three further reasons why we might consider the Ars Poetica to 
fall into the tradition of the didactic poems (or didactic epics) (Toohey 1996: 150-151): 
firstly, the hexameter corresponds to those of Lucretius, Virgil, etc from Hesiod; 
secondly, the length of the epistle is reflective of other Greek didactic poems; and, lastly, 
“another important feature of the Ars Poetica which reflects the traditions of didactic epic 
is the presence of the illustrative panel… This… is particularly apropos for Horatian 
verse: it engenders the recommended combination of utilitarian elements… sweetened by 
the insertion of the ‘easier’ narrative insertions” (Toohey 1996: 151)46. Just some 
comment now on these points: it seems a rather specious critical methodology that 
Toohey may here utilize the advent of hexameter to endorse the Ars’ status as didactic 
epic, but elsewhere in his work incorporate Ovid’s Ars Amatoria under the same general 
heading. On the second point, I have already made the argument against the Ars Poetica 
being considered a verse letter on account of its length; however, although its length does 
resemble other Greek didactic poems – Toohey provides the example of Nemesianus’ 
Cynegetica (Toohey 1996: 150, 204) – if we consider, as Dalzell implies, that didactic 
poets tended to build upon the efforts of their immediate generic predecessors, then 
Horace’s Ars Poetica falls substantially short of Lucretius’ six books and Virgil’s four, 
against which he would be judged by contemporary Romans. In other words, if Horace’s 
Ars was a genuine attempt at a didactic poem, we might expect a far more detailed 
                                               
46 See lines 333-334, 343-344 of the Ars Poetica. 
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account of his subject, in order to place it in the tradition of those who had written before 
him. Toohey’s last suggestion, that didactic epics should demonstrate illustrative panels, 
will form an important part of my argument in the ensuing chapter of how the discourse 
functions in the poem and must be delayed until that point47. 
Moving onto specific arguments against the Ars being considered a didactic 
poem, over and above any problems which we might have with the genre itself, several 
important objections must be raised. Firstly, the Ars Poetica, unlike most other didactic 
poems does not commence with a divine invocation (Frischer 1991: 96); so the first book 
of Virgil’s Georgics proceeds in laudatory fashion: 
 
vos, o clarissima mundi 
lumina, labentem caelo quae ducitis annum; 
liber et alma Ceres, vestro si munere tellus 
chaoniam pingui glandem mutavit arista, 
poculaque inventis Acheloia miscuit uvis; 
et vos, agrestum praesentia numina, Fauni, 
ferte simul Faunique pedem Dryadesque puellae: 
munera vestra cano…” 
(Verg. G. 1.5-12) 
 
And so the poem continues with reference to Neptune, Pan, Minerva, Silvanus, and dique 
deaeque omnes (Verg. G. 1.21). Contrast the elevated language here – the invocation to 
not one but multiple gods, the superlative clarissima mundi (line 5), the anaphora of co-
                                               
47 See my section on ‘Illustrative Language’. 
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ordinating conjunctions to garner a sense of immense scale, the hyperbaton of the main 
clause verb, cano (line 12), right to the end of the sentence to leave the poet breathless – 
with the opening of the Ars Poetica: 
 
humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam 
iungere si velit et varias inducere plumas 
undique collatis membris ut turpiter atrum 
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne, 
spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici? 
(Hor. Ars P. 1-5) 
 
While the Virgilian texts soars in lofty descriptive language, the Ars is content to plunge 
at once into a meditation of its subject, here the unity of an artistic work, through a far 
more playful conversational type of discourse. Indeed, even Lucretius, whose subject, 
Epicurean philosophy, would rally strongly against any tangible divine intervention in his 
view of a materialistic world, deems it necessary to fall in line with the tradition of 
didactic poets by invoking the goddess Venus at the start of his first book. 
Secondly, with regard to Dalzell’s insistence that didactic poems should somehow 
reference themselves with regard to their generic predecessors, there seems to be no point 
in the Ars where the poem explicitly relates its own position in accordance with other 
didactic epics, such as those of Lucretius or Virgil (Dalzell 1996: 21-22). The reference 
to Virgil in line 55 of the Ars pertains to the introduction of neologisms into the Latin 
language and the biased preference which is often given to writers of the past, such as 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 32 
Cato and Ennius. It has nothing to do with Virgil’s Georgics or didactic epic in general. It 
is in fact not uncommon for other Horatian poems to account for their generic position by 
citing a predecessor in the field: so Satire 1.448 alludes to the tradition in which it might 
be placed by presenting the satirist Lucilius and the writers of Old Comedy, ‘on whom he 
relied entirely’:  
 
Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae 
atque alii quorum comoedia prisca virorum est, 
si quis erat dignus describi quod malus ac fur, 
quod moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui 
famosus, multa cum libertate notabant. 
hinc omnis pendet Lucilius… 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.1-6) 
 
In short, if the Ars Poetica were designed by Horace to stand in the tradition of didactic 
poetry, we would expect some manifest suggestion of his place in the genre. 
At the conclusion to this discussion on didactic poetry, I think it is apt to quote an 
observation by Brink as to the nature of the Ars Poetica: “Its addiction to technicality is 
greater than that of any other literary satires or epistles. On the other hand the 
conversational and apparently inconsequential manner equals if it does not surpass that of 
the other works on poetry” (Brink 1963: 3). How does one resolve the technical didactic 
element in the Ars with the playful conversational tone? Does placing it within the genre 
of didactic poetry solve this difficulty? Certainly, the Ars, as we have seen, departs from 
                                               
48 Which I shall analyse in more detail in the third chapter of this dissertation. 
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the formal structure of other prestigious Latin works which we regard as didactic poems 
nor does it appear willing to place itself in such a distinct generic category, as witnessed 
in the discussion of literary genres in the poem itself. Moreover, the Ars does not give the 
type of systematic presentation of material which we get over the four books of Virgil’s 
Georgics or the six of Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura; the argument of the Ars is far more 
free-flowing and conversational – ‘it does not follow’, to get to the etymological root of 
Brinks descriptive adjective ‘inconsequential’, the typically logical structure which we 
might expect in a more technical account. If we find ourselves, like Peter Toohey, 
radically re-adjusting our criteria of what we consider to be ‘didactic poetry’, with all too 
liberal, quite subjective, categories such as ‘striking, even sensational subject matter’, 
‘marked variety in narrative, textual, generic, even discursive type’ or ‘a tension between 
play and instruction’, in order to fit a seemingly irresolvable work into a specific 
classification, we might find that the genre itself becomes so conceptually inclusive of a 
wide range of works so as to be critically useless. 
Finally, moving onto Fri cher’s third possible solution to the genre of the Ars 
Poetica we have his tertium quid, the sermo (Frischer 1991: 96-97). For Frischer the 
sermo is not so much a distinct literary category which can be identified in a tradition of 
writers preceding Horace but rather a characteristically Horatian creation, a Kreuzung der 
Gattungen, a deliberate mixing of conventions from different traditions: “Lest the 
suggestion that the Ars Poetica be classified as exemplifying the mixed genre of sermo–
an Aufhebung of the simple forms of technical handbook, didactic poem, and letter–seem 
strange or unlikely, it may be well to point out that such portmanteau arrangements of 
genres within genres have been encountered in other periods and literatures (Frischer 
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1991: 99); apart from such an historical precedent, Frischer provides further justification 
for this labelling of the Ars as a sermo by referencing a passage in the first book of 
epistles wherein “Horace claims that his achievement was due to his originality49 in 
mixing generic characteristics” (Frischer 1991: 99)50: 
 
libera per vacuum posui vestigia princeps, 
non aliena meo pressi pede. qui sibi fidet 
dux reget examen. Parios ego primus iambos 
ostendi Latio, numeros animosque secutus 
Archilochi, non res et agentia verba Lycamben. 
ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus ornes 
quod timui mutare modos et carminis artem, 
temperat Archilochi Musam pede mascula Sappho, 
temperat Alcaeus, sed rebus et ordine dispar, 
nec socerum quaerit quem versibus oblinat atris, 
nec sponsae laqueum famoso carmine nectit  
(Hor. Epist. 1.19.21-31) 
 
Frischer’s ultimate interpretation of the Ars Poetica, as lying within the ‘new genre’ of 
the sermo leads us onto the primary theoretical point of debate in all genre studies, that is 
the polarity which exists between the traditional and the original in a given work. If we 
are studying a work entirely by genre, relating an artist’s production to those who have 
                                               
49 My Italics. 
50 Unless otherwise indicated, all Latin text of the Epistles I has been taken from: Wickham, E.C. 1891. The 
Works of Horace, Volume II. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 
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preceded him, we risk neglecting the extent to which the work is an original creation, its 
“essential uniqueness” (Dalzell 1996: 3) – a concern which has led post-modern 
criticisms, committed to the irresolvable nature of the text, largely to reject the efficacy of 
literary genres (Dalzell 1996: 4); on the other hand, from a practical point of view, 
genres, in giving points of contiguity – literary codes – between individual works, do 
“provide the critic with a strategy for dealing with texts” (Dalzell 1996: 6). However, as I 
have mentioned previously with regard to didactic poetry, when the criteria or codes of a 
generic category become too inclusive, they risk losing their utility for the critic. 
Frischer’s allowance for the Horatian sermo to include, in different proportions, elements 
of three root genres (technical handbook, didactic poem, and verse epistle), means that 
we have poems as diverse as the Priapean Satire (Satire 1.8) and the Ars Poetica under 
the same generic title of sermo in his system of categorization (Frischer 1991: 98). Of 
what critical utility is a classification which incorporates such manifestly different 
poems? What is the basis of similarity? 
Furthermore, if ‘Horace’51 is understood to be constantly emphasising the 
essential primacy, the novelty of his work – princeps (line 21), primus (line 23) as in 
Epistle 1.19 – and since, with particular regard to the Ars Poetica, he is not overtly 
concerned with placing his own work inside a specific tradition of writers, we must then 
question the validity of analysis by genre. Indeed, Dalzell points out that in modern 
literary studies analysis by genre has become especially troublesome on account of 
writers who are committed “to shatter the very idea of genre” (Dalzell 1996: 4), far 
removed from the ‘obliging’ authors of antiquity; and yet this ‘shattering of genre’ is just 
what ‘Horace’ confesses to in Epistle 1.19.  
                                               
51 Again the inverted commas distinguish between the authorial persona and the historical personage. 
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In short, when we judge whether the Ars Poetica displays coherence in some way, 
we should firstly, before applying the standards of other literature, attempt to analyse it 
‘in ipso’ – as far as is realistically possible. Once we have acknowledged the form of the 
Ars by itself, we may accordingly draw comparisons with other works. 
  
Thus far I have discussed some interpretations which identify the Ars as an incoherent 
work: whether through the argument that it was an unfinished poem, and hence by default 
an inferior work of art, not fit to be analysed, or whether through its mixed allegiance to 
various generic traditions in Greek and Roman literature. In the following section I shall 
examine some constructive attempts at locating coherence within the Ars, judging the 
merits and shortcomings of each in turn. 
 
 
Interpretations of Coherence 
 
While in the last section I utilized the late 19th century commentary of Wilkins as a basis 
to illustrate various critical difficulties which ensued over the following century in 
interpreting the Ars, for this section, regarding attempts to locate coherence in the poem, I 
shall primarily examine C.O. Brinks’ Horace on Poetry: Prolegomena to the Literary 
Epistles and, to a lesser extent, Horace on Poetry: The Ars Poetica, since they serve as 
excellent exempla of the structuralist method of analysing a text, and since, on account of 
their scale, whether rightly or not, they have been viewed as essential to all modern 
studies of the Ars. Also, where appropriate, I shall draw attention to alternate structural 
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schemes recommended by other critics. After this I shall inspect briefly the 
interpretations of the Horatian biographers from the early part of the twentieth century, 
which will in turn lead aptly onto modern persona-based treatments of the Ars. 
 Critically, in his Prolegomena, Brink emphasises the essential dichotomy in the 
Ars between its didactic and poetic function: “It too offers the teachings of Greek 
technologia. Its addiction to technicality is greater than that of any of the other literary 
satires and epistles. On the other hand the conversational and apparently inconsequential 
manner equals if it does not surpass that of the other works on poetry… Horace employs 
conversation as material for poetic patterns which are flexible and complex” (Brink 1963: 
3). Brink is certainly on the right track by identifying the didactic and poetic elements as 
critical to an appreciation of Horace’s Ars Poetica; where he errs, however, is at once – in 
his very introduction – approaching these two functions of the poem as separate rubrics 
for judging the work. As I emphasised by using italics at the top of this paragraph, the 
language of Brink’s criticism here establishes the fundamental notion of a ‘dichotomy’ in 
his reading of the poem. The poem needs to be ‘cut apart into two’ to be appreciated. 
Accordingly, his interpretation throughout his Prolegomena is really divided strictly into 
the sections which deal with the Ars as a technical treatise and the very final chapter 
which focuses on the poetic structure of Horace’s work (Horace on Poetry: The Ars 
Poetica does give more attention to the latter). The primary difficulty in understanding 
Brink’s analysis of the poem lies, I believe, in the disunity between the divisions he 
creates – we are nowhere told just how the poetic patterns identified in the Ars might 
truly interplay with the more rigorous divisions attributed to it when it is discussed as a 
treatise. This is why, in the introduction to my dissertation, I have advocated finding an 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 38 
approach which locates an ‘admixture of utility and sweetness in the poem’, and does not 
simply pay lip-service to the complexity of the poem. 
 With this basic difficulty in mind, let us examine Brink’s interpretation of the 
structure of the Ars as a technical treatise. Working backwards through the poem, Brink 
first identifies the section running from lines 306-476 as concerned with the poet, or 
‘poiht»j’: “the beginning of a new section is indicated at 306, and that is the final 
portion of the poem, dealing with the very general precepts that are to help the poet52 to 
fulfil his function” (Brink 1963: 5). So this classification then is encouraged by the 
following lines: 
 
munus et officium nil scribens ipse docebo, 
unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam, 
(Hor. Ars P. 306-307) 
 
Clearly the references here to the duty of the writer, munus et officium (line 306), and to 
what shapes the poet, formetque poetam (line 307), are viewed by Brink as signalling a 
new structural sectio  running to the conclusion of the poem where the image of the 
metamorphosed poeta is manufactured.  
The second or middle part of the Ars is concerned with subject matter, or 
‘po…hsij’, and runs from lines 119-294 (Brink 1963: 8). It should be noted here that 
Brink does acknowledge the difficulties of identifying exact structural divides, and so 
locates transitional narratives between main sections, such as that between 294-306. 
Anyway, the central section commences with the following line: aut famam sequere aut 
                                               
52 My italics. 
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sibi convenientia finge (Hor. Ars P. 119) – where the phrase famam sequere is said to 
indicate the choice of subject in writing, rather than language; and this division then 
concludes with the words:  
 
vos, o 
Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non 
multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque 
praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem. 
(Hor. Ars P. 291-294) 
 
The reference to carmen (line 292) is perhaps thought by Brink to conclude this section 
pertaining to ‘content’, although this is highly questionable, as I shall discuss shortly. 
Finally, Brink labels the initial part of the Ars, from the opening lines of the poem 
to line 118, ‘po…hma’, as dealing with form (Brink 1963: 10). So, Horace’s introduction 
of the dysmorphic Scylla-like poem, as we have already seen, is thought to be concerned 
with the proper arrangement of poetry, while the conclusion of this section is concerned 
with how dramatic characters talk, loquatur (line 114), in other words, form or language 
as opposed to subject matter: 
 
intererit multum divusne loquatur an heros, 
maturusne senex an adhuc florente iuventa 
fervidus, et matrona potens an sedula nutrix, 
mercatorne vagus cultorne virentis agelli, 
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Colchus an Assyrius, Thebis nutritus an Argis. 
(Hor. Ars P. 114-118) 
 
Thus we have seen that Brink identifies a tripartite structure in Horace’s Ars Poetica, 
which deals in order with the aesthetic categories of ‘po…hma’, ‘po…hsij’, and ‘poiht»j’. 
Before I discuss some problems in Brink’s analysis, it is necessary to review briefly some 
alternate structural arguments of other critics, seeing that these will be subject to the same 
shortcomings as Brink in terms of their methodology. Before Brink’s popularising of the 
tripartite structuring in studies of the Ars, many commentators located a bipartite 
arrangement, although there was disagreement as to where in the poem and by what 
distinction they located this divide. Hermann suggests dividing the narrative of the poem 
into parts, not themselves in linear order, according to the number, singular or plural, of 
the addressed: “Il me semble que l’Art Poétique se divise en deux parties. La première à 
la seconde personne pluriel, s’adresse aux Pisons père et fils. La seconde, à la seconde 
personne singulier, s’adresse au eul fils aîné” (Herrmann 1964: 507). The first category 
deals generally with poetry and its history, the latter with advice for the poet in writing 
(Herrmann 1964: 507). This notion of a bipartite arrangement can be traced back to 
earlier 19th commentators who divided, in the case of Birt, the Ars into a section on the 
‘proper theory on the art of poetry’, from the start of the poem to line 295, and into a 
section on the poet, from line 296 to the end – or more simply put: ‘ars’ and ‘artifex’ 
(Brink 1963: 20). Other potential bipartite divisions have also been suggested along the 
lines of traditional and original, or Greek and Roman, or even Classicism and 
Romanticism, to employ these terms anachronistically (Tracy 1948: 113). This method of 
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structuring the Ars has become quite pervasive so that even in more modern scholarship, 
it is not uncommon for a critic to analyse the poem by dividing it into several – between 
fifteen and twenty – thematic compartments (Laird 2007: 136).  
 Now what are the various problems associated with this structural method of 
locating coherence in the Ars Poetica? Firstly, the notional structural units are able to be 
attacked simply by reading the original text of Horace against these superimposed 
categories of judgment. So, employing Brink’s scheme of the Ars as an example, the 
implication is that form or language is discussed principally in the first division, content 
in the second, and the role of the poet in the third. But does this really hold up to close 
textual scrutiny? As has been seen, the conclusion of the second ‘subject matter’ section 
is as follows: 
 
vos, o 
Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non 
multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque 
praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem. 
(Hor. Ars P. 291-294) 
 
Supposedly, if this were the end of a defined section in the treatise, we should expect a 
concluding remark on the nature of ‘subject matter’. What we get instead is, firstly, a 
pragmatic instruction to the Pisones to take great care and labour over their work, to 
spend many days, multa dies (line 293), in finishing it – in other words, this seems to 
belong in part to the ensuing section on ‘poiht»j’, which is concerned with the practical 
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task of the writer. Secondly, and more importantly, when the Pisones are instructed ‘to 
find fault with the poem, carmen reprehendite (line 292), which has not been chastened53 
ten times over to meet the test of the well-trimmed nail’ (Rudd 1989: 199), the carmen 
(line 292) refers not to ‘subject matter’ (as Brink’s rubric would demand) but more to the 
form or language of the writer, indicated by the metaphor from carpentry inherent in 
praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem (line 294) where the “carpenter uses his 
nail to test the joints; so the nail54 must not be chipped or cracked55” (Rudd 1989: 199). 
The appropriate selection of subject matter is hardly as suitable to this imagery as the 
physical form of the writing itself, which, like the joints in the carpenter’s wood, we can 
picture the poet with his keen sense of verbal detection, his ‘nails cut to the quick for 
sensitivity’, checking for smoothness – checking the joints between his actual words 
(Wickham 1891: 417)56. Grube, in his review of Brink’s Prolegomena, criticises this 
structural division thus: “no allowance for gliding transitions or patterned deliberate 
repetitions can justify extending the content section to 294” (Grube 1965a: 78); so, 
employing similar types of analysis over the text, we may easily locate examples of 
narrative concerned with subject matter in the opening 118 ‘po…hma’ lines57 or both 
subject matter and form in the final ‘poiht»j’ lines58. 
                                               
53 Literally translated: ‘which much time and erasure have not chastened…’ 
54 unguem. 
55 But rather it must be praesectum. 
56 The metaphor is continued in part in the proceeding narrative in which the mad inspired poets, who rely 
solely on ingenium, or natural ability, rather than artistic care and skill, ars, do not bother to trim their nails: 
bona pars non ungues ponere curat (Hor. Ars P. 297). Again, the indictment here would not seem to 
pertain to the subject choice of these individuals. 
57 For example, the discussion of the appropriate subject in genre: res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia 
bella / quo scribi possent numero monstravit Homerus. / versibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum, / 
post etiam inclusa est voti sententia compos: / quis tamen exiguous elegos emiserit auctor, / grammatici 
certant et adhuc sub iudice lis est… (Hor. Ars P. 73-78). res gestae refers not, I think, to language. 
58 So, for example, perhaps the most famous two lines on the relationship between subject matter, rem, and 
language, verba, in the Ars fall into this third division: rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae, / 
verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur (Hor. Ars P.  310-311). 
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 Another related problem with these structural divisions is the way in which they 
tend to ignore categories in the Ars which seem to be outlined far more clearly by 
Horace. The obvious example which should immediately come to mind is the dramatic 
focus of the poem, ranging from around lines 89-288 (Grube 1965a: 81). Commentators, 
even especially competent ones such as Donald Russell, tend to ignore the clear dramatic 
emphasis which runs through the Ars for so long a period, imposing their own general 
categories of aesthetic judgement over this continuous theme (Laird 2007: 136). There 
have been several arguments for the strong presence of drama in the Ars: Brink views the 
genre as an excellent means of presenting his second division pertaining to ‘subject 
matter’ (Brink 1963: 8); while Laird, along with others such as Joan Plotnick59, sees it as 
indicative of the interests of the addressees (Laird 2007: 133). In the second chapter of 
this dissertation I shall try to account for the focus on drama in my discussion on 
‘Illustrative Language’. 
 Returning to the problems associated with the structural divisions, a third 
difficulty lies in the basis on which these categories are selected by critics – and for this it 
is necessary to return to Brink. In trying to explain the structure of the Ars, Brink bases 
his whole argument ultimately on a statement by Porphyrio regarding Horace’s poem: in 
quem librum congessit praecepta Neoptolemi toà Parianoà de arte poetica, non quidem 
omnia sed eminentissima (Porphyrio Commen. In Horatium: Carmen de Arte Poetica 1). 
Brink then sets out to illustrate how the Ars Poetica of Horace was influenced by the 
writings of this Neoptolemos, especially with regard to the structural divisions of the 
work. The difficulty, however, is that very little in fact remains of the writings of 
                                               
59 See my discussion of genre in the previous section, ‘Interpretations of Incoherence’. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 44 
Neoptolemos, apart from several dubious references from Philodemos60, who might have 
taken these quotations out of the original context (Williams 1964: 188); indeed, even 
Brink concedes: “In dealing with any critic whose opinions are preserved and assessed by 
Philodemus we have to reckon both with his debating points and his Epicurean yardstick. 
With regard to the latter we are handicapped by insufficient knowledge of his aesthetics; 
but we must at any rate allow for the possibility that his critique is inspired by the 
doctrines of his school. In applying his strictures he rarely takes account of the setting 
and context in which he finds opinions that he considers obnoxious. He either seeks out 
contradictions in the opponent’s arguments or he applies the yardstick of his own theory 
or he does both” (Brink 1963: 54-55). 
  And so, even if we are to accept the accuracy of Brink’s recreation of the aesthetic 
judgments of this Neoptolemos, which goes far beyond the analytical scope of this 
dissertation, there is very little evidence, either from external sources other than the 
Porphyrio quotation or from any explicit reference in the Ars Poetica itself, to strongly 
support the insistence that Horace drew directly on Neoptolemus61 as a basis for a theory 
of aesthetics: “the conjectures62 are often attractive, and the ultimate source of many of 
these ideas63 is of course Aristotle, but the ideas were common currency in the first 
century B.C. That they occur in Horace is no evidence for Neoptolemus. So the passage 
on the role of poetry in human history (391-407) is but a working of the locus communis 
on the power of Logos as old as Gorgias and as young as Cicero. Why assume it ex 
                                               
60 See Brink, C.O. 1963. Prolegomena to the Literary Epistles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
page 55, in which the fragments from Philodemus are given, and page 47 for other references to 
Neoptolemus in ancient sources. 
61 And therefore Aristotle in Brink’s organization of the tradition. 
62 Of Brink. 
63 Which we find in the Ars. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 45 
hypothesi in Neoptolemus, even though he did say that poetry should instruct as well as 
entertain?” (Grube 1965a: 79-80). 
In short, Brink’s method64 is strewn with suppositions: firstly, in assuming that 
Porphyrio had detailed knowledge of the aesthetic theories of Neoptolemus and wasn’t 
simply making a most general remark, which would be of little critical value; secondly, in 
trusting the contextual accuracy of the fragments of Neoptolemos which survive in the 
writings of Philodemos; and, thirdly, in assuming that Horace drew directly from 
Neoptolemus as a source. But perhaps of greatest concern should be the manner in which 
the artistry of Horace himself should be diminished by an attempt to identify his entire 
work – or at least that part of it which endeavours to give instructions on a particular 
subject of ‘ars poetica’ – as solely a product of traditions. 
 In conclusion, criticisms which employ the technique of objective structuring of 
the Ars – whether bipartite, tripartite, or whatever else – are fallible on several counts: 
firstly, their structural divisions are open to contradiction through a close analysis of the 
text; secondly, their superimposed structures are refuted by more obvious structural 
divisions made explicit in the poem itself; and, lastly, the specific categories of the 
structures more often than not indicate a tendentious inclination on the part of the critic to 
place the work within a certain tradition, which can in effect undermine any creative 
originality on the part of the poet, neglecting the more playful conversational side of the 
Ars Poetica. 
 
                                               
64 As a footnote to this discussion of structure, it is well worth emphasising again that Brink has written 
much useful material on the poetic patterns of the Ars, focusing on how techniques such as abruptness, ring 
composition, and gliding transitions pervade the text (Brink 1971: 453). However, as has been said 
previously, it is not adequately explained by this critic just how these ‘conversational’ poetic patterns and 
devices function in relation to the obvious didactic purpose of the work. 
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Another prominent means of analysing the Ars Poetica is the biographic method, 
favoured by earlier twentieth century scholars such as Sedgwick in Horace and D’Alton 
in Horace and His Age. These writers endeavoured, in part, to explain the poetry of 
Horace by contextualising it. So D’Alton introduces the Ars with reference to a period in 
the life of the poet: “In later life, when his own fame was secure, he felt he had a message 
to impart, especially to his younger contemporaries who wished to accomplish something 
in the realms of poetry. He was then less exposed than formerly to the tooth of envy, and 
on the strength of the position he had won he could speak with an air of authority. He had 
made many successful experiments in the Greek metres. His mind was now matured, and 
he had pondered on the theory of poetry” (D’Alton 1917: 250-251). In such a way the Ars 
is portrayed as the work of an almost stoically wise Horace, the infallible sage, who at the 
end of his span earnestly imparts his knowledge onto the next generation. The problem 
that subsequent generations have had with these interpretations, following developments 
in persona theory, is the manner in which the voice of the author is assumed to be 
synonymous with the historical voice of Horace – that simply by identifying how the 
authorial persona speaks we may form an accurate picture of who the true author was. 
 In the followi g section I shall explain the notion of the authorial persona in 
general, and then examine approaches to the Ars which utilize this interpretative 
perspective. Moreover, I shall argue for how the persona method allows for a greater 
degree of interpretative coherence than other means of analysis both in general theory 
and with respect to the context of Horace’s works. Finally, in the concluding section of 
this introductory chapter, I shall examine the specific authorial persona which I have 
located in the Ars, and discuss just how I intend to judge this figure. 
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Authorial Personae 
 
The arrival of persona theory in the field of Classical Philology – pioneered by the 
criticisms of W.S. Anderson on Juvenal’s Satires in the late sixties and then by later 
Horatian scholars such as Braund, Freudenburg and Oliensis – was comparatively late in 
coming. By contrast, it was applied, for example, to English literary criticisms far earlier 
in the twentieth century where the creative works of T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound had 
induced scholars to adopt such an approach: “Popularized by Ezra Pound, given impetus 
by Yeats, institutionalized by Eliot in his poetry and criticism, the notion of the persona is 
at the centre of that phrase of modernism which holds that the “I’ of a poem is always a 
dramatized “I,” no more to be identified with the actual poet living in history than the 
Bishop ordering his tomb is to be identified with Robert Browning” (Elliot 1982: 16). 
However, before exploring more fully the concept of the persona in literature, it is well 
worth reflecting its precedent in more abstract thought. In short, what kind of theoretical 
outlook led to the adoption of the persona in literary criticism? 
 Just as one might track earlier nineteenth-century structural approaches to literary 
analysis – with which classicists are quite familiar from the seemingly endless doctrinal 
laws and strict regulations, in particular, of German philologists – to a highly scientific, 
organized and rational manner of thinking of the world, most manifest, for instance, in a 
field such as biology where the practice of taxonomy necessitated a complete 
systemization of the entire natural world, so, in contrast, the tendency to locate personae 
in literary works stems essentially, I believe, from developments in the concept of the 
psychology of the individual man, the constitution of his identity, instigated by Freud at 
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the turn of the previous century and espoused more fully and importantly by Carl Jung. It 
is to Jung’s notion of the ‘persona’ of the individual, espoused in his work ‘Two Essays 
on Analytical Psychology’, to which it is now necessary to turn. 
 Firstly, some basic background is needed here: Jung’s theory of the human mind, 
which is aimed principally at the pragmatic end of alleviating the affliction of patients 
suffering from nervous traumata or neuroses, rests fundamentally on the distinction 
between the conscious part, that of which a given person is manifestly aware, and the 
unconscious part of the mind, which, in the case of a mentally ill individual, needs to be 
analysed and assimilated consciously in order for that individual to overcome his 
particular malady (Jung 1928: 163). Jung’s major contribution to the conception of the 
psychology of the individual man was in the division of the unconscious into two 
separate parts, namely the personal unconscious: “The personal unconscious, of which I 
also speak as the ‘sub-conscious,’… contains forgotten memories, suppressed (purposely 
forgotten) painful ideas… sensory perceptions that were not strong enough to reach 
consciousness, and, finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness” (Jung 1928: 
footnote 2, 67-68) – and the super-personal unconscious: “We speak of the latter also as 
the collective unconscious, because it is apart from the personal and quite universal. For 
its contents can be found in all minds, and this is obviously not the case with personal 
contents. The primordial images are the deepest, the most ancient, and the most universal 
thoughts of humanity” (Jung 1928: 68). 
 In his discussion of the collective unconscious Jung then discusses the propensity 
for men to incorporate “certain impersonal, universal, and fundamental characteristics” 
(Jung 1928: 163) of this super-personal unconscious into their ‘personal conscious’ –
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what Jung also refers to as their ‘real (individual) character’ – to the extent that they 
adopt a ‘persona’: “this excerpt of the collective unconscious… I have called the persona. 
The word persona is really a very suitable expression for it; since persona originally 
meant the mask worn by an actor to signify his role… it is, as its name tells us, only a 
mask of the collective psyche, a mask that is a substitute for individuality, intending to 
make others as well as oneself believe one is individual. In reality it is only a role that is 
played” (Jung 1928: 164-165). The persona for Jung is the inevitable compromise the 
‘true individual’ makes with respect to his society; his name, his title, his rank, and his 
occupation are all part of the face which he is obliged to show towards the world (Jung 
1928: 165). The man who then believes his adopted persona – professor, poet, farmer, 
lawyer, etc – to be entirely synonymous with his ‘real individual character’ (his personal 
conscious) becomes something of a caricature. 
 Now quite clearly for Jung the persona, although often obligatory for a man to 
wear within his social environment, is seen ultimately as a hindrance to his ‘true self’, 
what Jung calls his ‘personal conscious’65, and therefore to his psychic salubrity; the 
persona must then accordingly be shrugged off in the process of individuation: 
“fundamentally the aim of individuation is to free the self from the false wrappings of the 
persona” (Jung 1928: 185). Regardless of the psychologically damaging effect of the 
adoption of a persona upon the mental health a man, which, however true it may be, 
really goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, one does wonder, however, whether 
Jung, in suggesting that an individual may attain some kind of self-realization by simply 
removing his fixed professional public face, is not trivializing the potential plurality of 
                                               
65 Not to be confused with the ‘personal unconscious’, see the definition given above. 
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faces or personae66 or even the dynamism67 of a single persona which a given individual 
may possess; as Oliensis observes in her study of the Horatian persona: “In any given 
encounter, this “face’ can be saved or lost, enhanced or maintained, effaced or even 
defaced. Behind the scenes, and sometimes (more or less discreetly) in mid-scene, faces 
are changed. We are constantly moving between spheres (social, spatial, temporal) that 
put different valuations and demands on our social faces” (Oliensis 1998: 1). Indeed, the 
theoretical debate between the realization of the idealized true individual and the 
pervasiveness of the masked individual or persona is complex and perhaps ultimately 
irresolvable; it must be said, furthermore, that even Jung does admit ironically enough to 
there being an element of the individual within the very selection of personae: “But it 
would be wrong to present the matter in this way without at the same time recognizing 
that there is already something individual in the particular choice and definition of the 
persona” (Jung 1928: 165). 
Moving on from the psychological ramifications of the persona upon our notion 
of the individual, quite practically the idea of social personae, putting on masks, should 
not be empirically foreign to us. Consider the following two scenarios. The first: you are 
attending a mandatory interview for a teaching post at a prestigious university; the 
second: you are enjoying a few beers in a bar with some good friends of yours. Each 
situation in turn demands a specific appropriate kind of conduct: for the first, you would 
act with formal restraint, considered introspection, and perhaps a certain amount of self-
deprecation; for the latter, you would act far less reserved, be more garrulous, and more 
inclined to frivolous light-hearted humour. In essence, for each situation you have 
                                               
66 I employ the terms ‘face’ and ‘persona’ synonymously throughout this essay. 
67 By this term I mean the potential to change its face. 
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adopted a certain kind of mask, a persona, a role to fit the social prescriptions. Horace, as 
we might conjecture from the evidence of the various relationships within his poetry, 
could have displayed several alternate social personae according to his company: whether 
he was addressing Augustus, whether he was entertaining his patron Maecenas, whether 
he was in the company of fellow poets and writers such as Virgil, or whether he was 
discussing his craft with a younger aspiring poet (Oliensis 1998: 1). For each situation we 
would expect a different Horace to emerge in the social setting. 
Furthermore, as justification of the efficacy of these social personae upon the  
character of the historical author of a given work – lest the somewhat romantic 
assumption is raised that the private face of an author is to be entirely removed from the 
restrictions of his social faces, revealing some idealised true self in the Jungian sense – 
we need look no further than Horace’s own Ars Poetica in one of the more famous 
passages of the poem, which is concerned with the ethical obligation of the aspiring poet: 
 
qui didicit patriae quid debeat et quid amicis, 
quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes, 
quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium, quae 
partes in bellum missi ducis, ille profecto 
reddere personae scit convenientia cuique. 
respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo 
doctum imitatorem et vivas hinc ducere voces. 
(Hor. Ars P. 312-318) 
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The personae or faces which an author projects into his narrative, reddere personae (line 
316), are those which he has learnt, didicit (line 312), from his own personae or from 
observation of other personae in society: the mask of a son, a friend, a parent, a sibling, a 
judge, a military general, and so forth; there is no sense in the Horatian passage that the 
poetic narrative is to be divorced from reality: the poet ‘holds up a mirror to life’, he is an 
‘imitator naturae’ in the Aristotelian sense (Abrams 1972: 20-21). Moreover, it is 
important for our purposes that we recognize that the Horatian passage is not merely 
recommending that the poet observes social roles, or personae, and projects them into his 
work as characters within a narrative, as, for example, in drama, but that he himself, in 
order to produce a literary work, is required to assume and adopt these roles as ‘a learned 
imitator’, doctum imitatorem (line 318). Just what social role in particular the author of 
the Ars assumes will be discussed in the following sub-chapter. 
 
By analogy, just as we expect a given individual to adopt a certain persona in relation to 
his environment at a particular time and place, so, in literature, we should expect an 
author to adopt a persona or mask which will situate his own self with regard to his 
narrative, which will, in short, provide him with a certain stance or position in relation to 
his narrative. As Gerald Genette, in his work Narrative Discourse, identifies, the author 
(in the case of his study the focus is more on the ‘novelist’ than the poet, satirist, etc) of a 
work is forced to choose between certain “narrative postures” (Genette 1980: 244), 
through which the story or narrative may be told to the audience. So what are the 
different types of ‘narrative postures’ which an author may adopt? From our own 
experience of reading, we could probably distinguish several different types: the third-
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person character within the text, who narrates events as he experiences them; the 
omniscient narrator who, although not himself involved in the subject matter, seems to 
possess a complete knowledge of everything that comes to pass; or, perhaps, the first-
person speaker who adopts the position of the author within the narrative, speaking as an 
authority over his subject. 
 As one potential theoretical means of differentiating the kinds of literary personae 
which an author may adopt, we can turn to Genette’s two way classification of the status 
of a narrator to a story or narrative (Genette 1980: 248). Firstly, he distinguishes between 
the relationship of the narrator to the narrative: whether he is absent from the story which 
he narrates, a heterodiegetic narrator (as ‘Homer’68 is absent from the Odyssey), or 
whether he is present in the story which he narrates, a homodiegetic narrator (as 
Odysseus is present in the story of his adventures which he tells to the Phaeacians); 
secondly, Genette, provides the criterion of the level of the narrator to the narrative: 
whether he stands outside the narrative, an extradiegetic narrator (as ‘Homer’ narrates 
outside the events of the story of the Odyssey), or whether he is narrating within the 
actual narrative, an intradiegetic narrator (as Odysseus is narrating within the events of 
the Odyssey) (Genette 1980: 244-248). 
 Applying Genette’s rubric to the Ars Poetica, we can see that the literary face or 
persona with which Horace, the historical author, presents us is that of the extra-
homodiegetic narrator (Iddeng 2005: 186-188). So, firstly, he is clearly homodiegetic, 
seeing that he is very much part of the narrative of the Ars, an identifiable character, often 
evident in the first person singular verbal tense, who interacts with his addressees, 
                                               
68 In inverted commas so as to avoid amalgamation of the heterodiegetic narrator, ‘Homer’, with the real 
historical figure or figures known as Homer. 
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instructs them, and presents his own personal role in relation to his subject, most 
manifest, for example, in the following programmatic speech:  
 
ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum 
reddere quae ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi. 
munus et officium nil scribens ipse docebo, 
unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam, 
quid deceat quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error. 
(Hor. Ars P. 304-308) 
 
Heterodiegtic narrators, such as ‘Virgil’69 in the Aeneid, remain removed from the subject 
of their narrative, acting as impersonal spectators. And, secondly, the narrator of the Ars 
is of course extradiegetic since he is not a secondary character recounting his narrative 
within another narrative, as Aeneas does to Dido in the second book of the Aeneid, but is 
himself relating his subject on the primary narrative level of the poem (Iddeng 2005: 186-
188). 
 This extra-homodiegetic quality of the narrator of Ars Poetica – and, indeed, of 
the other works of Horace – has encouraged critics to employ the term ‘authorial persona’ 
to characterize the face which Horace adopts. The phrase itself is conceptually 
ambiguous, since all potential narrative faces – extra-homodiegetic, extra-heterodiegtic, 
intra-homodiegetic, and intra-heterodiegetic, if we restrict ourselves to Genette’s 
organization – are personae which an author may elect to adopt, thus ‘authorial 
personae’. What is of course meant by the designation of ‘authorial persona’ is a face or 
                                               
69 See note 68 above. 
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persona which presents itself as the true historical author of a work, the façade of the real 
writer, but which is, as we know, only a specific kind of literary persona, a fictitious 
creation by the author. The authorial character of this literary persona is encouraged by 
the particular combination of extradiegetic narrative, which places the narrator on the 
primary narrative level – a quasi-authorial level – and homodiegetic narrative, which 
creates an often highly personal narrator, as if the historical author himself were 
speaking70. 
Horatian poetry, in general, has been a prime critical target for analysis by 
authorial persona on account of the pervasiveness of the homodiegetic narrator: “The first 
person is prominent in all of Horace’s work: ego and its oblique cases occur some 460 
times in the 7,795 lines of his extant poetry. Indeed, the different poetic genres which 
constitute his output all seem to have been chosen in part because of the primacy of the 
poet’s voice” (Harrison 2007: 22). And so accordingly the question of whether there 
exists a coherent authorial persona across all of Horace’s works has been tackled by 
critics such as Ellen Oliensis: “the first-person speaker who gradually accumulates 
characteristics associated with the figure known as “Horace”71 – friend of Maecenas, 
friend of Virgil and Varius, son of a freedman, owner of a Sabine villa, author of Satires 
1… author of the Epodes and so on” (Oliensis 1998: 2). Although such an extensive 
investigation far exceeds the spatial confines of this dissertation – whether there is such 
an ‘accumulation of characteristics’, as Oliensis suggests, throughout all of Horace’s 
                                               
70 Conversely, there is no great temptation to amalgamate an extra-heterodiegetic narrator with the 
historical author: ‘Virgil’, the narrator of the Aeneid, with Virgil, the writer of the Aeneid; nor is there a 
temptation to amalgamate an intra-homodiegetic narrator with the historical author: Aeneas with Virgil, the 
writer. It is only when we arrive at the extra-homodiegetic narrator that the critic, especially the historical 
scholar, is lured into identifying the created literary persona with the true author. 
71 Oliensis employs “Horace” to stand for the authorial persona which is created throughout the Horatian 
oeuvre, Horace without inverted commas for the historical figure. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 56 
works – in the third chapter I shall compare my analysis of the authorial persona in the 
Ars Poetica with that of Satire 1.4, identifying certain shared characteristics between the 
two poems and how the satire might enhance our understanding of the function of the 
persona of the Ars. 
 
So now let me discuss some interpretations of the Ars which have drawn on this notion of 
the authorial persona, judging the respective merits and shortcomings of each, as they 
appear to me. Ellen Oliensis, in Horace and the Rhetoric of Authority, has produced one 
of the more detailed explanations of how the authorial persona might function within the 
Ars. The key to understanding Oliensis’ text lies in her explanation of the performance 
aspect of all Horace’s poetry: for her the categories of social personae and literary 
personae interplay with one another in his work. “It is because Horace’s poetry is itself a 
performance venue that I make no clear, hard-and-fast distinction between the author and 
the character “Horace”. Horace is present in his personae, that is, not because these 
personae are authentic and accurate impressions of his true self, but because they 
effectively construct that self – for Horace’s contemporary readers, for us, and also for 
Horace himself” (Oliensis 1998: 2). Oliensis’ interpretation of the Horatian mask thus 
comes to emphasise the social role of the persona towards its audience: “My concern, 
then, is with the way Horace conducts his life in and by means of poetry. My approach is 
biographical… I am interested… in the life that happens in his poetry” (Oliensis 1998: 3). 
 In her interpretation of the Ars, Oliensis identifies an authorial persona who is 
constantly concerned with the opposition between his own poetic authority and the social 
authority of his audience. In this way, Horace “produces an extremely volatile blend of 
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authority and deference: a “masterwork” which is also a study in self-defacement, an 
educational essay which is also an exercise in antididaxis” (Oliensis 1998: 198-199). So 
the authorial persona of the Ars often adopts a discourse which juxtaposes social status 
with poetic status (Oliensis 1998: 211):  
 
ut praeco, ad merces turbam qui cogit emendas, 
adsentatores iubet ad lucrum ire poeta 
dives agris, dives positis in faenore nummis. 
(Hor. Ars P. 419-421) 
 
Here in the direct contrast between poeta (line 420) and dives (line 421) the implication is 
that high social status, with the accompanying wealth, negates the potential of a poet 
through the acquisition of adsentatores (line 420) or ‘flatterers’. Similarly, we can 
witness ‘Horace’ mocking in an ironic tone the assumption that an ingenuus (line 383), or 
‘man of noble birth’, should naturally possess poetic ingenium (Oliensis 1998: 211):  
 
liber et ingenuus, praesertim census equestrem 
summam nummorum, vitioque remotus ab omni. 
tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva: 
(Hor. Ars P. 383-385) 
 
Indeed, the theme of ingenium runs through the Ars where inherited authority is ridiculed 
in contrast to artistic authority or skill, ars. Oliensis then, throughout the Ars, is 
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concerned with identifying a language of authority – a discourse which the authorial 
persona of the Ars utilizes to subtly create a portrait of himself as “the master poet”72 
(Oliensis 1998: 198). 
 What seems to me most satisfactory in Oliensis’ interpretation of the Ars is her 
attempt to identify a particular kind of discourse – her ‘rhetoric of authority’ – to 
characterize the authorial persona. Simply put, she has analysed the very language of the 
persona – rather than having applied her own tendentious rubrics over the text – to try to 
illustrate the nature of the persona. It seems to me that any study which tries to locate a 
coherent authorial persona in the Ars must indeed illustrate how the language in the text 
creates such an impression, as I shall in my interpretation.  
Although Oliensis’ methodology in defining a particular kind of authorial persona 
is praiseworthy, I am not entirely convinced by the persona she identifies. Firstly, 
Oliensis undertakes what the literary theorist M.H. Abrams calls a ‘pragmatic approach’ 
to criticism (Abrams 1972: 11-12): she focuses entirely on the social purpose and effect 
of the authorial persona upon the implied audience, ignoring or dismissing the extent to 
which the ‘authorial persona’ can be appreciated objectively as a coherent constituent of 
a literary work, the Ars Poetica.  Clearly, we are stuck between the extremes of a work 
being appreciated purely in terms of its social context, or, on the other hand, entirely in 
isolation as a work of art – an approach which acknowledges the social debt of a writer 
but does not relate every detail of the work to this would surely be preferable. Secondly, I 
believe that Oliensis’ analysis of the persona of the Ars has been devised with a view to 
creating a coherent Horatian authorial persona, who utilizes this ‘rhetoric of authority’, 
across several works, including the Satires and Odes. I do wonder whether one would 
                                               
72 My italics. 
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come to the same analytical conclusion if interpreting the Ars in isolation73. Thirdly, I 
don’t believe that the authorial persona as ‘the master poet who speaks in the language of 
authority’ is really quite specific enough for this poem. In short, just what kind of 
‘authority figure’ exactly does the poet Horace present in the Ars? Just how is it different 
to the authority figures in the other literary epistles? 
 Stephen Harrison comes closer to what I would consider an accurate description 
of the authorial persona of the Ars, identifying “the didactic voice of the instructor” 
(Harrison 2007: 22). The notion of the persona as ‘instructor’ seems to incorporate better 
the scope of the Ars: an instructor would clearly engage in a ‘rhetoric of authority’ with 
his audience, as Oliensis demands, but he is equally concerned with espousing principles 
of poetics, which are undeniably important to an understanding of the Ars.  
Unfortunately, Harrison doesn’t proceed much further in trying to characterize the 
instructor or his language in the poem. In the Ars Poetica itself we can bear witness to 
several different models of instructor, not all of them especially positive faces. At one 
point we hear the rather authoritative, regimental, and all too pragmatic voice of a 
typically Roman schoolmaster, demanding calculations from his pupils (Rudd 1989: 
204):  
 
Romani pueri longis rationibus assem 
discunt in partes centum diducere. ‘dicat 
filius Albini: si de quincunce remota est 
                                               
73 Certainly, as I discussed in my analysis of the genre of the Ars Poetica, the work does depart from certain 
formal conventions inherent in the other genres which Horace adopts, such as the verse letter; and, 
moreover, the manner in which the addressees of the poem are treated is quite different from the familiar 
tone of Horace’s other letters where the addressees are more integrated. 
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uncia, quid superat? poteras dixisse.’ ‘triens.’ ‘eu. 
rem poteris servare tuam. redit uncia, quid fit?’ 
‘semis.’ 
(Hor. Ars P. 325-330) 
 
Then later we hear the stern voice of the critic Quintilian, not tempted by remuneration 
into flattery, who instructs the aspiring poet in strong imperative language (Wickham 
1891: 428): 
 
Quintilio si quid recitares, ‘corrige sodes 
hoc’ aiebat ‘et hoc’; melius te posse negares, 
bis terque expertum frustra, delere iubebat 
et male tornatos incudi reddere versus. 
(Hor. Ars P. 438-441) 
 
To title the Horatian persona simply as an ‘instructor’ is clearly not specific enough. 
What is the character of this instruction? Just how does he impart his subject? Is he the 
drill-sergeant schoolmaster? The brutally-honest critic? Or something else perhaps? 
What Harrison does again identify, as I did in my introduction, is the problem of 
how to come to terms with Horace’s claim to be concerned purely with instruction and at 
the same time his utilization of poetic structures: “Horace is clearly playing with the idea 
of the poet: in one sense he has renounced traditional poetry, especially the lyric poetry 
for which he is renowned, and returned to the ‘unpoetic’ form of sermo, but that 
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renunciation is itself made in elegant verse which exploits poetic devices such as the 
ambiguous metaphor” (Harrison 2007: 33-34). Harrison’s interpretation – and it is one 
worth considering – seems to locate the Horatian voice in general as one which is 
concerned with misleading ambiguous self-representations, deliberately shaping and 
distorting various personae. 
 Lastly, Peter Toohey’s interpretation of the authorial persona of the Ars, which I 
have already discussed in part in my discussion of genre, comes closest to the model of 
the persona which I shall be arguing for in the following chapter of this dissertation. His 
analysis of the Ars is focused upon the dichotomy between instruction and play in the 
voice of the authorial persona: “If all Horace had been concerned about was instruction, 
then he went the wrong way about things. There are many aspects of the poem, fissures 
they may be called, which undermine the primacy of didactic instruction. If instruction 
was not the only purpose of the poem, then what else was? Here I have stressed the 
intertwined notions of voice and of play. Horace in the Ars Poetica substitutes for… 
serious didactic posture… the ironic, chatty, often humorous, mercurial, and habitually 
discursive voice which he had produced above all in the Satires” (Toohey 1996: 156). 
Toohey’s emphasis o  the importance of ‘play’ is a step in the right direction in analyses 
of the Ars Poetica, and it will form an important part of the argument of my ensuing 
chapter; however, rather than stressing a dichotomy between these two aspects – an 
‘undermining’ of instruction on account of play – where I shall differ radically from 
Toohey is in uniting the notions of ‘play’ and ‘instruction’ under a more liberal 
classification in the discourse of a teacher or praeceptor, and not merely an instructor74. 
                                               
74 As I stated previously under the discussion of genre, Toohey also identifies the significance of what he 
entitles ‘illustrative panels’ in the Ars Poetica: “Another important feature… which reflects the traditions 
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Before I proceed further in my explanation of the character of the authorial persona in the 
Ars, I think it is necessary that I justify to an extent my selection of the device of 
authorial persona in general as a means of establishing a coherent interpretation of the 
poem. In other words, in what ways is it superior to, for example, structuralist methods of 
analysis? 
 What we are essentially doing by identifying and characterizing an authorial 
persona is characterising the language of a text, and by implication the meaning behind 
the language. We are concerned with illustrating how the language is indicative of the 
purpose, priorities, motives, emotions, and general scope of cogitations of the specific 
authorial persona presumed to lie within the text. In this way it is not that different from 
biographic approaches which endeavour to characterize the language according to the 
thought of the historical writer.  
I have already discussed this matter in part, but it should be emphasised that the 
relation between the biographic approach and the persona approach in literature is not 
one of polar opposition but a complex farrago: in everyday life we are always adopting a 
specific kind of role, hence a persona – any individual (even the historical author or poet 
as the Ars itself illustrates) is a true mixture of different masks rather than a fixed 
character; equally, to view literature as totally isolated from reality is ridiculous, and 
clearly any role which a writer assumes – be it a poet, a moralizer, a philosopher or 
whatever else – will have its basis in one of these social roles. I do not believe that we 
                                                                                                                                            
of didactic epic is the presence of the illustrative panel… This… is particularly apropos for Horatian verse: 
it engenders the recommended combination of utilitarian elements… sweetened by the insertion of the 
‘easier’ narrative insertions” (Toohey 1996: 151). I shall rework the importance of this feature of the 
Horatian text – rather than being merely a means of mixing utility and sweetness, as Toohey argues – in the 
section on ‘Illustrative Language’ in the subsequent chapter. 
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should be as concerned with the question of the relative veracity of a literary persona75 
(which has worried many critics) as we should whether this persona can be considered a 
favourable device for judging objectively a literary text. In other words, what does it 
mean in literary theory for us to locate coherence in a literary persona of the writer? 
 In his post-structuralist essay, What is an author, Michael Foucault aptly 
describes critical attempts to identify an author figure in a literary work thus: “The author 
is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning” (Foucault 1988: 209). Although 
Foucault is concerned with illustrating the futility of endeavours to compartmentalize a 
work in line with his deconstructionist tendencies (hence, ‘the proliferation of meaning’), 
his selection of the ‘author’ as ultimately the last recourse of the literary critic (‘principle 
of thrift’) is instructive to our pursuit. The implication is that the literary work stems from 
a kind of fundamental reservoir, a creative power, which determines the language and 
meaning of the subsequent text (Foucault 1988: 203). The literary voice or persona is 
then a coherent projection from this primary creative source. Foucault, although 
acknowledging the existence of the authorial persona, casts doubt over its constancy in 
relation to the author: “Everyone knows that, in a novel narrated in the first person, 
neither the first person pronoun, nor the present indicative refer exactly either to the 
writer or to the moment in which he writes, but rather to an alter ego whose distance from 
the author varies, often changing in the course of the work” (Foucault 1988: 205). 
However, irrespective of the positioning and malleability of this persona in relation to the 
ideal authorial creative power, I would suggest that at least by admitting to the presence 
of an ‘authorial alter ego’ in a literary text, Foucault is inadvertently providing us with an 
interpretative unit, the authorial persona, to locate in a work.  
                                               
75 I.e. the extent to which ‘Horace’ matches up to Horace, the historical writer. 
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In effect, the extent to which we locate coherence in an authorial persona will be 
shaped by the extent to which the ‘creative power’ can be thought to be coherent. In this 
way it could be argued that attempts to locate coherence through an authorial persona are 
just as subjective as structuralist methods: whereas the latter suppose a coherent division 
of subject matter in a literary text, which can be objectively analysed, the former 
presupposes a degree of coherence in the author himself. I do not deny the subjectivity of 
my choice of interpretation (although all interpretations, even anti-critical theories 
ironically enough, are forced to make some or other assumption) but rather all I can do is 
explain the aesthetic assumptions at work behind my methodology. 
 The literary theorist M.H. Abrams, whom I find to be one of the more lucid 
writers in his field, in his essay ‘Orientation to Critical Studies’, accounts for the desire to 
find coherence in a literary work by the identification of a persona through his definition 
of the ‘expressive’ interpretation or function of literature76: “A work of art is essentially 
the internal made external77, resulting from a creative process operating under the 
impulse of feeling, and embodying the combined product of the poet’s perceptions, 
thoughts, and feelings” (Abrams 1972: 17). If we approach literature with the attitude that 
a work of art is an external projection of the internal cogitations and feelings of a poet, 
then it would seem that the most coherent way in which we can read it will be through the 
voice, the literary persona, which the poet has to adopt as a type of conduit to relate the 
internal to the external. 
 
                                               
76 Abrams names four different types of critical approaches to literature, of which I have already mentioned 
the ‘pragmatic’ in my discussion of Oliensis’ work – the other two are the ‘mimetic’ or ‘representational’ 
and the ‘objective’. 
77 My italics. 
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But now apart from general discussions of literary theory, by what distinction should we 
deem it appropriate to judge a Horatian work in particular by means of an authorial 
persona? For justification of this we should turn to the critics who have focused on the 
satires and the voice of Horace in these sermones, in particular The Walking Muse by 
Kirk Freudenburg. In opposition to certain modern theorists who consider the persona to 
be an iconoclastic anachronistic device in analysing ancient literature, Freudenburg 
manages to illustrate, successfully I think, that the notion of the persona was known to 
the Augustan poets. 
Firstly, part of rhetorical training in the education of every Roman entailed the 
adoption of certain roles: “Every Roman schoolboy was expected to master the practice 
of characterization for the sake of projecting a positive, trustworthy image of himself as 
speaker and a highly negative image of his opposition” (Freudenburg 1993: 4). Tacitus, 
in his Dialogus de oratoribus, alludes to this convention in education by giving examples 
of the type of diverse subjects or materiae which ‘are acted out in schools on a daily 
basis’, in schola cotidie agitur: sequitur autem ut materiae abhorrenti a veritate 
declamatio quoque adhibeatur. Sic fit ut tyrannicidarum praemia aut vitiatarum 
electiones aut pestile tiae remedia aut incesta matrum aut quidquid in schola cotidie 
agitur, in foro vel raro vel numquam, ingentibus verbis prosequantur (Tac. Dial. 35). 
Tacitus’ usage of agitur here is most probably a metaphor borrowed from the stage, and 
the implication would seem to be that the school students, like actors in a play, are trained 
to adopt certain roles in the selection of fictitious materiae. 
Secondly, and with particular reference to the Satires, Freudenburg has illustrated 
the debt which Horace owes to drama, in which the notion of a persona, a ‘mask’, was 
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physically manifest to the audience (Freudenburg 1993: 39-40). The importance of the 
appropriate adoption by the actor of the persona or the mask of the character in drama is 
in fact mentioned at several different places in the Ars Poetica itself:  
 
ut ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflent 
humani vultus. si vis me flere, dolendum est 
primum ipsi tibi; tum tua me infortunia laedent, 
Telephe vel Peleu; male si mandata loqueris 
aut dormitabo aut ridebo. tristia maestum 
vultum verba decent, iratum plena minarum, 
ludentem lasciva, severum seria dictu. 
(Hor. Ars P. 101-107) 
 
The notion here is that a character’s language in a play must match up to the ‘face’ or 
vultus (line 106) which the actor wears to denote the emotional state of the character he is 
playing; if the language of the character is delivered poorly with respect to his ‘face’, 
male si mandata loqueris (line 104), if the persona is not believable, the audience will 
demonstrate its disapproval through boredom or hostile laughter, aut dormitabo aut 
ridebo (line 105) (Wickham 1891: 398-399). The important word in this passage, which 
is given emphasis through repetition, is vultus (lines 102, 106): an actor is required to put 
on the ‘face’ of the character he is playing. 
Moreover, on two other notable occasions in the Ars, the Latin word for the mask 
which the actor wears on stage, the persona, is explicitly used in the narrative. So, firstly, 
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when a playwright does introduce a new character on stage, he must ensure that this 
creation is coherent, that the mask holds up:  
 
si quid inexpertum scaenae committis et audes 
personam formare novam, servetur ad imum 
qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet. 
(Hor. Ars P. 125-127) 
 
And as has been already observed in my discussion of social personae, it is recommended 
that the writer observe the models from life if he wishes to create the appropriate 
characters on stage: reddere personae scit convenientia cuique (Hor. Ars 316). 
And, lastly, in terms of the poetic tradition in Latin literature, we have Catullus’ 
own loose definition of the literary persona in somewhat vehement terms (Freudenburg 
1993: 4): 
 
pedicabo ego vos et irrumabo, 
Aureli pathice et cinaede Furi, 
qui me ex versiculis meis putastis, 
quod sunt molliculi, parum pudicum. 
nam castum esse decet pium poetam 
ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est… 
(Catull. 16.1-6) 
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So Catullus’ anger here is directed against two individuals, Aureli pathice et cinaede Furi 
(line 2), who endeavoured to characterize the real historical Catullus as parum pudicum 
(line 4) from the evidence of the character of the ‘Catullus’ from his poetry, versiculis 
meis (line 3). There is, in short, a recognition that the identity which the poet establishes 
of himself in poetry need not be synonymous with his true identity78. 
 
 
The Praeceptor Persona 
 
It seems to me that the authorial persona of the Ars Poetica can be best described as a 
‘teacher’, or, in Latin, a ‘praeceptor’ persona.  
By identifying the persona as a ‘teacher’, I do not simply mean an ‘instructor’ 
(Harrison 2007: 22). The notion of ‘instruction’ does not appear to define quite accurately 
enough for me the function of a teacher: generals, religious preachers, politicians, and, 
indeed, teachers are all concerned to a large extent with ‘instruction’; however, I should 
think that a teacher speaking in the discourse of a general, or equally a general in that of a 
teacher, would prove to be a disastrous experiment.  
                                               
78 For the possible arguments against this interpretation, Clay’s article on ‘The Theory of the Literary 
Persona in Antiquity’ should be consulted: “We should not forget that he makes this distinction in a poem, 
and, by this very gesture, removes the grounds of his argument. The distinction is so severe that his poetry 
and by implication the Catullus of his poetry are presented as autonymous. This was, I would argue, a 
distinction that was unavailable to a culture dominated by public and performed poetry” (Clay 1998: 33). 
See also, Mayer, R.G, ‘Persona<l> Problems: The Literary Persona in Antiquity’, pg 66-68, and also more 
generally against the identification of the persona in the satires of Juvenal and, primarily, Horace, pg 71-78. 
Iddeng in his discussion of the authorial persona in Roman poetry argues for more flexible critical analyses: 
“We need perhaps to open for a much more flexible and less constant I-poet. If correct, this means that the 
I-poet consequently needs to be comprehended independently based on close readings and contextual 
studies of each poet and each separate poem” (Iddeng 2005: 198). 
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In the opening section of my next chapter I shall be arguing for a broader range of 
concepts to define the function of the Horatian Teacher or Praeceptor79. I shall be 
drawing on certain passages from the Satires of Horace – in particular from Satire 1.4, 
and, to a lesser extent from Satires 1.1 and 1.10 – which allow for a more ‘liberal’ 
classification of the task of the teacher than simply the pursuit of ‘instruction’; 
furthermore, as a means of justifying this Horatian concept of the Praeceptor, I shall be 
drawing on certain modern works from the analytical philosophy of education, which 
establish similar criteria for the teacher. 
 After I have outlined the broader scope of the task of the Praeceptor, my primary 
undertaking, which will form the bulk of the ensuing chapter, will be to relate the 
conceptual to the linguistic: in other words, to identify how the various types of language 
which the Praeceptor employs in the Ars fulfil our established concept of the Horatian 
Praeceptor. It will be seen that this discourse certainly might at times entail highly 
instructive language, but equally it might consist of more humorous, playful or discursive 
types of language, which might not seem manifestly ‘didactic’ in the common critical 
sense of the word, but which contribute nevertheless to the overall function of the 
teacher.  
Ultimately, my expectation is that by identifying the persona as a praeceptor, 
schooling his audience in the subject of poetry rather than a didactic instructor interested 
purely in espousing a theory of poetics, we might be able to account for the poetic 
elements within the Ars which have long been deemed irresolvable with the didactic 
principles. It is my contention that the Praeceptor of the Ars will naturally include more 
                                               
79 Henceforth I shall employ the term ‘the Praeceptor’ in un-italicized form to refer to the authorial persona 
presented specifically in the Ars, while in un-capitalized form it will refer to the general notion of a 
‘teacher’. 
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playful ‘poetic’ devices and structures in his language as part of the process of leading his 
audience into a greater knowledge of ars poetica.  
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Chapter 2 – The Praeceptor Persona At Play 
 
 
The Horatian Concept of the Praeceptor 
 
To a great extent much of my criticism of other scholarly methods of interpreting the Ars 
Poetica has pertained to the lack of explicit evidence in the Horatian poem itself to back 
up the respective theoretical arguments. If, for example, the Ars is to be understood as a 
didactic poem or epic, as Toohey argues, then why is there no mention of this class of 
poetry under the discussion of genre in the Ars? Or if it is to be analysed under Brink’s 
tripartite scheme of ‘poem’, ‘poetry’, and ‘poet’, then would it be unreasonable to expect 
corresponding headings organized at specific points in the Ars Poetica? These critical 
methods which endeavour to locate implicit structures and schemes in the text – however 
true they may be to the designs of the historical writer Horace – run the risk of being 
perceived as tendentious suppositions. 
 My insistence, however, that Horace is presenting a praeceptor persona in his 
poem rests on a particular programmatic passage in the text where the authorial persona 
explicitly identifies his own task or role within his narrative: 
 
o ego laevus, 
qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam; 
non alius faceret meliora poemata. verum 
nil tanti est. ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum 
reddere quae ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi. 
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munus et officium nil scribens ipse docebo, 
unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam, 
quid deceat, quid non, quo virtus, quo ferat error. 
(Hor. Ars P. 301-308) 
 
So, first of all, the authorial persona relinquishes the vocation of poet. Unlike the 
‘inspired’ poets of the Democritean school (lines 295-301), he would prefer to maintain 
his sanity, ‘to purge bile’, than to sacrifice his mental salubrity by attempting poetry: “If 
inspired poetry involves madness, that is, a surplus of (black) bile supposed to cause the 
melancholia of genius, then… he would rather be rid of it and be sane” (Brink 1971: 333-
334). His refusal of the status of poet is further enforced by the strikingly brief 
diminution of the worth of a poet – verum / nil tanti est (lines 303-304) – and most 
explicitly in Ars by the participle phrase nil scribens (line 306), ‘he is not going to write 
poetry’. 
 Having declined the title of poet, the authorial persona assumes the part of the 
teacher or praeceptor of poetry. So, firstly, there is the declaration of what role he will 
play, fungar vice (line 304), in his narrative: ergo fungar vice cotis, acutum / reddere 
quae ferrum valet exsors ipsa secandi (lines 304-305). His function, just like the 
whetstone, cotis (line 304), in sharpening iron, ferrum (line 305), rather than the iron of 
the knife itself, will be to shape aspiring poets, his pupils, in their duty rather than himself 
to engage in poetry. As the different commentators of the poem point out, the metaphor 
which the authorial persona employs here to explain his role in writing his Ars Poetica is 
reminiscent of a well-known declaration by Isocrates, reported by Plutarch, as to how he 
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chooses to teach people to speak rather than to engage in speaking himself (Wilkins 
1886: 394): kaˆ aƒ ¢konaˆ aÙtaˆ men teme‹n oÙ dÚnantai, tÕn de s…dhron Ñxša kaˆ 
tmhtikÕn poioàsin (Ps.-Plut. Vit. X. Orat. 4). And, secondly, of course, there is the 
persona’s explicit verbal declaration, ipse docebo (line 306), of his task to teach aspiring 
poets in their profession, munus et officium (line 306). Certainly, I should think that the 
high concentration of first person singular verbs in this passage, two of which, fungar… 
docebo (lines 304, 306), are in a ‘conclusive’ future simple tense80, reinforced by the 
emphatic employment of the 1st person pronoun ego (line 301) and the intensive 
pronouns ipsa… ipse (lines 305-306)81, indeed points to these verses as a programmatic 
statement by the authorial persona. 
At this juncture, the question will probably be submitted by the sceptical critic as 
to whether we can in fact trust these verses as a genuine defining statement of purpose, a 
programmatic speech, on the part of the authorial persona in the Ars Poetica. Do we 
believe him when he claims that he will merely play the role of a teacher?  
Perhaps our initial reluctance to accept the sincerity of the words of the authorial 
persona here lies in the curious mixture of authority and deference in his language. 
Certainly, on the one hand, he is manifestly laying claim to the authority of a teacher of 
poetry: he supplies a most well-known metaphor of teaching, ‘playing the whetstone’, to 
define his personal role; he states his purpose in emphatic language with the intensive 
pronoun and 1st person singular future simple verb – ipse docebo (line 306); and, thirdly, 
in a long series of sub-ordinate clauses, dependant on this main clause verb – unde, quid 
                                               
80 In other words, where the future tense does not so much denote an indefinite period of time in the future, 
but rather a conclusive remark or statement; so Gildersleeve & Lodge: “The Fut. is often used in 
conclusions, especially in Cicero (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 162). 
81 ipsa (line 305) is in agreement with quae (line 305) from the antecedent cotis (304), ‘the teacher as 
whetstone’, ipse (line 306) with docebo (line 306). 
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+ -que, quid, quid, quo and quo (lines 307-308) – he lists exactly what he will have 
authority over as teacher, what, in other words, will be the scope of his subject of 
instruction – unde parentur opes, quid alat formetque poetam; / quid deceat, quid non; 
quo virtus, quo ferat error (lines 307-308). 
At the same time as the persona plays up his role as poet teacher, he seems 
ostensibly to defer the role of poet. His language is pregnant with self-deprecation of 
various kinds. Most strikingly he commences the passage with the exclamatory phrase, o 
ego laevus (line 301), in which he castigates himself for staying sane (‘purging bile’) and 
thus not being able to write poetry (Rudd 1989: 201). The register of this self-indictment 
is deliberately elevated and overly poetic: “In exclamations consisting of interjection and 
personal pronoun the type o ego is poetic and very rare” (Brink 1971: 333), far more 
common in Latin is the form ‘o me’, the exclamatory particle, + the accusative case 
(Brink 1971: 333)82. Secondly, and on account of the preceding poetic construction, the 
adjective laevus (line 301) probably does not here denote a frivolous light-hearted self-
indictment – as in ‘clumsy’ or ‘silly me’, as Wickham suggests (Wickham 1891: 417) – 
but rather, taking its precedent from certain passages in Virgil’s Aeneid83, comes to 
signify a grand  insta ce of human self-deception (Brink 1971: 333). So Rudd gives the 
following English rendering of laevus (line 301): “acting against my own interests and 
perhaps even the intention of heaven, hence ‘perverse’” (Rudd 1989: 201).  
Considering the elevated sense of o ego laevus (line 301), the full absurdity of this 
paradoxical statement of the authorial persona should become apparent: in  other words, 
                                               
82 “The Vocative differs from the Nominative in form in the second declension only, and even there the 
Nominative is sometimes used instead, especially in poetry and solemn prose” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 
1903: 143): see Hor. Carm. 1.2.43, Liv. 1.24.7. 
83 For example: si mens non laeva fuisset (Verg. Aen. 2.54). 
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he is calling into question the state of his mental awareness, suggesting that he has 
deceived himself, laevus (line 301), purely on account of the fact that he has not lost his 
mind! His sanity is perverse. And so, accordingly, it ought to become clear that the self-
deprecation of the persona here is not an earnest diminution of his own status as a poet, 
but acts rather as an ironic indictment against the prevailing notions of the inspired poet, 
who treasures ingenium above ars, natural ability over skill. 
Now proceeding onto the defining statement of the authorial persona as 
Praeceptor, we can witness a rather bizarre logic at play in the text, indicated 
grammatically by ergo, where the sarcastic self-deprecation of the persona’s poetic status 
(Brink 1971: 335) – O ego laevus / qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis horam! / non 
alius faceret meliora poemata. verum / nil tanti est (line 301-304) – becomes the primary 
cause of his adoption of the role of a teacher – ergo fungar vice cotis (line 304); it is 
indeed noteworthy that the authorial persona has in this way sought to preface the most 
programmatic section of the poem with such ironic self-deprecation. Furthermore, it 
creates a ridiculous sequence of events whereby the persona’s acquisition of the authority 
of poet teacher is depicted as a very necessary physical means for him to avoid the 
insanity, the excess bile which characterizes the ‘true’ Democritean notion of the poet. 
His mental health is at stake. 
The question then stands as to whether we can truly trust the words of the 
authorial persona here as a defining statement of purpose: does his sarcastic denunciation 
of his poetic status entirely undermine his ensuing claim to be a praeceptor, or is the 
humour designed simply to soften “the transition to the most directly didactic part of the 
poem” (Wickham 1891: 418)? 
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Against the possibility that the Praeceptor is here undermined, a few pertinent 
points should be borne in mind. Firstly, I would suggest that the ironic playful manner in 
which the Praeceptor introduces himself and his task would only represent a major 
interpretative difficulty if we restricted our conception of the Horatian teacher to straight-
forward serious instruction; if on the other hand, as I shall discuss shortly, the Horatian 
concept of the teacher incorporates a wider array of criteria, which allows for an 
admixture of play and instruction, then the casual ridiculous manner in which he is 
presented to us should cause no major critical concern but would in fact be quite fitting 
for his character. 
Secondly, given that the subject of his instruction is poetry, it is actually quite 
necessary for the teacher to reference his authority as poet to some extent. Indeed, 
conversely, if the authorial persona’s deliberate diminution of his own authority as a poet 
were not articulated in such elliptical ironic language, it would be a serious indictment 
against his ability to teach his subject with any authority: how could he instruct poetry, if 
he himself had no natural ability, ingenium, in this field whatsoever, if he could not ‘play 
the poet’ to some extent, if he could not garner the name of a poet, nomenque poetae 
(Hor. Ars P. 299)? This, however, is not the resultant effect of his self-deprecation. As 
Rudd correctly identifies, his decision not to write poetry, ‘to purge bile’, “represents a 
conscious and voluntary decision” (Rudd 1989: 201). He does in actual fact possess the 
ability to write poetry, highlighted by the potential subjunctive faceret (line 303), but 
does not think it worthwhile – verum / nil tanti est (303-304) – to sacrifice his sanity to 
produce the type of true ‘inspired’ poetry, which the Democritean school in particular 
demands; rather he will consciously refrain from practicing poetry and instead will teach, 
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docebo (line 306) (Brink 1971: 334-335), which will indeed, as we shall see, allow him 
ample scope to display his ars, his artistic skill and technique in language, to his readers. 
 
Now whereas the Praeceptor expends much energy in describing the task, munus et 
officium (line 306), of the aspiring poet to his pupils, the Pisones, he is remarkably curt 
about his own task as teacher. What does it mean conceptually to be a teacher? What 
exactly does his part, vice (line 304), entail? His defining verb docere is suitably vague 
and could be translated by a critic to include any number of different though interrelated 
processes, such as ‘instruction’, ‘informing’, ‘showing’, ‘telling’, etc, which may be 
subsumed under the collective notion of ‘teaching’ (docere) (OLD s.v. 1-4). In short, we 
really need a more specific account of the Horatian concept of teaching than what is laid 
out for us in the Ars Poetica. And to this end we should turn to Satire 1.4, in which the 
authorial persona of that sermo provides what I consider to be a more complete 
exposition of the Horatian concept of teaching. In particular I would like to draw 
attention to the final 40 lines of the satire (lines 103-143) where the authorial persona, in 
order to justify the specific brand of satiric writing which he elucidated in the preceding 
part of the poem, provides for us a model of teaching through the characterization of a 
father-figure in the text, pater optimus (Hor. Sat 1.4.105)84, whose concept of teaching 
has become fused, insuevit (Hor. Sat 1.4.105), into the character of the authorial persona 
and then further developed by the persona, I believe, into his own particular conception 
of teaching. 
                                               
84 Unless otherwise indicated, all Latin text of Satires I has been taken from Brown, P.M. 1993. Horace: 
Satires I. Warminster: Aris & Phillips. 
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 So, first of all, the father’s method of teaching seems to involve what one might 
term straight-forward didactic instruction, where information is imparted or transferred 
directly to the pupil. The authorial persona represents this feature of his father’s teaching 
in the following terms:  
 
sic me 
formabat puerum dictis, et sive iubebat 
ut facerem quid, ‘habes auctorem quo facias hoc’ 
(unum ex iudicibus selectis obiciebat) 
sic vetabat, ‘an hoc inhonestum et inutile factu 
necne sit addubites, flagret rumore malo cum 
hic atque ille? 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.120-126) 
 
The father’s teaching or ‘shaping’ of his son, formabat (line 121), is here succinctly 
described by the persona as being characterized by a language of direct command, 
iubebat (line 121), a d prohibition, vetabat (line 124)85. Although the construction of 
iubeo with an ut clause is rare in Latin and unique in Horatian texts, the sense is much the 
same as the more common occurrence of iubeo with the accusative and infinitive (Brown 
1993: 137): the verb usually expresses notions of ‘ordering’, ‘commanding’, or ‘telling 
someone to do something’ (OLD s.v. 1, 4). So, for example, in the Ars Poetica, we can 
witness the same verb, also in the third person singular imperfect, being used to denote 
                                               
85 The actual composition of these commands, the direct speech, will form the second dominant 
characteristic of the father’s method of teaching, see below. 
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this kind of simple didactic instruction, where Quintilius the critic orders the inept poet to 
delete inadequate verses from his work (Regel 1836: 146):  
 
melius te posse negares, 
bis terque expertum frustra, delere iubebat 
et male tornatos incudi reddere versus. 
(Hor. Ars P. 439-441) 
 
Furthermore, apart from the persona’s characterization of his father’s discourse, the 
concept of instruction is implied, I believe, by the pater optimus’ following statement of 
purpose: 
 
‘sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu 
sit melius, causas reddet tibi: mi satis est si 
traditum ab antiquis morem servare tuamque, 
dum custodis eges, vitam famamque tueri 
incolumem possum; simul ac duraverit aetas 
membra animumque tuum, nabis sine cortice’… 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.115-120) 
 
So in this passage, the pater presents his own priorities as a teacher (specifically a teacher 
of ethics in this instance): he is not so much concerned with philosophy – with reasons, 
causas (line 116), as to what is better for a man to pursue, petitu (line 115), or to avoid, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 80 
vitatu (line 115) (‘which can be left to wise men’) – but rather with the practical task of 
‘looking after’, servare (line 117), what has been ‘handed over to him’, traditum (line 
117), from the past, antiquis (line 117) (Brown 1993: 137). What does this phrase 
traditum ab antiquis morem servare (line 117) mean exactly? In a simple physical 
context, servare (line 117) could be used in the sense of ‘keeping watch’ over a particular 
object or person (OLD s.v. 1). In this instance, however, where abstract ideas are handed 
over from the past, traditum ab antiquis (line 117), the particular kind of ‘protection’ 
denoted by servare (line 117) must surely be one in which the ideas conveyed from the 
past are ‘preserved’ or ‘kept for the future’ (OLD s.v. 6). This process then of simply 
handing over, traditum (line 117), information from the past to the future, from one 
generation to another, without interrogating the nature of what is handed over – sapiens… 
causas reddet tibi (lines 115-116) – of course implies a kind of straightforward didactic 
instruction on the part of the pater optimus. Instruction then – this process of ‘handing 
over’ information directly to his son without further elucidation – is very much at the 
heart of the father’s role as a teacher. 
 The second major characteristic of the father’s method of teaching, which we 
might term demonstrative, is quite explicit in the text and has indeed been commented 
upon by most critics:  
 
insuevit pater optimus hoc me, 
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando. 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.105-106) 
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So here the authorial persona explains his pater’s chief “mode of teaching the lesson” 
(Wickham 1891: 57) through the principle of notando… exemplis (line 106). The primary 
sense of notare of course denotes the action of physically marking out an object (OLD 
s.v. 1)86. Just how we translate this gerund notando (line 106) into English really depends 
on how we understand the grammar of the sentence. If we take vitiorum quaeque (line 
106) as the direct object of notando (line 106) (or of both fugerem (line 106) and notando 
(line 106), as Brown and Palmer do87), then we might want to associate notando more 
with a verb such as vituperare, and so, accordingly, the phrase might be rendered, ‘by 
censuring each of the vices with examples’ (Regel 1836: 198). So in Regel’s thesaurus of 
Horatian words he does not even include exemplis (line 106) in his classification of the 
sense of notando (line 106), but only gives the following words – vitiorum quaeque 
notando (line 106) – in which case vituperare would indeed be the preferred sense. 
However, if we take the ablative exemplis (line 106) directly after notando (line 106), the 
sense of the verb comes, I believe, closer to a verb such as exprimere and the phrase 
attains the sense of ‘by showing with examples’ (OLD s.v. 9d)88. 
 This principle of the optimus pater to teach ‘by showing’ or ‘illustrating with 
examples’ is indeed quite apparent in his discourse: 
 
‘nonne vides Albi ut male vivat filius, utque 
Baius inops? magnum documentum ne patriam rem 
perdere quis velit’… 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.109-111) 
                                               
86 For all the senses in which notare is used in the extant Horatian texts, see Regel 1836: 198. 
87 See Brown 1993: 136, Palmer 1968: 168. 
88 For other examples of notare in the sense of exprimere, see Regel 1836: 198. 
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So, for instance, rather than simply prohibiting his son against wasteful behaviour, he 
provides the models of certain notorious individuals, ‘the son of Albius’ and ‘Baius’, who 
had become “victims to prodigality” (Brown 1993: 136) in order to warn him against 
such behaviour. Moreover, it must be pointed out that this teaching method of the father’s 
incorporates both the illustration of positive – ‘habes auctorem quo facias hoc’ (Hor. Sat. 
1.4. 122), and negative exempla:  
 
‘an hoc inhonestum et inutile factu 
necne sit addubites, flagret rumore malo cum 
hic atque ille?’ 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.124-127) 
 
This is my primary reason for believing that the persona’s introductory description of his 
father’s teaching, notando exemplis, denotes a more general teaching principle of 
‘showing with examples’ than ‘censuring vices with examples’, vituperare, which would 
seem to omit instruction through positive illustration. 
 Lastly, it is perhaps an unintentional irony, but nevertheless instructive for our 
purposes, to consider that the father’s entire speech, which is concerned with examining 
the examples of others in his quest to teach his son, is itself an exemplary speech in the 
discourse of the authorial persona, designed to illustrate how the father enacted his 
principle of notando exemplis. It is perhaps a good indication of how this teaching 
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method has indeed become infused, insuevit (line 105), into the discourse of the authorial 
persona himself. 
Beyond the instruction and demonstration inherent in the pater optimus’ method 
of teaching, a third characteristic, the concept of play, can be found in the authorial 
persona’s opening programmatic statement: 
 
liberius si 
dixero quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris 
cum venia dabis: insuevit pater optimus hoc me, 
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando. 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4 103-106) 
 
The authorial persona describes his own discourse, dixero (line 104), with the following 
two comparative adverbs liberius (line 103) and iocosius (line 104). In particular I would 
like to consider the sense of iocosius here89. Perhaps more than any other Latin word, 
iocosius comes closest, I believe, to the characteristically Horatian sense of humour 
which we find not only in Satire 1.4, but also in the Ars Poetica. So what does it mean for 
one to speak iocosius? The OLD provides the following English equivalents to the Latin 
adjective, iocosus, derived from the noun iocus: “fond of jokes or jesting… full of fun or 
jesting… laughable, funny” (OLD s.v. 1-3). 
To garner a better idea of the connotations of this word, it is necessary to examine 
some other contexts in which it is used. Although the adverb iocosius (from the positive 
                                               
89 The usage of liberius is less problematic: “liberius continues the theme of the proper limits to the 
satirist’s libertas (5)” (Brown 1993: 136), which runs throughout Satire 1.4. 
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form iocose) is employed only in Satire 1.4 in the extant Horatian works, the related 
adjective iocosus is utilized on several occasions by Horace (twice in the Epodes, six 
times in the Odes, and once in the Satires) (Regel 1836: 143). So Satire 1.10, like 1.4, 
commences with a discussion of Lucilius’ stylistic short-comings, after which the persona 
of the poem gives his own stylistic requirements for a sermo: 
 
 
et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso, 
defendente vicem modo rhetoris atque poetae, 
interdum urbani, parcentis viribus atque 
extenuantis eas consulto. ridiculum acri 
fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res. 
(Hor. Sat.1.10.11-15) 
 
Firstly, regarding the sense of iocosus, the word order of the phrase et sermone opus est 
modo tristi, saepe iocoso (line 11) clearly gives prominence to the contrast between the 
adjectives tristi (line 11) and iocoso (line 11), which are removed through emphatic 
hyperbaton from their qualifying noun, sermone (line 11), and placed at the end of the 
verse, and which are preceded by the comparative temporal adverbs, modo… saepe (line 
11). The syntactic contrast is of course meant to heighten the semantic opposition 
between these two terms; so Brown provides the translation: “and a style is needed which 
is sometimes stern, often playful”90 (Brown 1993: 83). So, likewise, in Epodes 1.18 a 
similar contrast is established in the phrase (Regel 1836: 143): oderunt tristem iocosi 
                                               
90 My italics. 
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(Hor Epodes 1.18.89). The type of humour demanded by iocosus seems to be a lighter 
(i.e. not serious or tristis) playful kind of language, sportive. 
Furthermore, for my purpose of incorporating this concept of playfulness within 
the task of a teacher, Satire 1.10 provides the following important judgement on the part 
of the authorial persona: ridiculum acri / fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res 
(line 14-15). Humour, ridiculum (line 14), is often far more effective, fortius et melius… 
plerumque (line 15), in deciding affairs than serious invective, acri (line 14) (Brown 
1993: 185). The language here is almost forensic in word choice, particularly the 
employment of secat (line 15)91 and res (line 15), and, as Wickham points out, seems to 
recall a passage from Cicero (Wickham 1891: 100-101): odiosas res saepe, quas 
argumentis dilui non facile est, ioco risuque dissolvit (Cic de Or. 2.58.236).  
But undoubtedly the most important prescription as to the importance of play 
within the task of a teacher occurs in Horace’s Satire 1.1: 
 
praeterea ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens 
percurram – quamquam ridentem dicere verum 
quid vetat, ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi 
 
doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima? 
(Hor. Sat. 1.1.23-26) 
 
While the authorial persona here shrugs off the pursuit of humour for its own sake – 
where a man simply ‘runs through’ a subject laughing, qui iocularia ridens / percurram 
                                               
91 multae magnaeque secantur iudice lites (Hor. Epod. 1.16.42). 
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(lines 23-24) – he provides the abrupt, and thus striking, concession, quamquam (line 24), 
that humour is in fact quite compatible with giving serious instructions, ridentem dicere 
verum (line 24), specifically “with telling the truth (i.e. with a serious ultimate purpose)” 
(Brown 1993: 91)92. 
In order to give some justification as to just how such playfulness is compatible 
with serious aims, the persona provides the analogy of teachers, doctores (line 26), 
(specifically the teacher of young children in their elementary education), who coax, 
blandi (line 25), pupils into learning, discere (line 26), by offering them certain 
enticements, crustula (line 25) (Wickham 1891: 20). Clearly what we mean by ‘play’ is 
determined by the audience under instruction, whereas the teacher of young children 
offers play in the form of physical treats in order to coax his pupils into learning their 
alphabet, elementa… prima (line 26), for the more mature pupil, by analogy, such play 
might consist of disarming humorous language which both softens and endorses the 
particular instructions at hand. So, accordingly, in Satire 1.4, we can witness the authorial 
persona, when discussing how he was taught by his father, describing this playful 
constituent within his character, iocosius (line 104), as an inevitable result of the manner 
in which he was taught, exemplis… notando (line 106) (his exact phrasing presents 
notando exemplis as a justification, hoc mihi iuris (line 104), for his playfulness). In 
short, in the Horatian concept of the teacher, the serious is always intermingled with the 
playful in instructions – why simply dicere verum when one can ridentem dicere verum 
(Hor. Sat. 1.1.24), gently coaxing the pupil in the right direction. 
 
                                               
92 For further discussion and arguments pertaining to the particular type of humour which the authorial 
persona of the Satires (particularly 1.4) engages in, the third chapter of this dissertation ought to be 
consulted. 
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Against the possible charge that the conceptual criteria which I have hitherto established 
for the Horatian Praeceptor – namely, those of instruction, demonstration, and play – are 
somehow arbitrary in their relation to the role of a teacher in general, I would like very 
briefly as an additional justification of the efficacy of these principles to examine certain 
modern theories within the analytical philosophy of education pertaining to the task of a 
teacher93. In particular, I would like to draw on Ethics and Education by R.S. Peters, who 
seeks to encapsulate the term ‘education’ within three distinctive criteria, concentrating 
on the relationship between teacher and pupil. 
It must, however, be strongly stipulated that, by focusing on the analytical 
philosophy of education94 and by highlighting the work of one man, although he is 
regarded as one of the chief proponents in this field, I am not endeavouring to prefer or 
argue for a definitive modern account of the role of the teacher in ‘education’, which 
itself would surely demand an entire dissertation to justify; rather I am merely employing 
this account as a means to illustrate the relevance to the role of a teacher, from a general 
perspective, of the concepts which I have established from the Horatian texts, seeing that 
this modern account of education establishes similar or related conceptual criteria. 
Whether Horace or whether Peters are in fact ‘correct’ in their explanation of the task of a 
teacher is a question for philosophers and frankly not pertinent to my analysis of the text 
of the Ars Poetica. 
                                               
93 For a good introduction and brief summary of the field of analytical philosophy, see Noddings, N. 1995. 
Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Westview Press, pg 41-57. 
94 There are indeed several other noteworthy modern fields within this school of study, pardon the pun, 
such as continental philosophy (‘the analytical philosophy of education’ tends to focus on Anglo-American 
scholarship) and various post-modern interpretations of the philosophy of education. 
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 So Peter’s first criterion is formulated thus: “Education implies the transmission95 
of what is worthwhile to those who have become committed to it” (Peters 1966: 45). This 
is then a fairly straightforward commonsensical criterion for a teacher: a subject, which is 
deemed worthy of study, is transferred from a teacher to the respective pupil. In my 
discussion of Satire 1.4 we have already seen how the pater optimus (line 105) puts his 
trust in the value of the knowledge (particularly ethical knowledge, morem (line 117) in 
the case of that sermo) which has been handed to him, traditum (line 117), from the past 
and how he is concerned with preserving this knowledge for future generations – the 
Horatian model of teacher, in short, is preoccupied with this transmission of his subject, 
with ‘building information into the mind of his pupils’, to get to the etymological root of 
the concept of instruction (Schofield 1972: 43). 
As an addendum to this criterion, I think it is important to stress that in this 
dissertation I shall be employing the concept of ‘instruction’ purely to denote this process 
of handing over (transmitting, transferring, etc) subject matter, whatever it may be, on the 
part of the teacher. Too often in Classical Philology, particularly in discussions of the 
function of the teacher figure or persona in didactic works, the term ‘instruction’ is 
employed synonymously with a collective term such as ‘teaching’. So in Katharina 
Volk’s explanation of the criteria of didactic poetry, she provides the following principal 
rubric of ‘explicit didactic intent’: “A didactic poem either states clearly, or gives other 
strong indications, that it is first and foremost supposed to teach96 whatever subject or 
skill it happens to be treating. Thus, while we are free to imagine that Homer really did 
                                               
95 My italics. 
96 My italics. 
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wish to instruct97 his audience in strategy, the Iliad itself gives no sign of any such 
intent…” (Volk 2002: 36-37). Volk has here (and again further down on this page, 37) 
made use of the verbs ‘to teach’ and ‘to instruct’ as virtual synonyms in this important 
prescription. If, with regard to our established concept of the Horatian teacher, we were 
to equate these two terms as comprising a single concept, we would run the risk either of 
trivialising the plurality of the process of ‘teaching’, the vice of the Praeceptor, which has 
been shown to include at least three separate components, or otherwise we would lose the 
particular nuance of ‘instruction’ as being concerned simply with the ‘transmission’ of 
information or facts about a subject. As Dearden states: “The concept of teaching is much 
wider than that of instructing, which implies an imparting or telling of what is to be 
learned. Teaching leaves it open how learning will be brought about” (Dearden 1970: 
89). 
 Dearden’s recommendation leads us aptly onto Peters’ second criterion: 
“Education must involve knowledge and understanding98 and some sort of ‘cognitive 
perspective’ which is not inert” (Peters 1966: 45). Schofield explains the conceptual 
difference between Peters’ employment of ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ as follows: 
“we can have knowledge which we understand, and we can make use of such knowledge, 
or we can have knowledge which we cannot use, because we do not understand it” 
(Schofield 1972: 36). Education for Peters is not simply concerned with the transference 
of a particular subject so that the given pupil might possess ‘raw’ knowledge, but rather it 
demands that this knowledge be processed so that understanding is brought about. The 
notion that the ‘raw’ or ‘inert’ subject matter, to employ Peter’s term, conveyed through 
                                               
97 My italics. 
98 My italics. 
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instruction, must somehow be processed is represented by the Horatian concept of 
demonstration, where, as I examined in Satire 1.4, the pater optimus augments and 
elucidates his subject with reference to various examples, notando exemplis, in order that 
the pupil (in that case the authorial persona) might acquire a better understanding of the 
dangers of certain vices (prodigality, sexual debauchery, etc). In short, the Horatian 
model of the Praeceptor not only presents facts, but enhances and clarifies this instruction 
for the pupil through demonstration. 
Lastly, Peters’ third criterion states that “Education at least rules out some 
procedures of transmission on the grounds that they lack wittingness and voluntariness99 
on the part of the learner” (Peters 1966: 45). So then for Peters the task of the teacher is 
not simply to transmit prescriptions to his pupils and subsequently to render these in a 
form understandable to them, through demonstration or other explanatory means, but to 
ensure that these learners are willing to partake in such activities. Under this criterion we 
may locate the Horatian notion of play, where coaxing teachers, blandi / doctores (Hor. 
Sat. 1.1.25-26), offers enticements100, crustula (Hor. Sat. 1.1.25), to lure the pupils into 
following the given prescriptions. As Dearden suggests, in his The Concept of Play, 
teaching needs to acknowledge the wide array of processes by which learning and 
understanding can be brought about, of which playful activities could constitute a large 
proportion (Dearden 1970: 89). Indeed, the concept of play has long been a 
preoccupation for theorists of education, obviously with reference mainly to the 
formative education of children: Plato “draws attention to the importance of play in 
learning. He talks very strongly about both the indignity and inefficiency of compelling 
                                               
99 My italics. 
100 Literally translated: ‘that the teachers enticing them…’ 
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children to learn things that they do not want to know… if children can learn things in a 
context where they enjoy doing what they are learning, especially while at play, then they 
are more likely to learn it” (Peters 1981: 7). 
 In concluding this short interlude into the analytical philosophy of education, it 
must again be emphasized that my basis for establishing a coherent concept of the 
Horatian Praeceptor lies in the explicit statements made within the poetry of the Roman 
writer (specifically Satires 1.1, 1.4, and 1.10) and that, although such modern 
philosophical accounts, as Peters’, might be useful in clarifying the concepts which I 
have endeavoured to locate in the Horatian text and certainly in providing reassuring 
conceptual parallels between the modern and the ancient perspective of teaching, they 
should not themselves form the basis of my interpretation, which endeavours to locate a 
characteristically Horatian Praeceptor. 
 
Having established my concept of what constitutes the Horatian Praeceptor, it is 
necessary now to turn back to the Ars Poetica in order to see how this Praeceptor 
manifests himself in the language of the poem. My task will therefore be to relate the 
conceptual to the linguistic, to illustrate how the language reflects the aims of the 
Praeceptor. To this end I have divided this chapter into three sections, pertaining to the 
conceptual criteria of Instruction, Demonstration, and Play. Within each section, I shall 
suggest how the different types of language, which the Praeceptor employs, fulfil the 
respective criteria. 
 It must be stated here that on account of the spatial constraints of this dissertation 
I shall not be able to analyse the entire text of the Ars Poetica, as one would in a 
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commentary, for example. Having said that, I shall aim at including in my analysis as 
many different passages as possible and, where appropriate, I shall suggest corresponding 
linguistic parallels in the footnotes. Obviously, my selection of certain ‘important’ 
passages from the Ars will represent a latent subjectivity in my analysis which I cannot 
avoid and must therefore acknowledge here. 
 In terms of the secondary material utilized for this chapter, much of my analysis 
has stemmed from four prominent commentaries of the Ars Poetica: Wilkins’ The 
Epistles of Horace, Wickham’s The Works of Horace, Brink’s Horace on Poetry: The 
Ars Poetica, and Rudd’s Horace: Epistles Book II and the Epistle to the Pisones. For 
depth of analysis Brink’s colossal work on the poem clearly reigns supreme in its 
attention to the minutiae of language in the Ars and has accordingly contributed to and 
complemented much of my interpretation of Horace’s work; Wilkins, though briefer in 
scope, does provide a degree of intricate linguistic exposition of the poem, although, as 
befitting a nineteenth century commentary, its primary focus is oriented towards textual 
criticism of the manuscripts; thirdly, Wickham, far less detailed than Wilkins, supplies a 
more amenable guide to the poem – in particular, his knowledge of related classical texts 
provides useful source material with which to compare the Ars; and, finally, Rudd offers 
the definitive contemporary (1989) discussion of the language of the Ars, mediating 
between the earlier stances taken by the nineteenth century commentators and the often 
overly-ornate interpretations of Brink’s behemoth. In terms of other sources, I have on 
occasion drawn on fundamental works of Latin grammar and rhetoric, Madvig and 
Gildersleeve & Lodge, where interpretation of basic constructions is called for. 
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Furthermore, several specific linguistic studies of Latin syntax and poetics have also been 
employed at the relevant sections. 
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2.1 First Criterion: Instruction 
 
In this section I shall examine how the concept of instruction is conveyed through two 
types of discourse: a language of command, where the Praeceptor transmits his subject, 
ars poetica, directly to his pupils, the Pisones, and, secondly, proverbial language, where 
the Praeceptor uses the weight of traditional discourse to carry the thrust of his 
instructions. 
 
 
Language of Command  
 
At the core of the communication of the Horatian Praeceptor must be a language of direct 
command which manifestly transmits his subject matter to his pupils, the Pisones. This 
may be softened by other features of language: the Praeceptor may, for example, 
encourage the pupils through empathetic language, he may indulge in sportive speech to 
make light of the respective instructions, and he may even self-deprecate101 in order to 
reduce his assumed authority; however, ultimately, he could not teach effectively without 
a degree of what I would call purely commanding language. Now I shall illustrate in the 
following section just how he achieves this type of discourse, examining, in particular, 
the moods and tenses of verbs throughout the poem which have a manifestly 
commanding function as well as other syntactic features of the language which naturally 
accompany and supplement this discourse of command in the text. 
                                               
101 As I have already discussed with relation to the programmatic speech of the Praeceptor (lines 301-308). 
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 So, firstly, the most obvious form of commanding language is the second person 
imperative. The imperative is the mood employed by a writer to convey a direct 
command of some kind: “The imperative is the mood of will. It wills the predicate be 
made a reality. The tone of the imperative varies from stern command to piteous 
entreaty” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 174)102. The importance of the imperative mood 
in the Ars Poetica need not simply, I believe, be indicated by how pervasive it is 
throughout the poem, but rather how its employment is emphasised in the text. So the 
Praeceptor will often draw attention to the presence of the direct imperative by presenting 
the addressees of the command in the vocative or nominative case alongside or near the 
verb. Consider the following three examples:  
 
credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum 
persimilem cuius, velut aegri somnia, vanae 
fingentur species, ut nec pes nec caput uni 
reddatur formae. 
(Hor. Ars P. 6-9) 
 
tu quid ego et populus mecum desideret audi. 
(Hor. Ars P. 153) 
 
vos, o 
Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non 
                                               
102 Note that for grammatical works, as Gildersleeve & Lodge and Madvig, the reference is to the page and 
not the paragraph number. 
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multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque 
praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.  
(Hor. Ars P. 291-294)  
 
In each instance the second person imperative is made empathic by pointing to the 
addressee of the command through personal pronouns and proper nouns – credite, 
Pisones (line 6), tu… audi (line 153), and vos, o / Pompilius sanguis… reprehendite 
(lines 291-292). The third of these commands is rendered particularly forceful and 
weighty by juxtaposing the royal genealogy of the Pisones to Numa Pompilius beside the 
vocative vos (line 291) (Brink 1971: 292); moreover, Dickey lists sanguis (line 292) as a 
word of high poetic register, frequently employed to address a large group of men rather 
than just a few individual men, as in this passage, which obviously adds to the grandeur 
of the Praeceptor’s address (Dickey 2002: 295, 357). 
Now seeing that the second person imperative is a fairly strong form of command, 
it is not used as commonly throughout the Ars as other tenses and moods which convey 
instructions or rules; rather it can be used by the Praeceptor as a potent marker or header 
for a series of other instructions103. So, for example, the following imperative phrase – tu 
quid ego et populus mecum desideret audi (line 153) – does not in itself denote a 
particular aesthetic direction but rather acts as a “vigorous line [that] introduces the new 
series of instructions” (Brink 1971: 227): 
 
si plosoris eges aulaea manentis et usque 
                                               
103 For other examples of second person imperatives used in the Ars: lines 38, 39, 119 (the imperatives here 
also serve as headings to introduce a longer instructive passage), 141 (in a quotation), 155 (in a quotation), 
269, 368, 369, 438 (in a quotation), 459 (in a quotation). 
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sessuri donec cantor ‘vos plaudite’ dicat, 
aetatis cuiusque notandi sunt tibi mores, 
mobilibusque decor naturis dandus et annis. 
(Hor. Ars P. 154-157) 
 
In other words, although the second person imperative is not quite as common as one 
might expect in a discussion of commanding language, it tends in the Ars Poetica often to 
lead the way into and thus underscore other highly instructive language. 
 On the subject of imperatives in the Ars Poetica, one would have to cite the 
Praeceptor’s employment of the rarely-used third person plural future imperatives in his 
discussion of the appropriate register in tragedy and comedy: 
 
non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunto, 
et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto. 
(Hor. Ars P. 99-100) 
 
This form of the imperative mood is part of a specialized discourse ‘chiefly used in laws, 
legal documents, maxims and the like” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 175); Madvig, 
citing this particular passage from the Ars as a prime example, provides the following 
explanation: “the future [imperative is employed] (which has also the third person) when 
the request or command is stated with express reference to the time following or some 
particular case that may occur: it is consequently employed in laws and where the style of 
laws is imitated” (Madvig 1857: 340). Again, later in the Ars, when discussing the 
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primary purpose of poets – i.e. ‘to delight or to be useful’ (line 333) – the Praeceptor 
gives another form of the second or future imperative in esto: 
 
quidquid praecipies esto brevis, ut cito dicta 
percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles; 
(Hor. Ars P. 335-6) 
 
By employing such typically forensic forms the Praeceptor is lending a certain formality, 
strictness and gravitas to his commands: he is here laying out some of the ‘laws of ars 
poetica’ for his pupils to follow (Rudd 1989: 167).  
As an addendum to this, the question might arise as to why these commands in 
particular warrant a strong forensic form, while elsewhere instructions may be conveyed 
through less formal verbal moods. Brink provides the suggestion that the commands here 
are especially true to Horace’s own poetic practice, particularly, in the second instance, 
his fondness for brevity: “It has often been noted that this injunction expresses H.’s own 
practice, in this very passage as e.g. 23, 45, 92, 99-100, 102-3, 119-120” (Brink 1971: 
353). The forensic forms would then be a measure of how true these prescriptions are to 
the Praeceptor himself, to the extent that they have become artistic laws for him. Rudd, 
less prone to the linguistic supposition of Brink’s analysis, simply states that the legal 
verbs are indicative of a “prescriptive context” (Rudd 1989: 167). This is certainly true of 
the imperative esto (line 335), which lies in the part of the poem which follows the 
Praeceptor’s programmatic statement (lines 301-308), his instruction of the social 
responsibility of the poet (lines 312-318), and the important prescription of the role of a 
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poet (lines 333-334) in ‘mixing pleasure with utility’; in other words, it is possible that 
the strong forensic forms might not themselves be of the greatest importance but are 
reflective of the strongly prescriptive tone which a sequence of narrative as a whole is 
tending to take. 
Furthermore, a usage very similar to the ‘future imperatives’ can be seen in the 
Praeceptor’s employment of jussive subjunctives  to provide a series of established rules 
(Madvig 1857: 340); this is particularly noticeable in the section on dramatic conventions 
(Brink 1971: 255):  
 
neve minor neu sit quinto productior actu 
fabula, quae posci vult et spectanda reponi. 
nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus 
inciderit; nec quarta loqui persona laboret. 
(Hor. Ars P. 189-192) 
 
Indeed, the jussive language in this section might encourage one to label these verses ‘the 
laws of the stage’. 
 Continuing with this theme of legal discourse, on a number of occasions the 
Praeceptor speaks in what Brink chooses to call the ‘empirical perfect’, in which an 
action is represented as a fixed law, “proved by experience” (Brink 1971: 376). Madvig 
provides the following brief general observation of this particular function of the perfect 
tense: “The perfect is sometimes found in the poets… instead of the present, to express a 
thing that is customarily done (and has already often taken place)” (Madvig 1857: 289); it 
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is similarly described in Gildersleeve and Lodge under the name of the gnomic or 
sententious perfect: “The perfect is often used of that which has been and shall be… 
usually in poetry, from Catullus on, and frequently with an indefinite adjective or adverb 
of number or a negative” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 160).  As an example, the 
Praeceptor provides the following seemingly well-known dictum pertaining to poetic 
license (Wilkins 1886: 337):  
 
‘pictoribus atque poetis 
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.’ 
(Hor. Ars P. 9-10) 
 
As opposed to the imperfect, pluperfect or aorist (i.e. perfect in historic sequence) tenses 
in Latin, which would remove the statement somewhat from the present circumstances, 
the perfect tense in primary sequence (much like the true perfect tense in Greek) adopted 
here links the continuous past unto the present state of affairs such that the impression is 
created of a general or universal law. Elsewhere in the poem such empirical presents 
denoting accepted laws can be viewed in omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci (Hor. 
Ars P. 343) and, in syncopated form, somewhat ironically in the anticlimactic phrase:  
 
mediocribus esse poetis 
 non homines non di, non concessere columnae. 
(Hor. Ars P. 372-373) 
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Note how in all three examples the perfects portray the notion of an established law. 
Moreover, in firm accordance with the definition of Gildersleeve & Lodge, all these 
verbal forms are accompanied by indefinite numeral references and negatives to reinforce 
the aspect of universality: so, in the first example, there is emphatic hyperbole in semper 
(line 10), which removes any temporal specificity, while the object of the verb audendi 
(line 10) is the indefinite pronoun, quidlibet (line 10); in the second example, the 
indefinite numeral, omne (line 343), is object of the empirical perfect, tulit (line 343); 
and, in the third instance cited, the perfect, concessere (line 373) is supplemented with 
the repeated negatives in non homines non di, non… (line 373). 
One of the more important verbal tenses scattered throughout the prescriptive 
language of the Ars Poetica is the indicative future simple. Of the uses of this tense by 
the Praeceptor I would like to consider chiefly the 2nd and 3rd person singular, seeing that 
they are frequently utilized by the persona and are, indeed, the most relevant to this 
particular analysis of commanding language. 
Firstly, one must acknowledge that in Latin the future tense does not only have to 
imply futurity of action, although obviously this is often its root function in narratives: it 
can also stand as a polite form of command. So under the functions of the future simple 
tense, Gildersleeve and Lodge write: “The future is used in an imperative sense, as in 
English, chiefly in familiar language” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 162). Similarly, in 
English, we might imagine that a schoolteacher could convey a command using an 
imperative – ‘finish your homework’, or, otherwise, with a future simple – ‘you will 
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finish your homework’104. The second phrase is neither employed in the interrogative 
mood nor as an indicative statement of fact, but is designed to stand as a polite command; 
or as Madvig notes in his section on the imperative mood: “The second person of the 
future indicative is sometimes used for the second person of the imperative, in order to 
express a firm conviction, that the command or direction will be complied with, 
especially in familiar language” (Madvig 1857: 340). 
And it is this kind of polite command that we can witness in the Ars Poetica 
where the Praeceptor addresses the Pisones in the second person singular of the future 
simple indicative rather than with an imperative or prohibitive (i.e. in the subjunctive) 
form:  
 
publica materies privati iuris erit, si 
non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem, 
nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus 
interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum 
unde pedem proferre pudor vetet aut operis lex, 
(Hor. Ars P. 131-135) 
 
In this example, it is clear that the future simples moraberis (line 132), curabis (line 133) 
and desilies (line 134) have been presented as suppressed forms of negative command, 
i.e. as polite requests, within a conditional clause; they could, however, have been 
presented as more forceful prohibitions by the Praeceptor, in the form ‘do not tarry over 
                                               
104 Although the tone may be slightly more imperious in English with the addition of the auxiliary ‘will’ to 
the main verb, especially if this is given emphasis, whereas this obviously does not occur in the case of the 
inflected Latin verb. 
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the common ground, do not care to translate verbatim like a faithful translator’, etc (Rudd 
1989: 172). The conditional element in the above example certainly does seem to add 
another level of formality and politeness onto that of the already ‘courteous future 
command’. We can also view instances of this polite command solely within a main 
clause: as in the form of moraberis (line 178) in the discussion of presenting appropriate 
subject matter in terms of the age distinctions: 
 
ne forte seniles 
mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles, 
semper in adiunctis aevoque moraberis aptis. 
(Hor. Ars P. 176-178) 
 
And again a little later in promes and tolles (line 183) in the instruction to avoid unsightly 
events on the dramatic stage: 
 
non tamen intus 
digna geri promes in scaenam, multaque tolles 
ex oculis quae mox narret facundia praesens; 
(Hor. Ars P. 182-184) 
 
The recurrent employment of the second person singular, not just in the future simple but 
also often in present and future perfect tenses through the Ars105, is a typical feature of 
                                               
105 So for other examples of second person verbal forms in the Ars: lines 5, 20, 38, 47, 102, 104, 125, 129, 
130, 136, 154, 361, 362, 367, 385, 387, 426, 436, 438, 439, 442, 462 (in a quotation). 
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the language of Greek diatribes, where the teacher-figure addresses an “imaginary 
listener or disciple” (Brink 1971: 138). In essence, much of the discourse of the 
Praeceptor – whether manifestly commanding or not – is aimed in the direction of his 
pupils. His subject of ‘ars poetica’ is designed for their consumption. 
 Moving onto the 3rd person future, Brink points out that this can take the form of a 
‘potential’ future, which tends to convey a generalizing tone upon the narrative, citing the 
example of the verbs exprimet (line 33), imitabitur (line 33) and nesciet (line 35) in the 
following sentence (Brink 1971: 118-9): 
 
Aemilium circa ludum faber imus et ungues 
exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos, 
infelix operis summa, quia ponere totum 
nesciet. 
(Hor. Ars P. 32-35) 
 
Now this kind of future tense does not function to mark out a definite span of time in the 
future, contrasted to the present and past; rather, it denotes what we might think of as a 
general or universal state. We should observe how such a generalizing tone will tend to 
present statements almost as universally established facts or laws, quite similar to the 
manner of the empirical perfect (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 162). Consider perhaps the 
two most well-known verses from the Ars: 
 
rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae, 
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verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur. 
(Hor. Ars P. 310-311) 
 
The future, sequentur (line 311), although it does logically follow in time from the 
preceding clause, really here has the grammatical force of presenting a general principle – 
‘words will willingly follow a foreseen subject’. 
Thus far in this chapter concerning commanding language I have discussed 
primarily verbal moods and tenses; there are, however, other syntactic features within this 
general discourse which, although not conveying commands themselves (as only verbs 
can obviously do), very often supplement and augment the instructions inherent in the 
verbs – in other words, they provide emphasis for the verbal commands. I have already 
mentioned how indefinite language accompanies empirical perfects in the establishment 
of rules and how regular second person imperatives and future polite commands, in fact, 
are emphasized by vocatives of address or even nominative subjects, as in the following 
three examples: 
 
tuque 
rectius Iliacum carmen deducis in actus 
quam si proferres ignota indictaque primus 
(Hor. Ars P. 128-130) 
 
tu quid ego et populus mecum desideret audi  
(Hor. Ars P. 153) 
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tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva 
(Hor. Ars P. 385). 
 
Now I shall examine some features of word order which lend prominence to instructions 
in general. Firstly, in the prescriptive language of the Ars there are several examples of 
polyptoton – that is to say, the repetition and often juxtaposition of the same root word in 
a different grammatical form106. So in the discussion of the efficacy of neologisms there 
is a repetition of the impersonal verb licere in the ‘empirical’ perfect and ‘generalising’ 
future simple tense respectively: 
 
licuit semperque licebit 
signatum praesente nota producere nomen. 
(Hor. Ars P. 58-59) 
 
The ‘polyptoton’ has the effect of drawing attention to the key aesthetic concept under 
discussion here ‘lice tia’: the Praeceptor is arguing for modern Latin writers to be 
allowed the same degree of license in adopting new words as their literary ancestors, in 
the forms of Caecilius and Plautus (Brink 1971: 146). At other places in the poem, 
polyptoton emphasizes a particular instruction by reflecting the sense of the statement 
through the organization of the syntax: 
 
                                               
106 Technically the term refers to different noun cases but is also often employed by critics for differing 
verbal tenses or moods. 
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atque ita mentitur, sic veris falsa remiscet, 
primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet imum. 
(Hor. Ars P. 151-152) 
 
Appropriately, primo (line 152) lies at the start of the verse, medium (line 152) and medio 
(line 152) in the middle and imum (line 152) at the end. 
 Anaphora, the repetition of a word at the beginning of successive phrases or 
verses, is another common means to give emphasis to a command through its position in 
a sentence. So there is the stressed repetition of multa (line 293) in the Praeceptor’s 
request for poetic refinement and polishing (Brink 1971: 322): multa dies et multa litura 
coercuit atque (Hor. Ars P. 293). The repetition of multa (line 293) in two short phrases 
within a single verse lends a scale of importance to the verbal command of reprehendite 
(line 292) which would be nowhere near as emphatic without the anaphora.  
On the subject of emphatic discourse, hyperbaton is common in the rhetoric of the 
Praeceptor where the customary word order is inverted such that a particular technical 
term is given prominence. So when talking about the appropriate ordo or arrangement of 
a literary work, the teacher gives primary position to the dependant genitive, which in 
normal Latin grammar would follow its governing noun, so as to almost provide the 
subject heading, ‘ordo’, for this sentence (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430):  
 
ordinis haec virtus erit et venus, aut ego fallor, 
ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici, 
pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat; 
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(Hor. Ars P. 42-44) 
 
Furthermore, the interjection, aut ego fallor (line 42), in which the Praeceptor seems to 
question his authority in this particular prescription of ‘ordo’, might come across as a 
self-deprecatory phrase on the surface, but in actual fact, as both Brink and Rudd 
identify, it actually functions as “a fairly outspoken and perhaps humorous insistence on 
the truism” (Brink 1971: 130): observe the manner in which this phrase is positioned 
right at the end of a verse and expressed in as few words as possible, compared with the 
rest of the discussion on ‘ordo’, in order not to apportion any great weight to the 
sentiment that he might in fact be wrong, fallor; moreover, the emphatic selection of the 
1st person pronoun ego (line 42) to stand right beside its verb, fallor (line 42), seems not a 
little hyperbolic for a genuine polite self-deprecatory disclaimer. So what is seemingly a 
self-deprecatory parenthesis turns out to be an authoritative endorsement of the 
Praeceptor’s instructive language. 
 Lastly, and most basically, we should not forget to notice how the Praeceptor will 
give prominence to a precept by providing as few cola as possible in a clause in the form 
of a short sharp command rather than an elaborate statement (Brink 1971: 197). So, for 
example, in the instruction ‘either to choose characters for your work from tradition or to 
invent new ones’ – aut famam sequere aut sibi convenientia finge (Hor. Ars P. 119) – 
these two concepts are phrased most economically in the form of noun or adjectival 
object followed by imperative; in particular the neuter present participle, convenientia 
(line 119) is quite elliptical107, which might indeed warrant greater exposition in another 
                                               
107 As is fama (line 119), which normally denotes the concept of ‘rumour’ in Latin, as contrasted with 
‘fact’, but which here presents the notion of ‘tradition’ in two short syllables (Brink 1971: 198). 
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context but really here allows the Praeceptor to express the notion of ‘invention’ in as 
few words as possible. 
To conclude this discussion, the Praeceptor of the Ars certainly does engage in a 
language of direct command in certain parts of the poem. This is identifiable through the 
employment of specific verbal moods and tenses which convey orders or rules to the 
Pisones (and, indeed, the implied audience behind these generalized ‘dummy figures’108); 
and this discourse is often backed up by other syntactic features in the narrative which 
draw attention to the presence of commands. However, although there are indeed words, 
and lines which are manifestly prescriptive, this kind of purely instructive language is 
more often than not tempered throughout the Ars by less assertive types of discourse 
which demonstrate the Praeceptor’s desire to see his pupils adopt these prescriptions – he 
is not simply barking out orders in the manner of a drill sergeant. 
  
 
Proverbial Language 
 
In the previous sectio  I drew attention to a number of verbal moods and tenses109 which 
function to present certain statements in the Ars as fixed laws to be taken up by the pupils 
as irrefutable facts; I would like to explore further this characteristic of the Praeceptor’s 
discourse through his employment of proverbial language. By the designation of 
‘proverbial language’, I am referring broadly to the brief, often quite pithy, common dicta 
                                               
108 Recalling my discussion on the character of the addressees in the section, ‘Interpretations of 
Incoherence’. 
109 Future imperatives, jussive subjunctives, empirical perfects, and generalising futures. 
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handed down by tradition, within which we may include proverbs, maxims, aphorisms, 
adages, and perhaps even well-known parables. 
What renders this kind of discourse so especially germane to the instructive 
pursuit of the Praeceptor is its ability to stand in the text as a universal truth, proved by 
experience, which the pupils will naturally tend to agree with and adhere to; Aristotle, in 
his Rhetoric, speaks at length about the importance of traditional maxims, gnîmai, for an 
orator in presenting facts as truthful to his audience: kaqÒlou de m¾ Ôntoj kaqÒlou 
e„pe‹n m£lista ¡rmÒttei ™n scetliasmîi kaˆ deinèsei, kaˆ ™n toÚtoij À 
¢rcÒmenon À ¢pode…xanta. crÁsqai de de‹ kaˆ ta‹j teqrulhmšnaij kaˆ koina‹j 
gnèmaij, ™¦n ðsi cr»simoi: di¦ g¦r tÕ e„nai koina…, æj ÐmologoÚntwn p£ntwn, 
Ñrqîj œcein dokoàsin, oŒon parakaloànti ™pˆ tÕ kinduneÚein m¾ qusamšnouj 
(Arist. Rh. 2.21.1395a). On a related note, in Horace’s Satire 1.4 I have already discussed 
the pater optimus’ penchant for putting his trust entirely in what we may term “traditional 
rules of conduct” (Wickham 1891: 58), traditum ab antiquis morem (Hor. Sat. 1.4.117), 
within which category, I should think, we would find many examples of prescriptive 
maxims and common adages, over and above more logical, causas (line 116), forms of 
explanation for correct ethical behaviour: sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu / sit melius, 
causas reddet tibi (Hor. Sat. 1.4.115-116). In this particular study I shall examine several 
prominent examples of traditional proverbial language within the Ars110, discussing how 
these truisms relate, interact and often endorse the surrounding prescriptions of the 
Praeceptor. 
 In the following quotation the Praeceptor criticizes artists, whose works lack unity 
and congruity in their composition (Rudd 1989: 152): 
                                               
110 In the order in which they occur in the poem. 
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inceptis gravibus plerumque et magna professis 
purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus et alter 
adsuitur pannus, cum lucus et ara Dianae 
et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros 
aut flumen Rhenum aut pluvius describitur arcus. 
sed nunc non erat his locus. et fortasse cupressum 
scis simulare. quid hoc, si fractis enatat exspes 
navibus aere dato qui pingitur? amphora coepit 
institui; currente rota cur urceus exit? 
(Hor. Ars P. 14-22) 
 
He first supplies the example of an excessively-ornate overly-precious descriptio, which 
might function as a purple patch in a stereotypical epic poem (Brink 1971: 97); the 
Praeceptor’s censure then ensues in a short rather damning phrase – sed nunc non erat his 
locus (line 19), ‘this wasn’t the place for such bombast’111. After this stern condemnation, 
the teacher provides two more examples of this lack of unity in the artist’s designs: 
firstly, he presents the painter who, although he is commissioned, aere dato (line 21) to 
draw a picture of a shipwreck, requests if he can include a cypress, cupressum (line 19), 
in his work; secondly, we change artistic mediums to pottery where what started out as an 
amphora (line 22), seems ultimately to take the shape of an urceus (line 22), a pitcher.  
                                               
111 Literally translated: ‘but now was not the place (both temporally and spatially (Brink 1971: 19)) for 
these things’. 
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It is the first of these examples which should concern our study of proverbial 
discourse. Porphyrion, in his commentary on the passage, cites a well-known Greek 
proverb “supposed to be asked by a painter, whose forte lay in drawing a cypress, of a 
man who had escaped shipwreck and wished for a picture of a shipwreck to put as a 
votive offering in a temple” (Wickham 1891: 391): m» ti kaˆ kupar…sson qšleij; 
(Porphyrio Commen. In Horatium: Carmen de Arte Poetica 19)112. The question by this 
humorously limited painter then appropriately over time became a common artistic 
dictum for any person who wished to “introduce ornaments out of place” (Wilkins 1886: 
337)113. Now I should think that the educated Roman readers of the Ars Poetica would 
have at once been reminded of this proverbial line and its related context in the specific 
reference within the Horatian text to a painter’s desire to represent a cypress within a 
drawing of a shipwreck; moreover, the positioning of cupressum (line 19) at the end of its 
verse along with the preceding ironic phrasing et fortasse (line 19) does in fact lend 
syntactic prominence to this noun as a key word in the passage (Brink 1971: 100). The 
proverbial sense which would naturally, within a literary context, accompany the word 
cupressum (line 19) – as the quintessentially misplaced artistic element – has been 
adopted quite deliberately here by the Praeceptor to emphatically endorse the concept of 
‘artistic incoherence’ in the minds of his pupils. It also forms a suitably negative example 
to the ensuing prescriptive line denique sit quidvis, simplex dumtaxat et unum (Hor. Ars 
P. 23) and also manages to balance the similarly incoherent pictures of serpentes 
                                               
112 The full quotation runs: hoc proverbium est in malum pictorem qui nesciebat aliud bene pingere quam 
cupressum. ab hoc naufragus quidam petiit ut casum suum exprimeret. ille interrogavit num ex cupresso 
vellet aliquid adici. quod proverbium Graecis in usu est, m» ti kaˆ kupar…sson qšleij (Porphyrio 
Commen. In Horatium: Carmen de Arte Poetica 19). 
113 Brink, it must be said, is less certain as to the proverbial status of this phrase, “whether this is an 
anecdote rather than a proverb is not known” (Brink 1971: 100). 
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avibus… tigribus agni (Hor. Ars P. 13) and delphinum silvis…fluctibus aprum (Hor. Ars 
P. 30) on either end of this discussion. 
 Moving on through the Ars, in his discussion of how the speech of dramatic 
characters should match their allotted fortunes, the Praeceptor provides us with the 
following warning: 
 
si dicentis erunt fortunis absona dicta 
Romani tollent equites peditesque cachinnum. 
(Hor. Ars P. 112-113) 
 
The audience, Romani… equites peditesque (line 113), will find such a play risible, 
cachinnum (line 113), in which the characters’ voices do not correspond to their fortunis 
(line 112). As Wickham identifies, the phrase equites peditesque (line 113) “is proverbial, 
from the old military classification omnes cives Romani equites peditesque (Wickham 
1891: 399)114. So how does this archaic Roman military adage enhance the force of the 
prescription here? Clearly, unlike my previous example of proverbial language, the adage 
is not employed here to reflect the aesthetic concept under instruction – si dicentis erunt 
fortunis absona dicta (line 112) – but rather it is used to give a certain authority and 
weight to the Praeceptor’s ensuing scorn, cachinnum (line 113): so, firstly, judging purely 
by the syllable count and the attached connective particle -que, equites peditesque (line 
113) is a far more expansive and thus emphatic way of expressing the simple notion of 
‘omnes’; secondly, as an archaic military formula, it lends a sense of traditional Roman 
                                               
114 edixit ut omnes cives Romanes, equites peditesque, in suis quisque centuriis in campo Martio adessent 
(Liv. 1.44). 
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severity or sternness to the warning, almost “as though the audience were organised for 
war” (Rudd 1989: 168)115. Certainly by sharing the authority of his censure with the 
traditional authority of the cives Romani equites peditesque, the Praeceptor’s prescription 
comes across more as an established fact than if he alone were to direct his laughter at the 
aesthetic vice under discussion. 
 Staying in the central ‘dramatic’ section of the Ars, the Praeceptor urges his pupils 
not to sacrifice originality through adopting a hackneyed long-worn-out subject – ‘the 
common ground’ – through giving a verbatim translation, and lastly through pure 
imitation (Brink 1971: 211): 
 
publica materies privati iuris erit, si 
non circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem, 
nec verbo verbum curabis reddere fidus 
interpres, nec desilies imitator in artum, 
unde pedem proferre pudor vetet aut operis lex, 
(Hor. Ars P. 131-135) 
 
The phrase desilies imitator in artum (line 134), would seem to be proverbial in Latin, 
although there is little concord among the commentators as to the actual origin of this 
phrase. Rudd gives the English proverbial equivalents of “‘painting oneself into a corner’ 
or ‘finding oneself in a straightjacket’” (Rudd 1989: 172). Beyond being a simple adage 
Wickham sees in this locution an allusion to a fable: “The figure is from the fable of the 
                                               
115 There is also what Wilkins titles a slightly ‘sportive’ tone in the adoption of a serious military proverb to 
describe the seating reservations of the Roman theatre (Wilkins 1886: 357). I shall discuss this feature of 
the language in greater detail in the third division of this chapter. 
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goat who was persuaded by the fox to leap down into the well, though Horace is 
concerned only with the goat’s part in the story” (Wickham 1891: 402). Brink, although 
he is not convinced that the phrase might belong to this exact fable, does admit to “a 
vivid image which would suit a fable” (Brink 1971: 211).  
If, however, the parable of the goat – or something quite like it which was 
reasonably familiar to the Augustan audience – was in fact directly intended by this 
common adage of ‘jumping into a hole’116, it does provide a most compelling albeit 
humorously exaggerated allegorical lesson for the pupils of the poem on the ‘deathly’ 
dangers of excessive imitation. In addition, I believe Wickham could have further backed 
up this argument for the fable by referencing a later passage in the Ars when we do in 
actual fact happen upon one of those unshaven mad poets being ostensibly ‘artistic’117 
within a hole: 
 
hic, dum sublimis versus ructatur et errat, 
si veluti merulis intentus decidit auceps 
in puteum foveamve, licet ‘succurrite’ longum 
clamet ‘io cives’, non sit qui tollere curet. 
si curet quis opem ferre et demittere funem, 
‘qui scis an prudens huc se proiecerit atque 
 
servari nolit?’ dicam… 
(Hor. Ars P. 457-463) 
                                               
116 Literally translated: ‘a narrow space’. 
117 In the romantic sense of the word of course. 
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It is a humorous development in the Ars Poetica, and indeed a most instructive lesson for 
the pupils, that the metaphorical proverbial warning of the Praeceptor to the aspiring poet 
in line 134 has to our amazement manifested itself in a ridiculously literal situation where 
we do find a ‘failed’118 poet in a hole! This type of analysis is obviously highly 
suppositional but it may not be coincidental in a text such as Horace’s which readily 
employs ring structuring119. 
My fourth instance of proverbial language is certainly one of the more humorous 
passages in the Ars: 
 
nec sic incipies ut scriptor cyclicus olim: 
‘fortunam Priami cantabo et nobile bellum.’ 
quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu? 
parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. 
(Hor. Ars P. 136-139) 
 
After warning the reader against employing excessive imitation and negating originality 
in a work, the Praeceptor gives a stereotypical narrative opening, which one might expect 
to find in one of the inferior epic poets who dealt with the Homeric cycle of myths 
(Wickham 1891: 402), or which, depending on the sense of olim (line 136), is an actual 
quote from one of these poets (Brink 1971: 213). Following this example, the authorial 
persona gives his judgment on the value, dignum (line 138), of such an opening: 
                                               
118 In the sense of not possessing what the Praeceptor considers ‘ars’. 
119 See my section on Transitional Language. 
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parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus (line 139). This is, as a clear allusion to a 
Greek proverb (Wickham 1891: 402): êdinen Ôroj, ZeÝj d' ™fobe‹to, tÕ d' œteken màn 
(Ath. 14.6).  
Once again the Praeceptor has chosen a well-known proverb to answer perfectly 
the preceding statements in the poem. The sense is clear, in trying to reach for too much, 
tanto… hiatu (line 138), in his work, the budding poet will miss the mark entirely by 
achieving the opposite effect from what was originally conceived, a mus (line 139), so to 
speak. In addition, the Praeceptor doesn’t simply supply the proverb verbatim, but he 
gives it a slight tweaking by providing the descriptive adjective ridiculus (line 139) to 
accompany the noun mus (line 139). Indeed, the very sound of these final two words in 
the verse is rather comical on account of the combination of triple rhyming syllables, cu – 
lus – mus, preceded by the double rhyming, ri – di, as well as the monosyllabic 
conclusion to the line, mus: “it receives a comic emphasis from the separation of ictus 
and accent” (Rudd 1989: 173). One further adjustment which the Latin text makes is to 
change from the past tenses in the Greek to the future in order “to suit the tense of the 
question” (Brink 1971: 215): quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatus? (line 138). 
This again is an excellent grammatical example of how the Praeceptor views proverbs as 
definitive answering judgments to the aesthetic problems he raises, because of their status 
as ‘traditional truths’. 
So, to sum up this section, proverbial language can have several important 
functions within the discourse of the Horatian Praeceptor. First and foremost, proverbs 
exist as seemingly universal truths in the narrative because of their long-held status in a 
particular language as common knowledge; this allows them on certain occasions to 
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definitively endorse a particular prescription or at other times to function as irrefutable 
answers to questions being posed. Secondly, proverbs can remove the authority of a 
statement from the instructor and place it within the hands of the ‘common tradition’, 
thus allowing the pupils to have a share in its authority, and so in turn rendering them 
more willing to take up a particular precept120. And lastly there is often a comical touch 
in the employment of these proverbs with respect to the context of a passage, which can 
have the important effect of softening the predominantly instructive dynamic in the 
surrounding language121. 
Indeed, the very fact that the authorial persona of the Ars deems it proper to 
instruct through proverbial language on occasion is a good indication of his character as 
an accomplished authority on the subject of poetry: ¡rmÒttei de gnwmologe‹n ¹lik…ai 
men presbutšrwn, perˆ de toÚtwn ïn œmpeirÒj t…j ™stin, ìste tÕ men m¾ 
thlikoàton Ônta gnwmologe‹n ¢prepej ésper kaˆ tÕ muqologe‹n, perˆ de ïn 
¥peiroj, ºl…qion kaˆ ¢pa…deuton. shme‹on de ƒkanÒn: oƒ g¦r ¢gro‹koi m£lista 
gnwmotÚpoi e„sˆ kaˆ ∙aid…wj ¢pofa…nontai (Arist. Rh. 2.21.1395a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
120 Which I shall discuss further in a subsequent section, ‘Empathetic Language’. 
121 Again, see my section on ‘Sportive Language’. 
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2.2 Second Criterion: Demonstration 
 
In this section I shall endeavour to show how the Praeceptor augments his instructions 
through demonstration with what we may term illustrative language; moreover, I shall be 
concerned also with transitional language: that is to say, language which is designed to 
demarcate for the pupil the various subjects of the Ars both with respect to consecutive 
narratives and across the poem as a whole.  
 
 
Illustrative Language 
 
In Satire 1.4 the pater optimus provides illustrations of his ethical instructions and 
prohibitions to the authorial persona by manifestly referring to the well-known examples 
of certain notorious individuals: 
 
viverem uti contentus eo quod mi ipse parasset, 
‘nonne vides Albi ut male vivat filius, utque 
Baius inops? magnum documentum ne patriam rem 
perdere quis velit… 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.108-111) 
 
The principle of exemplis… notando (line 106) is thus duly enacted by the father. In the 
following section I would like to examine how this tendency to endorse or augment the 
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subject of instruction through illustration is prominent in the language of the Praeceptor 
of the Ars. This analysis will not simply comprise the obvious citation of individual 
exempla, as in the speech of the pater optimus, but it will explain, more importantly, how 
the very language of the Praeceptor – right down to the level of his choice of diction, his 
manipulation of the syntax of clauses, etc. – manages to illustrate his prescriptions 
appropriately. 
 Let me commence this study by examining a few examples of the characteristic 
phonetic word play of the Ars. Consider the following two lines from the segment in 
which the Praeceptor lays out for his pupils the behaviour of the various age categories of 
men: 
 
multa recedentes adimunt. ne forte seniles 
mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles, 
(Hor. Ars P. 176-177) 
 
Now both Brink and Rudd identify the rhyming pair of seniles (line 176) and viriles (line 
177) as being significant here, arguing that the device of rhyme has the force of evoking 
the inherent balance between the two concepts of ‘youth’ and ‘old age’: “These rhymes 
are formal means of bringing out features of the content” (Brink 1971: 243). This notion 
of ‘bringing out features of content’ through language is a clear indicator of the 
illustrative discourse of the Praeceptor, who here underlines the semantic balance of two 
abstract concepts through the demonstration of a phonetic balance, so to speak, via 
rhyme. Indeed, the employment of homoeoteleuton here – the fact that the final two 
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syllables of the final words in each verse end in identical form – along with the resulting 
rhyming should mark it out as a deliberate attempt by the Praeceptor to emphasize his 
subject through the sound of the verse (Brink 1971: 243). Other examples of such rhymes 
in homoeoteleuta can be found through the Ars: 
 
non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunto, 
et quocumque volent animum auditoris agunto. 
(Hor. Ars P. 99-100) 
 
The rhyming pair of ‘future’ imperatives sunto (line 99) and agunto (line 100) gives 
additional emphasis to the already strong “quasi-legal language of enactment” (Brink 
1971: 184). 
 Another characteristic phonetic feature of the Ars is the preponderance of the 
devices of alliteration and assonance. So, for example, in presenting the typical kinds of 
ornate descriptive narratives which saturate larger epic works, the Praeceptor supplies the 
following line: et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros (Hor. Ars P. 17), which 
Wickham rightly labels as “smooth and alliterative” (Wickham 1891: 390). Notice how 
the subject of flowing water is represented phonetically by the smooth final sibilant ‘s’, 
initiated by properantis and repeated in the final three words of the verse amoenos 
ambitus agros, and also by the nasal ‘n’ and ‘m’ sounds in properantis…amoenos 
ambitus. For a verse which has to illustrate an entirely different kind of action to 
‘smoothly running water’, consider the following line in the section pertaining to satyr 
plays: intererit Satyris paulum pudibunda protervis (Hor. Ars P. 233). So, here, the 
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buoyant rough-and-ready character of the satyrs is indicated by the repeated rough abrupt 
‘p’ sounds in paulum pudibunda protervis (Madvig 1857: 5)122: the idea would be that 
just as the smoothness of the Praeceptor’s voice is broken up by the plosive or ‘stop’ 
syllables (as they are sometimes referred to), so the decorum of high tragedy is broken up 
by these robust raucous satyrs (Kennedy 1962: 4)123. 
 Lastly, on the subject of sound devices, metre is often made to reflect the pace of 
a particular narrative. So, in the example already given of a stock line from epic – et 
properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros (line 17) – the four dactyls in the 
hexameter (three in a row at the start of the line) reflect the quick rhythm of the running 
water (Rudd 1989: 152). Conversely, when the Praeceptor is trying to convey the 
ponderous weight and gravity of high epic narrative concerned with lofty affairs of kings 
and wars, he furnishes the line with four heavy spondees: res gestae regumque ducumque 
et tristia bella (Hor. Ars P. 73); moreover, as Brink points out, the repetition of the 
coordinating particle -que (line 73) adds an epic tone to the passage (Brink 1971: 164). 
 Various rhetorical figures are employed by the Praeceptor to illustrate his 
aesthetic prescriptions. Two of the most common features in the word order of the Ars 
Poetica – which actually announce themselves in the opening lines of the poem – are 
chiasmus, that is the deliberate inversion of the order of words in a second clause or 
phrase from that of the first, and hyperbaton, the displacement of the normal order of 
words in a clause. So consider the opening sentence: 
 
                                               
122 “Of the consonants (litterae consonantes) some are mutes (mutae) b, c, (k, q,) d, f, g, p, t which have an 
abrupt sound… of the mute consonants c (k, q,) and g are palatals (palatinae), p and b labials (labials), t 
and d dentals (dentales). Some have a harder and rougher pronunciation (c, p, t, tenues)…” (Madvig 1857: 
5). 
123 “Plosives (= Mutes, = Stops), formed by the complete interruption of the breath” (Kennedy 1962: 4). 
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humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam 
iungere si velit et varias inducere plumas 
undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum 
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne, 
spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici? 
(Hor. Ars P. 1-5) 
 
There is chiasmus in the first verse where the order of ‘adjective-noun’ is inverted in the 
subsequent phrase into ‘noun-adjective’ – humano capiti (line 1) into cervicem… 
equinam (line 1); and again in similar fashion the order of ‘adjective-noun’ in atrum… 
piscem (lines 3-4) is inverted in the corresponding phrase into ‘noun-adjective’ in mulier 
formosa (line 4) (Wilkins 1886: 335-336). But it is perhaps the hyperbaton which is more 
extreme in this passage: most notably there is the lengthy procrastination of the 
subordinating conjunction si (line 2) to the seventh position in the initial conditional 
clause, which would occupy the primary position in standard Latin prose (Brink 1971: 
86); there is the unusual sandwiching of the prolative infinitive inducere (line 2) by the 
phrase varias… plumas (line 2)124; and, slightly less irregular, there is the delay of the 
subject of the ut (line 3) clause mulier formosa superne (line 4) to the end of the 
clause125.  
Now, I should think, such manifest manipulation of word order in the form of 
chiasmus and hyperbaton warrants some explanation – more than Wilkins’ perfunctory 
                                               
124 “An adjective usually precedes, but often follows, the word to which it belongs” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 
1903: 430). 
125 “The postponement of the subject is rare and always for definite reasons in the classical period” 
(Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430). 
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“the inverted order… adds emphasis” (Wilkins 1886: 335). The first sentence of the Ars 
paints a monstrous picture for the audience, a Scyllan creature: “the parts of the creature 
are drawn from each division of the animal kingdom: man, quadruped, bird, and fish” 
(Rudd 1989: 150); the underlying principle seems to be that a work of art which utilizes 
an excess of variety in its composition is an abomination, an inversion in fact of the 
natural order (Brink 1971: 85-86). How appropriate then that the Praeceptor’s language 
here too negates the natural Latin order for words; that is to say, that the violation of the 
law of artistic coherence is illustrated in the text by the violation of unity in language 
(Brink 1971: 86). 
 Progressing onto the next rhetorical feature of the Ars which can have a 
demonstrative effect in reflecting the subject of a passage, we should consider the device 
of asyndeton, or the lack of connective particles and conjunctions between phrases and 
clauses. So, for example, consider when the Praeceptor is warning against the 
employment of excessive brevity in constructing a poem: 
 
decipimur specie recti: brevis esse laboro, 
obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi… 
(Hor. Ars P. 25-26)126 
 
His very language is here characterized by excessive brevity in the lack of any connection 
(asyndeton) between three consecutive main clause verbs: decipimur… laboro… fio (lines 
25-26) (Brink 1971: 107-108). Conversely, when describing superfluous overblown 
language – qui variare cupit rem prodigialiter unam (Hor. Ars P. 29) – the Praeceptor 
                                               
126 I have retained Wickham’s punctuation for this sentence over Rudd’s. 
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correspondingly allows for a far more inflated syntax with a count of 15 syllables out of a 
possible 17 in dactylic hexameter; moreover, the hyperbaton, where the adverb 
prodigialiter (line 29) lies between noun and agreeing adjective, rem… unam (line 29), 
creates an awkward compound or ‘interwoven’ phrase to utter, so illustrating the type of 
dense superfluous language under discussion (Brink 1971: 114).  
A third rhetorical feature which is visible throughout the Ars Poetica is antithesis, 
the balancing of contrasting words or phrases. So, at line 295, there is a clear antithesis 
between the two nouns ingenium and arte, which balance each other on either end of the 
verse: ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte (Hor. Ars P. 295). The polarity implied by 
the positioning of the language is taken up by the Praeceptor in the ensuing narrative, in 
which natural talent, ingenium, is contrasted with artistic skill, ars. Moreover, it has been 
astutely suggested by Brink – since the line itself both displays ‘ars’ in its carefully 
structured antithesis, and also actually promotes ‘ars’ in its cleverly-inverted word order, 
which subtly suggests that arte is really fortunatius and ingenium misera (although the 
reverse appears true grammatically) – that the syntax here demonstrates the Praeceptor’s 
preference for ‘ars’ over inspired ‘ingenium’, typified by the unshaven Democritus-
inspired zealot, which develops over the course of the poem (Brink 1971: 330). 
 Moving onto some broader rhetorical figures which often function over several 
clauses, there is tendency for the Praeceptor to engage in ‘m…mhsij’ or ‘imitatio’ through 
parts of the poem. Rather than providing his pupils with defining descriptions or 
explanations of certain aesthetic terms, ‘di»ghsij’, the Praeceptor prefers to enact a 
particular technical term, to reveal its nature through illustration in his narrative. So, for 
example, when the teacher wishes to explain the poetic device of ‘descriptio’, he does not 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 126 
give a technical definition of this device127 but illustrates its nature by himself imitating 
briefly a ‘descriptio’ (Brink 1971: 108-9): 
 
cum lucus et ara Dianae 
et properantis aquae per amoenos ambitus agros, 
aut flumen Rhenum aut pluvius describitur arcus. 
(Hor. Ars P. 16-18) 
 
Apart from the excessively ornate language128, we should observe how the clichéd 
subject matter of such narratives is adopted here: in lucus et ara Dianae (line 16) – 
“groves were a major topic of topograf…ai” (Brink 1971: 97), in the overly idyllic 
setting of the running river, and in the hackneyed reference to the Rhine (Brink 1971: 97-
98). It is indeed notable that when the Praeceptor does employ ‘di»ghsij’ it is ironically 
presented as a mimetic piece of writing in the Ars. 
 Similarly, at other places in the poem, the Praeceptor’s adherence to imitatio can 
be seen in his near direct citation or paraphrases from famous literature. So, when 
discussing the appropriate method to commence a work, the teacher manifestly illustrates 
the concept of in medias res (Hor. Ars P. 148) by all but quoting the opening lines of the 
Odyssey (Wickham 1891: 402). So compare the following verses: 
 
‘dic mihi, Musa, virum, captae post tempora Troiae 
qui mores hominum multorum vidit et urbes.’ 
                                               
127 I.e. I might explain such a technical term in English thus (Brink 1971: 97): ‘a highly descriptive overly-
ornate segment of narrative found in epic poets such as Ennius and occasionally Virgil’. 
128 Which I have already discussed above. 
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(Hor. Ars P. 141-142) 
 
 with the opening three lines of the Odyssey: 
 
¥ndra moi œnnepe, Moàsa, polÚtropon, Öj m£la poll¦ 
pl£gcqh, ™peˆ Tro…hj ƒerÕn ptol…eqron œperse: 
pollîn d' ¢nqrèpwn ‡den ¥stea kaˆ nÒon œgnw, 
 (Hom. Od. 1.1-3) 
 
Although the Horatian text is not a direct translation from the Homeric, it is clear – both 
in the correspondences in vocabulary: dic (line 141) to œnnepe (line 1), mihi (line 141) to 
moi (line 1), Musa (line 141) to Moàsa (line 1), virum (line 141) to ¥ndra (line 1), and 
so forth, as well as in the formulaic syntax of the opening verse – that the pupil is meant 
to draw this analogy (Brink 1971: 217). Again the illustrative force in the Praeceptor’s 
voice is apparent: he wishes to augment a general artistic principle – starting a work in 
medias res (line 148) – by providing the most well-known example of this in the literary 
tradition, the Odyssey of Homer; in other words, he is not simply satisfied with presenting 
an abstract idea to his audience, but he feels the need to demonstrate it within the text. 
 Moving onto the rhetorical device of prosopopoeia, there are instances through 
the Ars where the Praeceptor briefly speaks in the voice of some other character. So in 
the following verses, the Praeceptor picks up the “burlesque nonsensical claims made in 
the grand style” (Brink 1971: 399) of the ‘would-be poet’: 
 
‘ego mira poemata pango, 
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occupet extremum scabies; mihi turpe relinqui est, 
et quod non didici sane nescire fateri’. 
(Hor. Ars P. 416-418) 
 
At other times in the narrative of the Ars the Praeceptor, although not assuming the voice 
of another person in the manner of prosopopoeia, introduces on stage briefly some other 
character, such as the sycophant to the aspiring poet (line 428) or, later on, the critic 
Quintilius: Quintilio si quid recitares, ‘corrige sodes / hoc’ aiebat ‘et hoc’… (Hor. Ars P. 
438-439). The key facet to take note of in all these examples is the willingness of the 
Praeceptor to change at regular intervals the subject of the verses – to actively engage in 
role-playing within the text – so that he does not simply present what certain characters 
might say in reported speech but allows them to speak for themselves; he is, in short, 
using imitatio of other voices to enact and illustrate his respective condemnation or 
approval of the subject at hand, while his own aesthetic judgment, his prescriptions, 
appear temporarily removed from the content of the text. 
In summary, the Praeceptor of the Ars frequently employs a type of discourse we 
might term ‘illustrative’, which is concerned with backing up what he has stated in his 
various aesthetic prescriptions and explanations through exemplary language, whether on 
the level of the syntax and phonology or whether across larger segments of his narrative. 
Moreover, by presenting constant exempla of what he is instructing rather than simply 
issuing orders, the Praeceptor is, I believe, placing immense importance in the task of 
leading his pupils into a greater understanding of ars poetica.  
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Transitional Language 
 
In the first chapter of this dissertation I discussed Wilkins’ censure pertaining to the lack 
of structure in the Ars Poetica – its apparent “want of structural completeness” (Wilkins 
1886: 330) – and I then viewed the difficulties later 20th century critics have had in trying 
to impose their own tendentious divisions upon the poem. The resulting impression has 
often been created of a hotchpotch ramshackle effort – a mixture of random prescriptions 
with some poetic touches here and there by Horace, but ultimately a work without any 
real organization. In truth, if the poem were wholly lacking in any structure, how could 
the pupils, the Pisones and the implied literary audience, follow such an erratic and loose 
presentation of precepts? How could they make any sense at all of the aesthetic 
instructions of the Praeceptor, if these commands confronted them without any context in 
which to situate them? 
 In the following section I shall challenge such interpretations of the Ars Poetica 
by exploring how the Praeceptor does in fact give a structure to his lesson through 
employing what I shall term transitional discourse, that is to say, specific structural 
devices and patterns within his language which are designed to demarcate and highlight 
the subject matter across the narrative of the Ars. It will thus be observed – in order to 
relate this discussion to my second major conceptual criterion of the Horatian Praeceptor 
– that the demonstrative thrust of the Praeceptor’s discourse is manifest not only in the 
particular diction and rhetorical devices employed (as I discussed in the previous chapter) 
but also in terms of how his language is displayed across the greater narrative in such a 
way so as to give a clear structural prominence to his various prescriptions. It must be 
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acknowledged here that this section is to a large extent a further textual exploration of the 
discussion in Brink’s chapter pertaining to ‘Poetic Patterns in the Ars Poetica and the 
Odes’ in Horace on Poetry: The Ars Poetica, which should be consulted for a more 
thorough explanation of this type of language through Horace’s lyric works. 
 The first structural device of the Praeceptor which ought to be discussed is ring 
composition, the manner in which later narratives are designed to recall earlier ones in 
the poem to create the impression of a ring or circular structure in the text (Brink 1971: 
453). So at the start of the poem the Praeceptor draws a picture for his pupils of a work of 
art without any unity (Hor. Ars P. 1-5), and, correspondingly, at the end of the Ars we are 
given the picture of the poet who possesses natural ability, ingenium, but no sense of 
artistic unity and skill, ars (Hor. Ars P. 472-476). Just as ‘the work of art without artistic 
unity’ at the beginning of the Ars Poetica is appropriately transformed into a hideous 
creature of myth recalling Scylla, so at the end the ‘poet who does not demonstrate 
artistic unity’ is transformed first into a savage bear furit… ursus (line 472) and then 
suddenly into a bloodsucking leech hirudo (line 476) – the imagery recalled is that of the 
grotesque metamorphosis (Brink 1971: 431). By virtue of this ring structure in the text 
the pupils of the Praeceptor are subtly persuaded to recall and thus reinforce in their 
minds the opening principle of artistic unity at the very conclusion of the poem; indeed, it 
is especially ironic that the imagery of artistic disunity should in fact provide the 
overriding unity to the Ars Poetica as a whole. 
 Another example of such ring structuring on a less grand scale in the poem occurs 
from lines 12 to 30 where the Praeceptor is clearly concerned with stressing the following 
precept: denique sit quidvis, simplex dumtaxat et unum (Hor. Ars P. 23); he is here 
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imploring the pupils always to maintain coherence and unity in their literary endeavours. 
As an illustration of the dangers of a lack of coherence in a given narrative, he provides 
the exemplum of an ill-placed descriptio – sed nunc non erat his locus (Hor. Ars P. 19) – 
and then warns against writing styles which sacrifice unity in their narratives through 
excessively brief or excessively grand discourse. What has not been commented on in 
great detail by other critics is the manner in which the Praeceptor encloses this passage in  
a ring structure with the following two verses, which are used to exemplify artistic 
disunity and incoherence: serpentes avibus geminentur, tigribus agni (Hor. Ars P. 13) 
and delphinum silvis appingit, fluctibus aprum (Hor. Ars P. 30). One can at once observe 
the similarities in the chiastic syntax: in the form of an opening noun of three syllables, 
an ablative plural, the main verb placed in the centre (which, although it belongs 
grammatically to the first clause in each case, visually seems to apply to both), then again 
another ablative plural and a noun of two syllable count; apart from this deliberately-
woven reflection in word order, the theme of artistic disunity is embodied in both these 
sentences by the disturbance of the natural order in the animal kingdom, where serpents 
are paired with birds, tigers with lambs, dolphins are placed among trees, boars among 
waves (this, moreover, also reflects the visual imagery at the start of the Ars). 
 Apart from ring structuring, the Praeceptor is also able to link together certain 
artistic principles across vast portions of his narrative through the marked repetition of a 
single word (Brink 452-453): so, for example, the Latin word for nail, unguis, is utilized 
on three different occasions in the text (Regel 1836: 333). Firstly, in the following 
passage:  
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Aemilium circa ludum faber imus et ungues 
exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos, 
infelix operis summa, quia ponere totum 
nesciet. 
(Hor. Ars P. 32-35) 
 
The lowest craftsman’s ability ‘to represent nails’, ungues / exprimet (line 32-33), in 
particular is an indication of the degree of refinement in physical detail of which he is 
capable, although ultimately he fails to create a ‘coherent whole’ in his artwork (Wilkins 
1886: 340). Later in the injunction: 
 
vos, o 
Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non 
multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque 
praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem. 
(Hor. Ars P. 291-294) 
 
The Praeceptor recommends that the Pisones take great care and labour, multa dies et 
multa litura (line 293), in refining their work, castigavit (line 294), by employing a 
metaphor from carpentry where the nail checks for smoothness between the joints of the 
wood (Rudd 1989: 199)129. Lastly, in his humorous parody of the inspired Democritean 
school of poets, it is clear, I believe, in the Praeceptor’s clever reference to their not 
                                               
129 See my discussion in the section ‘Interpretations of Coherence’. 
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trimming their nails, ungues ponere curat (line 297), that these poets, although outwardly 
artistic in appearance, are lacking in artistic refinement and skill:  
 
ingenium misera quia fortunatius arte 
credit et excludit sanos Helicone poetas 
Democritus, bona pars non ungues ponere curat, 
non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat. 
(Hor. Ars P. 295-298) 
 
Thus through the simple association of the word unguis with notions of artistic 
refinement and cultivation, the Praeceptor is able to link together a principle outlined in a 
passage from the 32nd line of the poem with one from 297th line. 
  Apart from such broad structural connections throughout the poem, the 
Praeceptor also may announce the start of specific aesthetic discussions with marked 
subject headings, or, conversely, he may draw conclusions of certain parts with résumés 
or brief summaries. So, firstly, how does the Praeceptor announce a new subject or how 
does he change tack i  his narrative? Of the following four lines, the first three mark the 
conclusion to the discussion on the appropriate ages for dramatic parts, while the final 
line begins a fresh topic on whether dramatic actions, res (line 179), should be acted on 
stage or reported in indirect discourse: 
 
ne forte seniles 
mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles, 
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semper in adiunctis aevoque morabimur aptis. 
aut agitur res in scaenis aut acta refertur. 
(Hor. Ars P. 176-179) 
 
As Brink says: “after the descriptive rhetoric of the preceding piece, there is now a 
change of subject–marked, as often, by a brusque new beginning–and a change of style: 
prescription instead of description” (Brink 1971: 245). This swift change in style is firstly 
signalled by an adjustment in verbal person, tense and voice from the 1st person future 
deponent verb morabimur (line 178) to the 3rd person singular present passives in agitur 
(line 179) and refertur (line 179). Secondly, there is a certain degree of asyndeton 
between lines 178 and 179: there is no causal or temporal particle or conjunction to lead 
us gradually into the ensuing discussion – instead the particles aut… aut (line 179) 
suddenly happen upon us without reference to what has preceded. Thirdly, there is a 
manifest change in tempo, marked by the number of cola: whereas the preceding two 
main clauses, from lines 176-178, contained a syllable count of 21 (ne forte seniles / 
mandentur iuveni partes pueroque viriles) and 15 (semper in adiunctis aevoque 
morabimur aptis) respectively, the two clauses in line 179 contain 8 (aut agitur res in 
scaenis) and 6 (aut acta refertur) syllables. It is clear, therefore, that the Praeceptor is 
introducing a new subject within his narrative by radically altering the language by 
brusque or abrupt transitions (Brink 1971: 455-459).  
 At other places in his work, however, the Praeceptor does provide smoother 
‘gliding’ transitions between consecutive closely-related subjects (Brink 1971: 124, 455): 
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sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, aequam 
viribus, et versate diu, quid ferre recusent, 
quid valeant umeri. cui lecta potenter erit res, 
nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo. 
(Hor. Ars P. 38-41) 
 
The first sentence of this quotation acts as the conclusion to the section on unity within a 
poetic work, in which the Praeceptor’s final advice is sumite materiam vestris… aequam / 
viribus (line 38-39) such that the pupil doesn’t become like the ‘lowest craftsman around 
the Aemilian School’ whose materiam (line 38) is not a coherent whole – quia ponere 
totum / nesciet (Hor. Ars P. 34-5). This prescription of sumite materiam (line 38) is taken 
up by the phrase cui lecta potenter erit res (line 40) in the ensuing relative clause, which 
duly leads the way into the new discussion of facundia (line 41) and ordo (line 41) (Brink 
1971: 124). The key to the smooth transition here lies in the correspondence in words 
across these two sentences, which, although not exact synonyms, are close enough in 
sense to suggest a close link between the two passages: materiam (line 38) to rem (line 
40), sumite (line 38) to lecta (line 40), and viribus (line 39) to potenter (line 40), the last 
of which denotes the sense of ‘doing something within one’s capabilities’ (Rudd 1989: 
155). 
 One final matter to address in this discussion is the manner in which the 
Praeceptor allows for brief summaries or résumés at the end of certain discussions. After 
his lecture on the license which should be given to poets, with particular reference to 
neologisms, the Praeceptor begins a new subject, distinguishing the different literary 
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genres by matching their content with the appropriate style in terms of the metre (Hor. 
Ars P. 73-76)130. In order to reinforce this principle, the Praeceptor concludes the section 
by providing a résumé in the form of two sharp rhetorical questions, which have the 
function of looking back at what has been discussed in the preceding twelve lines (Brink 
1971: 171):  
 
descriptas servare vices operumque colores 
cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor? 
cur nescire pudens prave quam discere malo? 
(Hor. Ars P. 86-88) 
 
So here the rather ambiguous phrase descriptas vices (line 86) must refer to the different 
types or genres of works (whether epic, elegy, etc) while colores (line 86) refers to their 
respective styles (Rudd 1989: 165). 
 In conclusion, the value of this kind of transitional language lies, I believe, in its 
ability to provide the pupils of the Ars with regular synopses: that is to say, with 
‘bridging’ passages which have the ability to introduce succinctly, to revise, or to 
summarize the more detailed subject matter from the ‘bulk’ of the poem. For example, 
the brusque transitions between topics, like bold headings, have the function of alerting 
the pupils to a wholly new subject in the narrative, while the device of ring composition 
allows for the appropriate revision and emphasis of earlier content. Such synopses are an 
important facet in the process by which the Praeceptor maintains the coherent 
                                               
130 res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella / quo scribi possent numero, monstravit Homerus. / 
versibus impariter iunctis querimonia primum, / post etiam inclusa est voti sententia compos… (Hor. Ars 
73-76). 
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understanding of his pupils, without which the poem would come across as a loose 
arrangement of random precepts. 
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2.3 Third Criterion: Play 
 
Within the concept of play, my focus shall be on sportive language, where the Praeceptor 
‘plays games on paper’ (Hor. Sat. 1.4.139.); furthermore, I shall also examine under the 
rubric of empathetic language how the Praeceptor through certain clever role-playing 
involves the Pisones in his narrative.  
 
 
Sportive Language 
 
An important critical problem confronting any interpretation of the discourse of the Ars 
Poetica is how to come to terms with the candidly humorous tone in many verses of the 
poem. For the purposes of my particular study, we should ask: does this kind of voice 
greatly undermine the authority of the Praeceptor, calling into question his more serious 
aesthetic instruction and demonstration? Does it essentially transform the poem into an 
“exercise in antididaxis” (Oliensis 1998: 198-199)? Or does this humorous undertone 
perhaps constitute, as Stephen Harrison suggests, part of the characteristic Horatian 
technique of deliberate misdirection: the desire on the part of the writer to shrug off any 
one fixed self-representation (Harrison 2007: 35)? There is certainly merit in such 
interpretative responses, and, in the third chapter of this dissertation, I shall explore 
further some of the critical responses regarding the effect of humour upon the Horatian 
model of the teacher, specifically with regard to Satire 1.4. 
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However, in my own understanding of the Ars, the irony is never so weighty, nor 
the mockery so harsh, that it radically refutes what is said in the other more prescriptive 
segments of the narrative. Rather, I believe, we should characterize the humorous tone of 
the Praeceptor, as Wilkins often succinctly identifies within his commentary, as 
‘sportive’ or ‘ludic’: a light playful, even comic, humour which has the force both of 
softening, as opposed to negating, and even at times of subtly endorsing in an amusing 
fashion the more serious instructional tone elsewhere. Indeed, in my discussion of the 
concept of play within the model of the Horatian Praeceptor, I drew attention to a passage 
from Satire 1.1, which highlighted the way in which playful activities can be employed 
by a teacher to entice children into learning: ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi / 
doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima? (Hor. Sat. 1.1.25-26). In my interpretation of 
the Ars Poetica the crustula (line 25) being offered by the Praeceptor to entice, blandiri, 
his pupils into learning the ‘art of poetry’ are not actual physical treats but rather, to 
employ Horace’s own words elsewhere, the ‘games being played on paper’, illudo131 
chartis (Hor. Sat. 1.4.139). In the following analysis then I shall examine how the 
Praeceptor makes use of such sportive or playful language by highlighting several 
rhetorical figures in the poem and by examining how they interact with the neighbouring 
instructive discourse. 
                                               
131 According to Regel’s index of Horatian words, various forms of the verb illudo can be found on four 
other occasions in the extant Horatian texts, all of which interestingly are to be found in the Satires (Regel 
1836: 127). Most famously perhaps in Satire 2.8 is Nomentanus’ lament of the lot of man: heu, Fortuna, 
quis est crudelior in nos / te deus? ut semper gaudes illudere rebus / humanis! (Hor Sat. 2.8.61-63). The 
sense of this passage, I believe, is that the goddess Fortune ‘enjoys playing games’, illudere (line 62), with 
human affairs, rebus / humanis (line 62-63) – human beings offer good ‘sport’ for Fortune. This sense of 
illudere is backed up by a passage in the Odes (Wickham 1891: 203): Fortuna saevo laeta negotio et 
Ludum insolentem ludere pertinax (Hor Odes 3.29.49) – ‘Fortune stubbornly plays her haughty 
(insolentem) game’. The OLD gives the following principal definitions for the verb illudere: “to make 
game of, speak mockingly of” (OLD s.v. 1). 
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 Firstly, I would like to consider humorous techniques which function through the 
creation of extremes. The most obvious example of this in the Ars is hyperbole. 
Hyperbole, or the exaggerated statement, is manifest in the opening passage of the poem 
(Hor. Ars P. 1-5). To represent the concept of the work of art without any unity, the 
Praeceptor has painted a picture of the most fantastically conceived creature imaginable: 
“The monster combines the special characteristics of each division of the animal 
kingdom, of man, quadrupeds, birds, fishes, even of every species of each” (Wickham 
1891: 389).  
Importantly at the very start of the Ars Poetica we are induced by the Praeceptor 
to laugh at this comically over-the-top image: spectatum admissi risum teneatis, amici 
(line 5)132 – indeed how could we ‘hold our laughter’ at such a ridiculously exaggerated 
ensemble from the natural world? Now because this hyperbolically-described monster is 
used to exemplify ‘the work of art lacking in unity’, which is spelled out clearly in the 
ensuing verses, it is only natural that our laughter is gradually transferred from the 
supernatural image to the inadequate artistic work itself, rendering this the focus of our 
ridicule: “within the Ars… laughter is regularly the sign not of comic success but of 
artistic failure” (Oliensis 1998: 205). Humour in this instance is not oriented against the 
audience or the authorial persona himself but is directed against the subject of artistic 
disunity, which is turned into a comic spectacle of Scyllan-proportions, while we, the 
readers, and the teacher knowingly look on and laugh (Oliensis 1998: 202). Furthermore, 
there is a sense in this line that the amici (line 5) are not supposed to laugh – that they 
                                               
132 In my understanding of the text, amici (line 5) is here a vocative of address, picked up by the vocative, 
Pisones, in the following sentence, rather than a genitive dependent on risum (line 5) (Rudd 1989: 151). 
The sense is then: ‘will you, admitted to the spectacle (to look on), hold back your laughter, friends’, rather 
than ‘will you restrain the laughter of a friend’. 
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should hold back, teneatis (line 5), their ridicule – since they have been ‘admitted to this 
private viewing’, spectatum (line 5) (Wickham 1891: 390); however, the fact that they 
are still persuaded by the Praeceptor to raise their laughter at the picture created by the 
incompetent artist, even though they seem to be socially compelled to restrain 
themselves, emphasises just how ridiculous this image really is.  
Another more straightforward example of hyperbole occurs further on in the 
poem: 
 
nec sic incipies ut scriptor cyclicus olim: 
‘fortunam Priami cantabo et nobile bellum.’ 
quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu? 
(Hor. Ars P. 136-138) 
 
Here the Praeceptor has playfully exaggerated the physical mouth, tanto hiatu (line 138), 
of the second-rate stereotypical epic poet in order to emphasize the inflated bombast 
which pours forth from it; moreover, there is also a certain amount of comical metonymy 
in describing the issuer of an epic poem simply as ‘one large mouth’. Once again the 
poetic censure of the Praeceptor is manifested in the form of his and our shared laughter 
at the ridiculous comic spectacle, on this occasion, of the wide-mouthed epic poet. 
 At other times exaggerated speech functions simply to soften with humour the 
force of the Praeceptor’s instructive language. Exclamations often accomplish this 
through the introduction of a high inflated poetic register into a somewhat more mundane 
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subject matter. So in his instruction to the Pisones to ensure that their literary efforts are 
polished and pruned, the Praeceptor commands:  
 
vos, o  
Pompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite quod non 
multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque 
praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.  
(Hor. Ars P. 291-294) 
 
As Brink identifies, “the nominative of the address, Pompilius, and the vocative particle 
o, add to the archaic solemnity (over-solemnity, it would seem) of phrasing” (Brink 1971: 
322); moreover, the reference to the addressees of the poem through their unlikely 
mythical royal genealogy to Numa Pompilius as well as the highly poetic term of address, 
sanguis (line 292)133 further augments the exaggerated high register of the verse. The 
humour here lies in the “studied incongruity between the elevated address and the 
pedestrian subject of labor” (Brink 1971: 322), which manages playfully to soften the 
instructive language of the Praeceptor in the form of the imperative, reprehendite (line 
292).134 
                                               
133 See my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’. 
134 For a similar example of this humorous change in register, I have already discussed the following 
quotation in my introduction to this second chapter: o ego laevus, / qui purgor bilem sub verni temporis 
horam (Hor. Ars P 301-2). This is placed right before what is the most manifestly didactic section of the 
poem in which the Praeceptor enumerates the obligations or duties of the aspiring poet (Wickham1891: 
418) – quid deceat, quid non; quo virtus, quo ferat error. / scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons: 
/ rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae… (Hor. Ars P. 308-310). The form of the exclamatory 
phrase o ego laevus (line 301) again develops a comically heightened poetic register in the narrative: “in 
exclamations consisting of interjection and personal pronoun the type o ego is poetic and very rare… 
instead of the established o me + accusative” (Brink 1971: 333). See my discussion in my section on ‘The 
Horatian Concept of the Praeceptor’. 
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 The converse to this type of hyperbolic language is the deliberate employment of 
understatement by the Praeceptor. Let me first consider the example of anticlimax. The 
following passage is concerned with illustrating how mediocrity is not accepted in the 
field of poetry, unlike certain other professions in which it might offer a degree of 
usefulness (Wilkins 1886: 401-402): 
 
o maior iuvenum, quamvis et voce paterna 
fingeris ad rectum et per te sapis, hoc tibi dictum, 
tolle memor, certis medium et tolerabile rebus 
recte concedi. consultus iuris et actor 
causarum mediocris abest virtute diserti 
Messallae nec scit quantum Cascellius Aulus, 
sed tamen in pretio est: mediocribus esse poetis 
non homines, non di, non concessere columnae. 
(Hor. Ars P. 366-373) 
 
Firstly, the prescriptive tone in this passage, signified by the second person verb fingeris 
(line 367)135 and imperative tolle (line 368)136, is given initial emphasis through the 
vocative, o maior iuvenum (line 366), and the personal pronouns, per te… tibi (line 367). 
After presenting some professions where mediocrity is in fact acceptable, there is a 
climactic build up in the final verse of this passage as we discover who exactly ‘does not 
yield’ to mediocre poets: first, it is men, homines (line 373), who vent their disapproval; 
                                               
135 See my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’. 
136 See my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’. 
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then we step up to the divine plane in the form of the gods, di (line 373); and, lastly, to 
complete this majestic cosmic (Brink 1971: 376) tricolon arrangement, the line ends in a 
farcical bathetic note with the noun columnae (line 373), meant to stand for ‘the stores of 
booksellers’ (Wickham 1891: 423).  
In terms of how this type of humour orients itself with regard to the rest of the 
narrative: it seems that the Praeceptor has become aware of the instructive note his 
language is starting to adopt here – in the form of the second person future indicative, 
fingeris (line 367), second person imperative, tolle (line 378), and the syncopated 
empirical perfect, concessere (line 373), presenting the last clause as a law137 – and has 
simply, as Wickham puts it, given “a playful turn to the outburst” (Wickham 1891: 423) 
with this very last word in the sentence, columnae (line 373). This is really a case of the 
Praeceptor acknowledging the authority he possesses as a teacher and playfully poking 
fun at himself by boiling over into a lofty outburst at the end of which he humorously, but 
quite intentionally, loses control of his subject. Furthermore, there seems also to be a 
humorous suggestion in this anticlimax that the approval of men and gods is all very well, 
but, from a pragmatic perspective of making a living, it doesn’t hurt for the budding poet 
to sell a few books at the store, columnae! 
The second major type of humour which must be addressed in any discussion of 
the Ars is the prevalence of witty puns or word-plays manufactured by the authorial 
persona. In the account of how the various literary genres have assumed different metres, 
the iambus is duly allotted to drama – i.e. comedy and tragedy: 
 
Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo; 
                                               
137 See my discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’. 
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hunc socci cepere pedem grandesque coturni, 
alternis aptum sermonibus et populares 
vincentem strepitus et natum rebus agendis. 
(Hor. Ars P. 79-82) 
 
So here comedy, denoted metonymically by the comic slipper, soccus, and tragedy, 
likewise by the buskin, coturnus, are said to take the iambic foot, pedem (line 80) (Brink 
1971: 168). Of course there is a delightful pun here in the double sense of the word, 
pedem (line 80), referring both to the metrical foot in poetry and to the physical foot, both 
of which soccii (line 80) and coturni (line 80) can be made to apply to, used in their 
metonymical sense or in their literal sense; as Rudd aptly translates into English: “the 
foot was found to fit the sock and stately buskin” (Rudd 1989: 164).  
There is also an etymological pun by the Praeceptor in the verse Archilochum 
proprio rabies armavit iambo (line 79): supposedly the origin of the Greek word ‡amboj 
stemmed from the verb „£ptein, meaning to ‘fling or hurl an object’, which is often 
employed in Greek in a military context (Wilkins 1886: 351)138; in the Latin text 
therefore the bellicose phrase armavit iambo (line 79), although it is obviously used 
figuratively of the particular metrical verse, attains an amusing literal sense. Indeed, the 
traditional association of the character of Archilochus as a bellicose poet is referenced by 
Horace both in the Epodes:  
 
cave, cave, namque in malos asperrimus 
parata tollo cornua, 
                                               
138 “send, drive on, of missiles, send forth, shoot…” (LSJ s.v. BI) 
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qualis Lycambae spretus infido gener 
aut acer hostis Bupalo 
(Hor. Epod. 6.11-14) 
 
And in the Epistles: 
 
ac ne me foliis ideo brevioribus ornes 
quod timui mutare modos et carminis artem, 
temperat Archilochi Musam pede mascula Sappho, 
temperat Alcaeus, sed rebus et ordine dispar, 
nec socerum quaerit quem versibus oblinat atris, 
nec sponsae laqueum famoso carmine nectit 
(Hor. Epist. 1.19.26-31) 
 
My next instance of punning comes from the central part of the Ars, in which the 
Praeceptor explains how satyr-plays came into existence from tragic performances:  
 
carmine qui tragico vilem certavit ob hircum, 
mox etiam agrestes Satyros nudavit, et asper 
incolumi gravitate iocum temptavit, eo quod 
illecebris erat et grata novitate morandus 
spectator, functusque sacris et potus et exlex. 
(Hor. Ars P. 220-224) 
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Although Brink regards the word nudavit in mox etiam agrestes Satyros nudavit (line 
221) a highly suspect transmission from the manuscripts and proceeds with perhaps 
prudish pleasure to eliminate all interpretive responses to the sense of this specific verb 
suggested by other commentators, I think we can conjecture a rather amusing play on 
words in nudavit (line 221) (Brink 1971: 278-279). In a transferred sense, like verbs such 
as protulit or induxit, it could denote the action of the dramatic poet in simply 
‘introducing’ or, possibly better in English, ‘revealing’ a new performance on stage139; 
then, very literally, it could also gain the sense of bringing the “Satyrs naked on stage” 
(Wickham 1891: 411)140 – which is of course a permissible poetic exaggeration, since, as 
Rudd points out, satyrs are often depicted in art wearing “loincloths or shaggy aprons” 
(Rudd 1989: 187). This witty pun could be rendered by a similarly oblique English 
phrase, such as ‘he soon even exposed the wild Satyrs to his audience’. 
 Again as was the case with the iambus joke above, the Praeceptor has once more 
introduced an etymological pun in the phrase carmine qui tragico vilem certavit ob 
hircum (line 220). By presenting the Latin term for ‘goat’, hircus (line 220), he has 
alluded to the lowly origin of the Greek term for tragedy, tragwid…a, in tr£goj, a ‘he-
goat’, which was originally given as a prize to the successful playwright (Brink 1971: 
277). The force of the humour here lies in the manner in which hircus (line 220) exposes 
the basic sense and primitive context of the ostensibly high genre tragico (line 220), such 
that the reader may amusingly render the phase carmine tragico (line 220) literally as the 
                                               
139 (OLD s.v. 3, 6). 
140 (OLD s.v. 1). 
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‘goat-song’ rather than the somewhat more highbrow ‘tragic hymn’ (Wickham 1891: 
411). 
 In summary, it is his propensity to scatter ridiculously hyperbolic comic images, 
at times even bordering on the absurd, across his narrative – pictures of mad ‘inspired’ 
poets stranded within pits and imploring for help (lines 457-463), of mythical monsters 
devouring children for breakfast (line 340), of obscenely dressed satyrs (line 220) – as 
well as to invest in clever witty puns or word plays, which lends much of the Ars a 
playful and quite conversational element. This kind of tone in turn functions to soften the 
highly instructive voice of the Praeceptor which dominates other parts of the Ars and 
induces the audience to follow the prescriptions far more willingly than if such discourse 
were absent. I think Rudd perhaps best accounts for the playful dynamic in the poem 
when he succinctly describes the Ars: “It is a lively, entertaining verse epistle, written by 
a well-read man for his friends, who shared his love of poetry and whose company we are 
invited to join” (Rudd 1989: 34). The sportive humour in the Ars is neither designed to 
mock and ostracise the readers nor to parody the writer’s own portrayal of himself, but 
rather to serve as playful enticements, crustula (Hor. Sat. 1.1.25), to lure us into what 
might otherwise be a quite technical intimidating discussion of aesthetic theory. 
 
 
Empathetic Language 
 
In the previous section I examined how the games which the Praeceptor plays with his 
pupils are manifest through various rhetorical devices and word puns; in the ensuing 
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analysis I shall consider how this playful tendency in his discourse extends to role-
playing in the narrative where the Praeceptor on occasion allows for a change in 
perspective by a marked change in verbal person and number, i.e. from 1st person 
singular to 1st person plural, to 2nd person singular, and so forth. The propensity of the 
authorial persona to alter the personal perspective of his narrative is alluded to by Brink: 
“H’s astonishing practice of partly displaying and partly concealing his personality is at 
the root of his poetry both in the lyric and the hexameter poems” (Brink 1971: 107). 
However, rather than interpreting this as a characteristically Horatian attempt to elude a 
fixed interpretation of his own true identity (Harrison 2007: 35), I would like to consider 
this role-playing, this change in verbal person and number, ultimately as an indication of 
the empathetic function of the Praeceptor, where he manages both to reduce his own 
personal authority as a teacher and at the same time increase his pupils’ authority in the 
narrative in such a way that they might be more gently coaxed, blandi (Hor. Sat. 1.1.25), 
into following his precepts (Volk 2002: 77-79). 
 To begin, 1st person plural verbs clearly allow for a shared perspective of subject 
between the Praeceptor and his pupils. In the very opening passage of the poem the 
Praeceptor provides no less than three 1st person plural verbs in a single verse within his 
discussion of the tension between poetic license and poetic unity: 
 
‘pictoribus atque poetis 
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.’ 
scimus, et hanc veniam petimusque damusque vicissim; 
sed non ut placidis coeant immitia, non ut 
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serpentes avibus geminentur, tigribus agni. 
(Hor. Ars P. 9-13) 
 
Instead of supplying the 1st person singular form scio to give his affirmation to the 
common dictum141 – pictoribus atque poetis / quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa 
potestas (lines 9-10) – the Praeceptor shares his authority as teacher of poetry with his 
pupils by incorporating them in the plural subject: “here the plural differs from the 
singular only by an authoritative note” (Brink 1971: 92). He allows the pupils to give 
their assent, scimus (line 11), to this dictum. And, moreover, in order to endorse his 
acknowledgement (scimus) of this traditional poetic license, the teacher gives practical 
testimony to this precept by briefly transforming both himself and, significantly, his 
pupils first into poets, petimus (line 11), and then into readers or critics, damusque (line 
11), who duly enact the principle of quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas (line 
10) (Wilkins 1886: 337). Again, the Praeceptor could have simply referred to his personal 
experience as a poet and critic, in the 1st person singular, as sufficient empirical proof of 
this aesthetic principle, but has chosen rather to incorporate his audience into the 
narrative in such a way that he both ostensibly downplays his own poetic authority and 
raises theirs.  
Apart from this sharing of poetic authority, the Praeceptor also ‘invites’ his pupils 
into the narrative – that is to say he projects their voice into the narrative – on other 
notable occasions: such as the discussion of the brevity of human life and endeavours – 
debemur morti nos nostraque (Hor. Ars P. 63) – marked out by the emphatic reference to 
                                               
141 The fact that this is a common ‘understood’ law is exemplified by the empirical perfect, fuit, see my 
discussion in the section ‘Language of Command’ 
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first person plural in the indicative verb, debemur (line 63), subject pronoun, nos (line 
63), and possessive adjective, nostraque (line 63); and, secondly, in the verb, speremus 
(line 331), when referring to the characteristic literary shortcomings of Romans: 
 
an haec animos aerugo et cura peculi 
cum semel imbuerit, speremus carmina fingi 
posse linenda cedro et levi servanda cupresso? 
(Hor. Ars P. 330-332) 
 
The Praeceptor is once more allowing a shared perspective of his subject: in the first 
example (line 63), the pupils enter into the narrative in their very general role as human 
beings, who are subject to mortality; in the second (line 331), they arrive as typically 
‘practical’ Roman citizens142. 
 It is also worth considering how this 1st person plural ‘shared voice’ interacts with 
other verbal numbers and persons. Perhaps the most complex instance of the Praeceptor’s 
fondness for role playing can be found in discussion on the failures of poets to achieve 
unity and coherence i  their works through an excess of a particular style:  
 
maxima pars vatum, pater et iuvenes patre digni, 
decipimur specie recti: brevis esse laboro, 
obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi 
                                               
142 The Roman ‘practical’ priority in education is exemplified by the preceding speech, in which a school 
boy is required by the teacher to do sums, arithmetic, for the pragmatic end of looking after his property – 
rem poteris servare tuam (Horace Ars P. 329); this is to be contrasted with the artistic prowess of the 
Greeks (lines 323-324). For a similar usage of the 1st person plural, see line 285. 
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deficiunt animique; professus grandia turget; 
serpit humi tutus nimium timidusque procellae; 
(Hor. Ars P. 24-28) 
 
It is quite astonishing here how often the Praeceptor is changing the point of view for his 
readers in this segment. At the beginning of the sentence, maxima pars vatum (line 24) 
would suggest a 3rd person singular verb is required; however, the Praeceptor turns 
abruptly to a 2nd person voice by addressing the recipients of the letter in the vocative 
case – pater et iuvenes patre digni (line 24); he then presents the verb decipimur (line 25) 
in the 1st person plural, thus placing himself and his pupils in apposition to the subject 
maxima pars vatum (line 24). In the subsequent clause he adopts a 1st person singular 
voice, laboro… fio (lines 25-26) as he alone apparently assumes the role of an errant 
poet; and then he changes to a 3rd person plural verb, deficiunt (line 27), and finally into 
an indefinite 3rd person singular, turget; / serpit (line 27-28). 
How do we interpret such a passage? Brink simply believes the transition into and 
out of the 1st person form constitutes the characteristic Horatian ambiguity (Brink 1971: 
107). I think, however, with regard to my particular study of empathetic language, what 
these commentators are overlooking is the extent to which the 1st person plural verb 
decipimur (line 25) has the force of governing the rest of the narrative: that is to say, the 
ensuing statements – brevis esse laboro, / obscurus fio; sectantem levia nervi / deficiunt 
animique (lines 25-27) – are all examples of the principle decipimur specie recti (line 
25); they are, in short, all dependent on a shared 1st person perspective. As a result of this 
it is in fact quite possible that the pupils might unintentionally substitute themselves in 
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place of the various persons in the examples: note, for example, how the Praeceptor 
subtly changes from the 1st person plural to the 1st person singular, decipimur (line 25) to 
laboro… fio (line 25-26), such that a pupil of the poem may continue to ‘read himself’ as 
subject. 
Beyond the intermittent sharing of perspective with his audience in the Ars, how 
else does the Praeceptor allow their voice to enter into the narrative? We may infer that 
the employment of rhetorical questions through the poem is an indication of the assumed 
objections or interrogation of his pupils; because they themselves, as voiceless readers, 
clearly cannot query his instruction, the Praeceptor takes it upon himself to suppose what 
these various questions might be (Volk 2002: 79). This is highlighted by the fact that the 
rhetorical questions in the Ars are more often than not dominated by 1st person singular 
verbal forms. Consider the following three examples:  
 
ego cur, acquirere pauca 
si possum, invideor, cum lingua Catonis et Enni 
sermonem patrium ditaverit et nova rerum 
nomina protulerit? 
(Hor. Ars P. 55-57) 
 
descriptas servare vices operumque colores 
cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor? 
 
cur nescire pudens prave quam discere malo? 
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(Hor. Ars P. 86-88) 
 
idcircone vager scribamque licenter? an omnes 
visuros peccata putem mea, tutus et intra 
spem veniae cautus? 
(Hor. Ars P. 265-267) 
 
In all three of these examples there are strong personal pronouns and adjectives – ego 
(lines 55, 87) and mea (line 266) – as well as 1st person singular verbal forms, invideor 
(line 56), nequeo ignoro… salutor (lines 87), and scribamque… putem (lines 265-266). 
The emphatic 1st persons here would then seem to be a ‘response’, so to speak, to the tacit 
or understood 2nd person objections or questioning of the Praeceptor’s pupils; it is as 
though he is pre-empting what they would ask him, if they were in fact able to. This 
verbal ‘exchange’ between the Praeceptor and his pupils is further illustrated in the last 
example given where he change  immediately from 1st person verbs back to 2nd person 
verbs directed at the Pisones:  
 
        vitavi denique culpam, 
non laudem merui. vos exemplaria Graeca 
nocturna versate manu, versate diurna. 
(Hor. Ars P. 267-269) 
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To conclude this section, I think it is fair to say that the playful dynamic of the Praeceptor 
of the Ars can be located in his willingness to switch roles frequently in the course of his 
narrative, almost like a game of literary hide-and-seek as he alternately conceals and 
reveals his own identity. However, in addition to this playful penchant on the part of the 
Praeceptor, this role-playing, this constant changing of verbal person and number, also 
serves to lure the pupils, the Pisones, further into the subject of the Ars, while at the same 
time moderating the degree of the Praeceptor’s own authority. Indeed, if this type of 
empathetic discourse were somehow to be removed from the Ars, the potential for the 
Praeceptor to coax his pupils, blandiri143, into taking up these aesthetic principles would 
surely be greatly diminished. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
143 See Hor. Sat. 1.1.25-26. 
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Summary of Analysis 
  
Reviewing my analysis of the Ars Poetica, I believe I have managed to illustrate how the 
different kinds of discourse which the Praeceptor employs in the poem serve to fulfil the 
three essential Horatian conceptual criteria of teaching: instruction, demonstration and 
play.  
In terms of the first criterion, the Praeceptor manages to transfer his subject to the 
Pisones primarily through a language of direct command, epitomized by highly 
instructive verbal moods and tenses. I have also shown that this instructive thrust of the 
Ars is represented by the Praeceptor’s fondness for proverbial language, where the 
authority of traditional discourse – maxims, adages, proverbs, etc – conveys and transfers 
certain truisms to the pupils. 
 Regarding the criterion of demonstration, I discussed how the Praeceptor’s 
language epitomizes the principle of exemplis… notando (Hor. Sat. 1.4.106), where the 
choice of diction as well as various rhetorical devices, both on the smaller syntactic level 
of individual clauses and across larger segments of the poem, serve to illustrate the 
aesthetic principles under discussion. Moreover, in my section on transitional language, I 
explained how the very structure of the poem is displayed in such a way so as to give a 
prominent position to the aesthetic principles in the narrative. 
With regard to the third criterion, the Horatian Praeceptor’s penchant for play was 
shown to be evident both in his employment of sportive language, constituting various 
rhetorical devices and witty word puns where ‘games are played on paper’ (Hor. Sat. 
1.4.139), as well as in his tendency to engage in role-playing in his discourse where he 
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regularly changes verbal number and person. Moreover, in addition to softening the 
highly instructive tone elsewhere, I suggested, in my section on empathetic discourse, 
that such playful language is in fact vitally important in the Praeceptor’s quest to ‘coax’ 
(Hor. Sat. 1.1.25) his pupils into following his precepts. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
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Chapter 3 – The Teacher of Satire 1.4 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this final chapter of my dissertation, as a necessary supplement to the concept of the 
Horatian Praeceptor which I have established and have endeavoured to locate in the 
discourse of the Ars Poetica, I shall explore how other modern scholars have tended to 
explain the Horatian ‘teacher persona’. To this end, I shall turn my attention to the Satires 
of Horace, where by far the greatest critical focus has been paid to the character of the 
Horatian authorial persona; in particular, seeing that it has played such a large role in 
determining my concept of the Horatian Praeceptor, I shall examine principally Satire 
1.4, in which the persona of that sermo seeks to explain his own particular brand of satiric 
writing. After I have presented and commented upon four prominent critical 
interpretations (those of Fraenkel, Anderson, Freudenburg, and Oliensis) of the character 
of the ‘teacher’ in 1.4, I shall respond to the prevailing critical concern about how the 
instruction of this teacher functions in combination with his humour. 
 
Interpretations of the ‘Teacher’ Persona 
 
Commencing with Fraenkel’s analysis of Satire 1.4 in his work Horace, it is necessary 
first to point out that he does not identify the presence or even the possibility of an 
authorial persona in the text: his interpretation of the Horatian works (1957) predates by 
at least ten to twenty years most of the earnest critical discussion of authorial personae in 
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the Satires. However, in discussing Horace’s aims in writing the poem, he does provide a 
useful starting point for us in terms of the problems which have come to preoccupy more 
recent scholars concerned with characterizing this persona as a teacher (Fraenkel 1957: 
124-125). Fraenkel introduces the satire by referring to the substantial tradition of self-
conscious theoretical reflections on poetics in Roman poetry, such as those in the extant 
fragments of Lucilius, Accius, and Cato, so establishing the belief that there was a natural 
precedent for Horace to follow in this field: “It was, then, no novelty in itself when 
Horace undertook to discuss themes which we are accustomed to regard as belonging to 
the theoretical treatment of poetics” (Fraenkel 1957: 125). But crucially Fraenkel, 
although paying homage to the origin of this work (as well as of others, such as the Letter 
to Augustus and indeed the Ars Poetica) in theoretical treatises, differentiates Horace’s 
poetry from other earlier texts on poetics with the key adversative statement: “But 
whether late or early, all his writings on problems of poetics, while drawing on a large 
store of theories, served an eminently practical purpose144” (Fraenkel 1957: 125). 
 But – and this is really the point of debate – just what is this practical purpose for 
Horace in Satire 1.4? To what end has this satire been constructed? Fraenkel provides us 
here with two fundamental aims, and, inadvertently, two resulting faces or personae in 
Horace’s sermo (Fraenkel 1957: 126). On the one hand, the writer seems to assume the 
role of a social preacher, who, directing his satiric invective against various causes, 
presents the reader with a series of prohibitive exempla of what they ought to avoid: “he 
wanted to fight against all kinds of prejudice, amateurish slovenliness, philistinism, 
reactionary tendencies, in short to fight for the new and noble kind of poetry which he 
and his friends were endeavouring to bring about” (Fraenkel 1957: 125); on the other 
                                               
144 My italics. 
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hand, Horace appears to use the satire as a means to instruct his readers in his own 
personal approach to the art of writing poetry: “[b]ut it is obvious that he wrote them also 
to give to himself and to his readers an account of what he was attempting to achieve and 
of the means which he had chosen as most suitable to his ends” (Fraenkel 1957: 125). In 
both of these cases we are provided with what we might term ‘instructors’, characters 
who are concerned with handing over a particular subject: the social preacher transmits to 
us the moral requirements of his satire, the artistic instructor the required aesthetic 
quality. 
 Both of Fraenkel’s defining comments on the aims of the sermo share the 
common acknowledgement that this is a work which is essentially outward-looking145, 
which seeks to interact with an audience or, at the least, some kind of close literary circle 
rather than to confine itself to theory or solitary reflection. The question which has busied 
later commentators of this poem is just how the persona, this face of Horace, interacts 
with his audience. Is he simply concerned with instruction – a process of ‘handing over’ 
or ‘transmitting’ – of the relevant moral and aesthetic requirements of his own brand of 
satiric writing, as Fraenkel seems to suggest? 
 In his essay ‘The Roman Socrates: Horace and his Satires’ (1982b: 13-49) W.S. 
Anderson has produced perhaps the seminal modern account of how the authorial persona 
functions in the Horatian Satires (his other important essay, ‘Autobiography and Art’ 
(1982c: 50-73), is concerned with the justification of the authorial persona in Horatian 
literature in general, as contrasted with the historical figure of Horace). In a method 
similar to that of Ellen Oliensis (1998: 2), who locates a coherent Horatian persona 
                                               
145 In the first case, in his reference to “the new and noble kind of poetry which he and his friends were 
endeavouring to bring about”, and, in the second case, “to give to… his readers an account of what he was 
attempting to achieve” (Fraenkel 1957: 125). (My italics). 
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interplaying throughout all of his works, Anderson tries to identify a coherent persona 
through the whole of Book 1 of the Satires, which he simply calls the ‘satirist’. So who is 
this satirist? The core of Anderson’s analysis of the Horatian satiric persona lies in 
distinguishing it from its generic predecessor, the Lucilian satiric persona. For Anderson 
– as is laid out in Satire 1.4 itself – the Lucilian persona is defined by his libertas: “The 
virtues of such a satirist are relatively obvious: he seems friendly, amusing, frank, and 
confiding; he can talk seriously or lightly, but you yourself do not have to take him too 
seriously… we can profitably describe Lucilius’ satirist as lusor, a playful individual” 
(Anderson 1982b: 33).  
Now whereas the Lucilian lusor is fundamentally defined by his playful 
countenance, the Horatian satirist, although he permits a good dosage of measured 
laughter on occasion, is principally, according to Anderson, delineated by ‘sapientia’ 
rather than ‘libertas’ – a ‘wise old man’ persona: “Here is the principle distinction 
between the Lucilian and the Horatian manner: while the former is essentially lusor, the 
Horatian satirist is doctor. He is a teacher instructing puerile mankind in serious 
elementary  moral truths, but willing to coax us by his laughing, ironic manner in order to 
impress his truths more effectively in our hearts” (Anderson 1982b: 35). 
 The crucial characteristic of the Satires which endorses Anderson’s conception of 
the teacher, the doctor, is the persona’s sense of irony. He accordingly links this method 
of teaching through ironic language with Socratic instruction: “That essential trait of 
Socratic discourse, irony, is likewise an essential feature of Horatian discourse, and this 
guarantees his Socratic character” (Anderson 1982b: 38). The degree to which humour is 
employed and the direction in which it is oriented is the key for Anderson in 
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distinguishing the Horatian doctor from the Lucilian lusor: “all too often Lucilius let his 
libertas proceed too far, and consequently his laughter became sardonic or mere jesting. 
Irony is intellectual; it smiles and avoids uproarious laughter” (Anderson 1982b: 38) – in 
Anderson’s interpretation, the satirist in Horace’s works is not trying to create a spectacle 
of himself or any other specific person for that matter, but is rather concerned with gently 
nudging his audience in the right direction, towards the truth, with a laugh (Anderson 
1982b: 38): ridentem dicere verum (Hor. Sat. 1.1.24). Of course Anderson’s conception 
of the Socratic character of the Horatian satiric persona goes beyond merely an ironic 
tone of voice and incorporates aspects of both style and content: “Such Socratic 
understanding demanded complete disciplining of vocabulary, exact choice of words, a 
delicate touch in word-order, and improvement of the metre; but the final product was 
what I call a Socratic style: an intelligent use of all the poetic materials available to the 
writer of verse satire in order to create an intellectual poetry… Horace fully integrated it 
with his material, so that it is quite possible to say that the contents followed on the style” 
(Anderson 1982b: 41).  
Now, briefly, let us consider some of the difficulties with Anderson’s 
interpretation of the satirist as the Socratic doctor, the persona who, although making no 
explicit claims to teach, steers his pupils towards the truth through a form of 
‘constructive’ irony146. I think that the progress made from Fraenkel’s interpretation of 
Satire 1.4 to Anderson’s is the realization that the satiric persona does not simply 
function to instruct – to impart the relevant moral or aesthetic knowledge of what 
constitutes his brand of satiric writing – in the manner of a preacher, but that he is willing 
to blend his instructive discourse with humorous ironic language, as I discussed in the 
                                               
146 i.e. humour for the sake of arriving at the truth. 
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Ars. What is questionable in Anderson’s analysis is whether we can confidently call this 
teacher specifically a Socratic doctor. 
Firstly, I would query whether it is not rather too tendentious an approach to label 
the style of Book 1 of the Satires ‘Socratic’, simply because Horace makes use of his 
customary ‘brevitas’, careful selection of words, polished verses, and an ironic turn of 
voice – such language can be found throughout Horace’s corpus. Are we then to 
conjecture that all of Horace’s writing is underlined by this persona? Indeed, Anderson’s 
decision to title his persona ‘Socratic’ ultimately derives from a line in the Ars Poetica:  
 
rem tibi Socraticae poterunt ostendere chartae 
verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur. 
(Hor. Ars P. 310-311) 
 
Does it necessarily stand to reason that if Horace adopts a Socratic subject, his language 
and style should also be Socratic?  
Secondly, to try to ascribe a single philosophy, rather than an eclectic farrago, to 
the works of Horace has always been a dangerous task – even one so accommodating as 
the Socratic spirit, which several later philosophical schools claimed as their original 
inspiration. We can, if we are so inclined, find traces of Epicureanism, Stoicism and 
Peripatetic doctrine in many of Horace’s works without these then serving to define the 
corresponding discourse of those particular Horatian poems. Moreover, if the persona is 
definitively Socratic, why then does he not engage to a significant degree in any form of 
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dialectic in Satire 1.4 with some other interlocutor, as we are familiar with from the 
Platonic dialogues?  
Thirdly, with reference to the type of irony demanded by the Socratic doctor, can 
we truly say that the persona of the entire first book of Satires – even in the Priapean 
satire – never utilizes that type of ‘Lucilian’ over-the-top comical humour, designed not 
to elicit that state of enlightening bewilderment, ‘¢por…a’, from the audience in the 
manner of Socratic discourse, but rather designed purely to entertain the reader without 
immediate thought given to instruction? I believe a re-evaluation of how the humour 
functions in terms of our broader conception of the Horatian Praeceptor is required in 
Satire 1.4. Lastly, then, on account of the previous observation, we must surely cast doubt 
on the notion of there being a single coherent ‘satirist’ persona across Book 1. 
 Although he does acknowledge the critical progress made by Anderson in the 
development of an authorial persona within the Horatian Satires, Freudenburg’s analysis, 
in his work The Walking Muse: Horace on the Theory of Satire, does represent a major 
shift in how we are to perceive the authorial persona of 1.4. Firstly, unlike Anderson who 
attempts to establish a coherent persona – his Socratic doctor – for the entire first book of 
Satires, Freudenburg has confined the scope of his interpretation to the first four 
sermones of the book: “To begin this study, I limit myself to the first four satires of Book 
1, the so-called diatribe147 satires, for here alone has Horace developed an image of the 
speaker fully consistent from satire to satire” (Freudenburg 1993: 7)148. The notion that 
                                               
147 My italics. 
148 As a brief addendum, it should be noted here that Freudenburg does acknowledge the difficulties in 
trying to peg down a specific definition for the term ‘diatribe’, so providing the following description by 
D.A. Russell as a guideline (Freudenburg 1993: 7): “a lecture or discourse on a moral theme marked by a 
combination of seriousness with humour and a certain vividness and immediacy in language” (Russell 
1973: 29, no 25). 
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these satires are based upon the Greek diatribe form will be fundamental to this critic’s 
understanding of the sermones. So Freudenburg’s initial important distinction between 
his interpretation of the satirist persona and Anderson’s lies in the difference in audience 
or recipient between the Socratic discourse and the diatribe form: whereas the Socratic 
doctor persona should engage in dialectic with his interlocutor, the diatribe persona 
“pontificates. His interlocutor is a shadowboxer, totally void of personality, outside of 
time and place; he functions as a rhetorical convenience. He is neither a peer nor a pupil; 
he is an adversary, an ignorant voice from the crowd” (Freudenburg 1993: 9).  
The notion that this authorial persona is not so much a teacher communicating 
with his pupils, or a receptive audience, but more a preacher-type figure communicating 
with an adversary, a random man plucked from the crowd, is an important facet in 
Freudenburg’s subsequent explanation of how the persona truly functions here. 
Freudenburg further characterizes the satirist of the Horatian diatribes by relating him to 
the tradition of the Cynic moralizer in Greek diatribes: “The satirist is a philosopher, but 
not a philosopher who demands respect for being original, well read, or polished. His 
rhetoric, like his philosophy, is homespun… [he is] characteristic not of the professional 
rhetorician but of the old country sage” (Freudenburg 1993: 12). So whereas Anderson 
interprets simplicitas, brevitas, lucidus ordo and other such features in the language of 
Horace as indicative of a measured intellectual ‘Socratic’ style, Freudenburg points to 
these same characteristics – as well as other linguistic features, such as a conversational 
logic, excessive illustrations, and abrupt colloquialisms – as reflective of the unrefined 
boorish preacher of diatribe (Freudenburg 1993: 12). 
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 However, the recognition of the presence or, perhaps one should say, the 
influence of the simple uncouth Cynic moralizer within the Horatian diatribes is really 
only half of Freudenburg’s analysis. He does not take the view that the Horatian Satires 
are at all instructive in nature, not even the seriocomic instruction of diatribe, as opposed 
to the ironic Socratic instruction which Anderson recommends. For him the persona of 
the first four satires resides entirely within a comic world (Freudenburg 1993: 8). The 
satirist then duly becomes the doctor ineptus, a self-parodying instructor of diatribe, 
plucked out from the comic stage by Horace and inserted into his sermones, whose 
preaching serves not any real didactic purpose but purely as an avenue of self-ridicule. 
The persona, in short, is acting the fool, making a spectacle of himself in front of a 
crowd.  
So what justification does Freudenburg give for his interpretation of this kind of 
comic persona in 1.4? He points to the role of the satirist’s father as paramount to our 
perception of this as a sermo derived from the comic stage. For Freudenburg this is not 
the historical writer’s true father but the kind of overly exaggerated figure which we can 
typically find in comedy: “he is the traditional comic pater ardens, cleverly adapted from 
the character of Demea in the Adelphi of Terence. The verbal parallels, the convictions, 
and the characteristics shared between Demea and the satirist’s father make the literary 
influence upon the portrait of 1.4 undeniable” (Freudenburg 1993: 34). And so naturally 
once we come to appreciate the comical nature of the satirist’s depiction of his father, the 
sincerity of the satirist himself – setting himself up as heir to this ridiculous character – 
should accordingly begin to wither away in front of us. How can we now consider 
anything which he says to be truthful?  
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This is then the general scope of Freudenburg’s analysis. Now I would like to 
consider some critical problems with his interpretation for Satire 1.4. Firstly, unlike 
Freudenburg, most other commentators of the Satires do not classify 1.4 as a diatribe 
sermo alongside the first three works (Brown 1993: 89)149: it is certainly, as Freudenburg 
himself confesses, not concerned with addressing any one particular moral issue, as is 
customary in diatribes (Freudenburg 1993: 7). Certainly, both the highly personalized 
programmatic language of 1.4 as well as the subject matter, which seems more indebted 
to the tradition of theories of poetics, as Fraenkel points out, than moralistic discourse, 
are quite different to the first three Horatian satires, which in turn naturally raises doubts 
as to whether we can consider this work to be indebted at all to Cynic diatribe, as 
Freudenburg suggests. 
Secondly, I do not believe that Freudenburg makes a suitable argument for the 
distinction between the seriocomic instruction of Cynic diatribe and the mock-serious 
instruction from the comic stage. We are told that in diatribe the moralistic preacher often 
achieves his ends with a fair accompaniment of humour – the implication would then 
seem to be that the force of the humour in 1.4 is so excessive that it radically undermines 
this instructive function, creating the comic persona. However, apart from labelling the 
satirist’s father as a hackneyed figure from comedy, Freudenburg does not provide 
adequate proof of a major difference in the text between the humour of the rustic Cynic 
preacher and the doctor ineptus from comedy. And where in the text does Horace give an 
obvious indication that his authorial persona is a self-parody? Where does he openly 
                                               
149 “The first three satires of the book form a related group, and have more in common with, and owe more 
to the influence of, the Greek diatribe or philosophical street-sermon than any of the others; in each of 
them, Horace criticizes what he presents as a form of foolish extremism in human behavior” (Brown 1993: 
89). 
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destroy – not simply humorously poke at – his authority, which seems necessary for a 
purely comic portrayal? 
Thirdly, if the portrayal of the pater optimus is in fact entirely comical, as 
Freudenburg believes, it is rather striking that he is so effective in transferring his 
educational philosophy onto the authorial persona himself, who frequently employs 
exemplary discourse through the sermo and, indeed, supplies the pater optimus’ speech 
itself as an example of how he was taught, ironically reinforcing the concept of 
exemplis… notando (Hor. Sat. 1.4.106); as Brown writes: “The passage is reminiscent of 
Terence, where the stern father Demea describes his use of the same principle in his son’s 
moral education. But while this gives an extra dimension to Horace’s account, it does not 
follow that it owes more to literature than to life… whereas Horace’s father has employed 
this method with complete success, Demea, unknown to himself, has failed miserably, as 
his slave’s ironic praise in the passage serves to underline” (Brown 1993: 136). 
I think, in summary, Freudenburg’s interpretation of the authorial persona of 1.4 
is a reaction against criticisms of Horace which treat his satires as fundamentally 
instructive works. However, although admirably demonstrating some of the comic 
features of the persona, he has travelled perhaps a bit too far in refuting any real 
instructive function in the satire. Once again, I would call for a broader term than merely 
‘instruction’ to refer to the discourse of the Horatian teacher, such that we can account for 
the comic element at play in the sermo, as I shall discuss in the subsequent section. 
 Finally, Ellen Oliensis provides the most recent (1998) interpretation of how the 
authorial persona functions in Satire 1.4, which she endeavours to relate to the coherent 
persona she identifies across the Horatian oeuvre. Oliensis’ analysis is very much based 
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upon the social face of the persona in the Satires. For her the authorial persona ‘Horace’ 
can never really be distinguished from the historical writer, so that the Satires duly 
become a means by which Horace represents and manages his social face (Oliensis 1998: 
16-17). In Satire 1.4 this management takes the form of a rigorous defence of his own 
face: “This defence is already under way in the first three satires… but it is only in the 
fourth satire that Horace directly confronts his readers’ (imagined or actual) negative 
constructions… At the outset Horace seems to be responding to the charge that he abuses 
his satiric license by attacking the virtuous along with the vicious” (Oliensis 1998: 17). 
The defence is reflected by a series of disclaimers, by which ‘Horace’ seems to shirk his 
‘external’ social authority and responsibility, and ultimately, towards the end of the 
poem, seems to lay claim to a kind of private authority, as championed by the character 
of the pater optimus in the poem: “The disavowal of ambition also helps to motivate the 
inward turn that characterizes the satire’s final movement. No longer something that 
amuses or insults a more or less extended public, Horatian satire is now reconfigured as 
an essentially private and self-reflexive moral activity… As a grown man, the son 
dutifully internalizes his satiric father, becoming his own ever-present moral instructor” 
(Oliensis 1998: 23).  
The persona suggested by Oliensis then is a kind of self-reflecting instructor, who 
does not wish to be seen ostensibly lecturing others, represented by his apologetic 
discourse, but rather provides a model of morality, represented by his father, purely for 
his own sake. I do wonder, however, when reviewing her analysis, whether Oliensis is in 
fact not underestimating the playful tone inherent in the authorial persona’s self-
deprecation: there is a certain irony in, on the one hand, claiming that one speaks purely 
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for one’s own enlightenment and then, on the other, writing and publishing these 
sentiments for the explicit consumption of others. 
 I think it is fair generalization to say that most of the critics of Satire 1.4 have 
been grappling with the mixture of instruction and humour in the voice of this ‘teacher 
persona’. How do we resolve these two components? Do we, like Anderson, characterize 
the persona as a Socratic doctor, equating the humour with the kind of ironic instruction 
for which that particular philosopher was famous? Do we, like Freudenburg, reject the 
primacy of the instructive voice and instead locate a comical self-parodying authorial 
persona, the ‘doctor ineptus’? Or, like Oliensis, do we view the sermo as an entertaining 
refusal on the part of the Horatian persona of his social responsibility to instruct? In the 
following section I shall add my voice to the discussion by applying my third conceptual 
criterion of the Horatian Praeceptor, ‘play’, to how the ‘satirist’ persona (to employ 
Anderson’s locution) teaches in Satire 1.4. 
 
 
The Playful Satirist  
 
In our pursuit as critics to discover how the brand of humour employed by the satirist150 
functions in the poem, we need, rather than turning to Greek comedy, as Freudenburg 
does, or Plato’s characterizations of Socrates in his treatises, as Anderson, to turn to the 
satirist’s very characterization of his own discourse in this same sermo as iocosius (Hor. 
                                               
150 As I shall often refer to the authorial persona of 1.4 henceforth. 
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Sat. 1.4.104) – as ‘playful’ or ‘sportive’151. In the following study, by examining certain 
rhetorical devices and word puns, I shall suggest how the same playful humour which I 
endeavoured to locate in the language of the Ars Poetica may also be readily located in 
the voice of the satirist of 1.4. 
I commenced my study of the type of humour employed in the Ars by focusing on 
techniques which functioned through the creation of extremes. In particular, with 
reference to the opening verses of the poem concerned with the shaping of a Scyllan-
proportioned monster (lines 1-5), I examined how the Praeceptor was able to endorse his 
criticisms of what he considered inept works of art by providing hyperbolic ridiculous 
images in the text, from which both he as authorial persona and his reading audience 
could stand removed and make fun of. Just like in the Ars, the satirist persona of 1.4 
makes frequent usage of such comical hyperbole by poking fun at inept satirists in the 
text, turning them into physical spectacles, the objects of his jokes. For example, consider 
the following lines in which an overly derisory satirist, who spares no one in his ardent 
desire to furnish his works, is metamorphosed into a raging bull (Palmer 1968: 162): 
 
omnes hi metuunt versus, odere poetas. 
‘faenum habet in cornu; longe fuge: dummodo risum 
excutiat, sibi non, non cuiquam parcet amico; 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4 33-35) 
 
                                               
151 For my discussion of the Horatian concept of ‘play’, see my section ‘The Horatian Concept of the 
Praeceptor’. 
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Here this nameless hostile satirist is not even permitted the chance by the authorial 
persona to present himself on the stage of the sermo, as in the case of the profligate 
Crispinus earlier152, but is described in bull-like form, faenum habet in cornu (line 34): 
“[a] satirist is like a wicked ox, to whose horns a wisp of hay was tied as a warning that 
he was dangerous” (Palmer 1968: 162). This description is clearly a comical 
exaggeration, presented in the form of the exclamations of those who pass close to him, 
of the derisory satirist’s characteristic hostility towards others. He duly becomes the butt 
of the joke, a ridiculous creature to be avoided by us. 
 But it is not just such disreputable individuals as Crispinus and Fannius who are 
granted a rather ridiculous entrance into the sermo, even the esteemed Lucilius – who, as 
the satirist says, stems in the tradition of the genre from the masters of old comedy, hinc 
omnis pendet Lucilius (Hor. Sat. 1.4.6) – is presented somewhat peculiarly on stage. If we 
are to translate the text literally in terms of his physical description: firstly, he can be 
viewed wiping his nose clean – emunctae naris (Hor. Sat. 1.4. 8) – next we see him 
reciting verses while standing on one leg – versus dictabat stans pede in uno (Hor. Sat. 
1.4.10) – and, finally, he is described as flowing along muddily – cum flueret lutulentus 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4. 11). Certainly one would have to concede that the first two descriptions of 
Lucilius can possess positive metaphorical senses. emunctae naris (line 8) may denote in 
some cases a man of keen scent and thus sensitivity (Brown 1993: 128); or, perhaps more 
relevant to this satire, it may be used to describe a man who understands humour: 
“properly one with a well-wiped nose, hence, one who has that organ in a fit state for 
appreciating the ludicrous” (Palmer 1968: 158). And the expression stans pede in uno 
                                               
152 Crispinus’ bombastic language is comically compared by the satirist to ‘goat-skin bellows’, hircinis 
follibus auras (Hor Sat 1.4.19), and by metonymy ‘empty wind’ (Palmer 1968: 160). 
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(line 10) is proverbial in Latin for someone who can accomplish a given task with great 
facility (Wickham 1891: 50).  
Now had either of these descriptions of Lucilius been offered in isolation, I would 
have little reason to doubt the positive portrait created of the famous satirist; however, the 
combination of these two physical expressions with the obviously critical epithet 
lutulentus (line 11) does in my interpretation manufacture a burlesque image of the 
famous satirist: an absurd picture in the mind of the reader of a man standing on one leg 
in the middle of a muddy stream while picking his nose. Our laughter or, at the least, our 
bemusement at this bizarre portrait, manufactured by these mixed metaphors describing 
Lucilius, is accordingly utilized by the satirist persona to warn us of the vices of the 
Lucilian style – that is a certain crassness and coarseness in shaping his poetry, a lack of 
refinement, which is obviously built up and reflected in the uncouth physical description 
of the man:  
 
garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, 
scribendi recte: nam ut multum, nil moror. 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4. 12-13) 
 
So once again we can see how humour is important in endorsing the criticism and 
instructions of the satirist. In the above example it is also apparent that the authorial 
persona builds up a ridiculous picture in order to soften his ensuing criticisms. 
 On the subject of exaggerated discourse, I would like to consider the effect of 
exclamation on the surrounding narrative. I examined two notable instances in the Ars 
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Poetica (lines 291-294, 301-302) where the Praeceptor amusingly heightens the register 
of a passage when providing an instruction: in these examples the authorial persona is 
showing that he is cognizant of the fact that he is manifestly giving orders to his 
audience, that he is traversing instructive discourse, by deliberately going over-the-top 
for a brief portion of the narrative, making a scene of himself. Such comically self-
parodying speech rarely lasts for more than a few lines in the text – never so long, I 
believe, as to radically refute what has been uttered, but so as to simply poke fun at his 
own voice. So, similarly in 1.4, the satirist warns the readers against men who mock 
others behind their backs: 
 
absentem qui rodit amicum, 
qui non defendit alio culpante, solutos 
qui captat risus hominum famamque dicacis, 
fingere qui non visa potest, commissa tacere 
qui nequit, hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto. 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.81-85) 
 
The question then for the literary critic is whether the weighted anaphora – qui… qui… 
qui… qui… qui… hic… hunc (lines 81-85), the archaic vocative of address and ‘forensic’ 
future imperative – Romane, caveto (line 85), and the emphatic pronoun, tu (line 85), 
merely denote great solemnity in the prohibition, as both Palmer and Brown maintain, or 
whether they go a little too far, and so actually poke fun at the austerity of the speech. 
This is certainly not a facile question to solve, especially in the absence of the actual tone 
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of voice of the satirist, as in a recitation. However, I would firstly point to the emphatic 
juxtaposition of the personal pronoun, vocative of address, and imperative, which are all 
directed towards the second-person recipient, as exceedingly tautologous – to the extent 
that it draws unnecessary attention to itself. Moreover, one should also observe that this 
heightened register suffers an abrupt bathetic fall in the ensuing line, which resumes the 
standard conversational register of much of the poem in second person present tense, 
videas: 
 
saepe tribus lectis videas cenare quaternos, 
e quibus unus amet quavis aspergere cunctos 
praeter eum qui praebet aquam; 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4. 86-88) 
 
This sudden change in the register of voice from the solemn archaic imperative tone to 
present conversational should be surprising to us and mark out the solemnity as not a 
little ridiculous. 
 Next, in this discussion of sportive discourse within Satire 1.4, we should 
consider, as in my analysis of the Ars, how the satirist persona plays games with words or 
how he makes use of puns in the text. So after the opening 38 lines of the satire, in which 
the authorial persona enumerates some of the shortcomings of other writers in the genre, 
we are given a seemingly earnest refusal of poetic status on the part of the satirist (Hor. 
Sat. 1.4.39-40); however, as we proceed further along this personal ‘recusatio’, this self-
deprecation of poetic ‘ingenium’, it becomes less clear whether his refusal of status is to 
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be taken seriously or not; this culminates in a climactic passage which Ellen Oliensis 
describes as “a serpentine sentence that at once flaunts and disavows poetic ingenium” 
(Oliensis 1998: 19):  
 
his, ego quae nunc, 
olim quae scripsit Lucilius, eripias si 
tempora certa modosque et quod prius ordine verbum est 
posterius facias, praeponens ultima primis, 
non, ut si solvas ‘postquam Discordia taetra 
Belli ferratos postis portasque refregit’, 
invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae. 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.56-62) 
 
Here the deceptively-simplistic argument which the satirist persona is ostensibly 
presenting against a satiric work being considered ‘poetic’ may be paraphrased thus: “a 
man coming across the phrase “foul discord” would know he was dealing with a fragment 
of poetry; not so with the plain language of satire, which is distinguished from prose 
“merely” by meter and word order. Destroy these… and there’s not trace of poetry left” 
(Oliensis 1998: 19). True poetic ‘ingenium’ is thus defined by a high register, whereas 
satire is simply imitating the rhythm of poetry in a lower ‘unpoetic’ register. 
 However, when we match the language of the satirist up against his professions of 
what constitutes a poetic text, we notice a rather ironic disparity. As Oliensis remarks, 
while he is superficially renouncing poetic ingenium in his subject matter, he is at the 
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same time flaunting his poetic ability, specifically in the form of ‘compositio’, in the 
language (Oliensis 1998: 19). Let me now examine the arrangement of the Horatian 
language a little more closely. For the quintessential example of what comprises poetic 
language the satirist quotes a passage from Ennius, alluding to “the temple of Janus, 
whose doors were kept open in time of war” (Brown 1993: 132): postquam Discordia 
taetra / Belli ferratos postis portasque refregit (line 60-61). While the diction of this 
passage might be considered ‘elevated’, as opposed to the puris verbis (line 54) of satire, 
the word order is relatively simple, almost pedestrian: opening with a subordinate 
conjunction, followed by nominative subject with agreeing adjective, genitive, accusative 
objects, and verb in final sentence position (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 429-430). We 
are then persuaded to compare this language with the supposed ‘prose in versified form’ 
of the satirist. 
 What we should notice above all in the satirist’s discourse is the way in which he 
plays around with word order so that meaning is reflected through language. So, for 
example, we can observe when the satirist suggests to his readers to break up the regular 
quantities and rhythms of a given text  – eripias si / tempora certa modosque (lines 57-
58) – that he is actually himself breaking up, eripias, the rhythm here by, firstly, splitting 
a quite short clause over two verses and then by the implementation of hyperbaton in the 
first sentence position of the verb, the slight delay of the conditional conjunction, and the 
noun objects placed at the end (quite a different order from the passage of Ennius) 
(Wickham 1891: 54)153. Then, in the subsequent clause, in an elaboration of the previous 
sentiment, when the satirist asks that the reader invert his sentence such that the first 
word takes final position, and final first, we can witness a similar inversion or chiasmatic 
                                               
153 Again for standard word order, see Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 429-430. 
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structure in the language of the authorial persona in prius…posterius… ultima primis 
(line 58-59) where prius (line 58) moves from first sentence position, after the 
introductory conjunctions, to final in the form of the related adjective primis (line 59). 
And, thirdly, and perhaps most strikingly, there is the phrase, disiecti membra poetae 
(line 62), where again the metaphorical picture of a dismembered poet, signifying writing 
which has been torn apart, is displayed graphically in the hyperbaton of the noun, poetae 
(line 62), removed from its adjective, disiecti (line 62), as though these words were being 
pulled apart in the very text (Brown 1993: 132). 
 Indeed, it is worth noting, as Oliensis points out, that the metaphor of the 
physically dismembered text, augmented and enhanced by the ‘compositio’ of the satirist 
persona, by his artful weaving of words, is at once more powerful and perhaps ‘poetic’, 
we might say, than the revered text from Ennius: “Indeed, his sustained metaphor of the 
dismembered Orphean text far outdoes the obviously ‘poetic’ but relatively tame 
personification of Discord to which these lines purport to pay tribute” (Oliensis 1998: 
19). It is important to realize here that word play, such sportive language in the Horatian 
text, does not undermine the instructional aims of the passage but is actually a vital 
constituent within the satirist’s discourse as a teacher. The ironic contrast between what 
the authorial persona is stating and the form of his language is designed to teach the 
audience: to elicit their laughter at a superficial interpretation of what constitutes a poetic 
work, and so accordingly to broaden their appreciation by this very irony of how poetry is 
to be judged. 
Further examples of this witty word play in the satirist’s language may be found 
in his ironic refusal of poetic status: 
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agedum, pauca accipe contra. 
primum ego me illorum, dederim quibus esse poetis 
excerpam numero:  neque enim concludere versum 
dixeris esse satis; neque si qui scribat uti nos 
sermoni propiora, putes hunc esse poetam. 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.38-42) 
 
It has been suggested quite persuasively by Brown in his commentary on the sermo that 
the satirist’s language in this particular passage is quite intentionally designed to appear 
“awkward and ‘unpoetic’” (Brown 1993: 131). He is playfully trying to mimic the 
discourse of an ‘unpoetic’ writer in order to back up his claim that he ought not to be 
considered a poet (a claim which we take seriously at our own peril). This awkward 
‘unpoetic’ language is indicated firstly by the quite cumbersome overly emphatic 
juxtaposition of three pronouns, ego me illorum (line 39), at the beginning of the verse 
(Brown 1993: 131). And, secondly, less severe but still noticeable, there is a degree of 
hyperbaton in the sentence in the placement of the relative pronoun in the second 
sentence position after its verb, dederim (line 39)154, and in the separation of the genitive 
illorum (line 39) from its governing ablative numero (line 40)155, perhaps creating the 
impression of a man who does not know how to assemble his words fittingly (Brown 
1993: 131). 
                                               
154 “Interrogative Sentences begin with the interrogative, subordinate clauses with the leading particle or 
relative” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430). 
155 “A dependent Genitive usually follows the governing word” (Gildersleeve & Lodge 1903: 430). 
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 Following this passage, the satirist then gives an indication of the type of 
‘inspired’ person whom we might deem a true poet, as compared to the writers of comedy 
and satire, who are only poets by virtue of metre (Palmer 1968: 162): 
 
ingenium cui sit, cui mens divinior atque os 
magna sonaturum, des nominis huius honorem. 
(Hor. Sat. 1.4.43-44) 
 
Whereas in the previous narrative the satirist was imitating the discourse of an inept poet, 
now he is surging into a higher poetic register in order to indicate to the audience the type 
of language which is fitting for such poetry – and also, ironically, and quite intentionally, 
to show himself worthy of this particular view of how a ‘true’ poet should speak. Firstly, 
there is a tricolon arrangement, which is typical of high poetry such as epic, in the build 
up of the nouns – ingenium (line 43), mens divinior (line 43) and os / magna sonaturum 
(line 43-44) (Brown 1993: 131); the increase in syllable count in these nouns phrases – 4, 
5, and 7 – to give the appropriate climactic effect should be observed. Secondly, there is 
the rather ornate meto ymical employment of os (line 43), literally ‘a mouth’, to stand for 
a voice, rendered in prose Latin, for example by vox (Wickham 1891: 53). We can 
favourably compare this diction where the satirist is imitating epic or generally high 
poetry with a passage from the Ars Poetica, in which the Praeceptor gives an example of 
the inflated bombast typical of this kind of inspired poetry (Wickham 1891: 53)156: 
 
                                               
156 Other instances in which os is used to denote ‘a voice’ in speaking in the Horatian works (Regel 1836: 
212): Epist. 2.1.126, Ars P. 94, Carm. 4.2.8. 
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Grais ingenium, Grais dedit ore rotundo 
Musa loqui, praeter laudem nullius avaris. 
(Hor. Ars P. 323-324) 
 
Within this discussion of the authorial persona of Satire 1.4 I have presented other 
important critical interpretations of the model of the Horatian teacher: from Fraenkel’s 
simple notion of an instructor of the moral and aesthetic requirements of satire, to 
Anderson’s Socratic doctor, to Freudenberg’s doctor ineptus, and to Oliensis’ self-
reflecting instructor. These differing interpretations of how the ‘teacher figure’ functions 
in the sermo are to a large extent a result of how the critics perceive the humorous tone in 
the Horatian satire. Does the humour radically undermine the instructions of the satirist 
persona? Or does it perhaps constitute an instructive irony, leading us laughing towards 
the truth? My particular emphasis on ‘playful’ or ‘sportive’ humour in the language of the 
satirist, I hope, represents a move back towards a characteristically Horatian model of the 
Praeceptor, which we can find in the explicit statements of the sermo itself, rather than 
relating Horace’s text to what we find in Plato, or Greek comedy, or what we try recreate 
from the society, the historical circumstances of the Roman poet. 
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Epilogue 
 
At the start of this dissertation I posed the question as to whether a coherent Praeceptor 
persona could be identified in the Ars Poetica of Horace. It ought to be clear at this stage 
that my response to this is an emphatic ‘yes’. I have endeavoured to illustrate in this 
dissertation how the various types of discourse which the authorial persona employs 
manage to fulfil certain criteria – instruction, demonstration, and play – which form the 
Horatian concept of the Praeceptor. 
 I hope that, even if my specific conceptual criteria were in one way or another to 
be rejected, my analysis represents a step in the right direction in constructing a 
characteristically Horatian concept of the teacher or praeceptor figure in the Ars Poetica, 
as well as perhaps in other more instructive sermones such as Satire 1.4 and 1.10. This 
method seems far more preferable to me than approaches to limit Horace’s originality 
and artistry by measuring the Ars against a fixed genre such as the ‘didactic poem’. The 
assumption in such analyses is that there are certain fixed textual markers which 
comprise a genre and render a literary work essentially ‘didactic’ or not. Frequently, as I 
discussed with refere ce to Volk’s analysis of ‘didactic poetry’ (which I have placed in 
inverted commas to express my doubt over the validity of this genre in general for 
interpretations of ancient literature), the Ars, deemed too poetic and conversational in 
style, fails to pass the critical test of what is supposed to be ‘didactic’. 
 Such interpretations, I believe, are guilty of a far too rigorous scientific approach 
to the question of whether a literary work endeavours to ‘teach’ or not, negating the 
multiple different means by which this task may be brought about. In Horace’s 
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conception of the teacher, we are given a far more liberal classification of the task of the 
Praeceptor: certainly straightforward didactic instruction is part of his role, vice (line 
304), to transfer his subject to his pupils, the Pisones and the implied literary audience; 
however, he is also concerned with demonstration, with clarifying his precepts through 
illustrations in his text, as well as with play, whereby his language is designed to soften 
the instructive force of his discourse and to gently coax his pupils in the right direction. 
These last two criteria, as I showed in my analysis of the discourse of the Ars Poetica, 
allow the Horatian authorial persona to engage in poetic structures and to utilize artistic 
techniques in his poem, while still serving to teach in the broader sense which he has 
allowed for this process. 
 If I were ultimately compelled to suggest a succinct generic designation for the 
Ars Poetica – seeing that critics will inevitably try to situate the work with respect to 
Horace’s other poetic efforts as well as to those of his contemporaries – I would classify 
it under the rubric of ‘educational sermo’. The term ‘educational’ in the modern sense, as 
I discussed earlier in this dissertation with reference to Peters’ work in the analytical 
philosophy of education, would tend to signify a broader scope for the role of the teacher 
than simply ‘instruction’; while, clearly in form and in its treatment of its addressees, 
Horace’s Ars Poetica, as Frischer points out, comes closer to some of his satiric 
sermones, such as 1.4 and 1.10, than his epistles.  
 
 
------------------------------ 
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